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The current research explored two aspects of intergroup relations. The first explored intergroup 
approaches of Multiculturalism (i.e., focus on similarities and differences) and Common Identity 
(i.e., focus on group commonalities) and whether these would reduce Intergroup Bias and 
simultaneously increase support for Collective Action towards Pakistani-British ethnic group. It 
was also hypothesised that political liberals would show less bias and more support for Collective 
Action than conservatives, and that perceived threat would mediate this relationship. Contrary to 
predictions, in comparison to Multiculturalism, a Commonality-focus reduced bias and increased 
support for collective action in Experiment 1 but was not reliably replicated in Experiments 2 and 
3. However, political orientation and perceived threat consistently supported our hypotheses. The 
second section examined the Uncertainty-Threat model as potential explanation for mediating the 
observed Political Ideology effects in relation to immigrants. Across Studies 4 through 6, more 
liberalism was related to less negative bias and less implicit bias towards immigrants. Both 
increased Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance mediated the Political Ideology to Bias 
relationships. Overall the research has shown potential for future exploration of simultaneous 
effects of Common Identity on bias reduction and Collective Action, and consistent evidence for 
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION OF BIAS REDUCTION APPROACHES, 
WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGES IN SUPPORT FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION, POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND PERCEIVED THREAT. 
 
1.1  Introduction. 
An ethnically and culturally diverse post-World War II British society is composed of a 
mix of languages, nationalities, religions, and races through the arrival of immigrants. Ethnic 
diversity has become more noticeable in the United Kingdom in recent decades (Office for 
National Statistics/ONS, 2012) and this diversity and multiculturalism have been perceived in 
contrasting ways. Generally, these may have positive effects on a country’s economy (for 
example Canada; Heibert, 2016), and culture with an introduction of a variety of foreign cultural 
festivals, traditional foods, products and languages to make the local culture more vibrant and 
socially enriched (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004), but on the other hand, may also be perceived as 
a threat to the national identity in addition to social and cultural values (Card, 2005; Craig, 
Rucker, & Richeson, 2018; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012; Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010; 
Verkuyten, 2009). Such conflicting perceptions towards ethnic minorities and immigrants within 
multicultural and multiethnic societies may encourage negative stereotypes or biased reactions 
and may produce intergroup tensions (Craig et al., 2018; Licata & Klein, 2002; Outten, Schmitt, 
Miller, & Garcia, 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Valentine & McDonald, 2004).  
According to a recent briefing report by the University of Oxford (Blinder & Allen, 
2016), the results of a public opinion survey showed that 56 % of the British respondents chose 
the option “reduced a lot” in response to a question “Do you think the number of immigrants to 
Britain nowadays should be ...?”. This briefing report further described that the British majority 
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picked up immigration as the top social and political issue being faced by the British people 
(34%) among five other issues such as the EU/Europe (31%), the National Health Service (NHS, 
31%), the economy (30%), housing (22%), and defence/international terrorism (19%). The 
authors also considered that the underlying factors could possibly be the cultural and economic 
undermining due to increasing immigration. 
A research study by Tip, Zagefka, Gonzalez, Brown, Cinnirela and Na, (2012) examined 
the attitudes of the British majority groups (e.g., students sample from universities in a diverse 
city; London and from a university in located in less diverse city of England) regarding their 
perceptions of how the minority groups adapt to British culture (i.e., acculturation preferences) 
and how the perceived identity threat might potentially affect their support for MC. They tested 
their hypotheses in three studies towards Pakistani-immigrants (studies 1 & 2) and members of 
ethnic minority (study 3) through survey questions. They explored as if members of minority 
group will maintain their indigenous culture, this would affect support for MC negatively, but if 
they adopt British culture the effect will be reversed. They also predicted that the British majority 
groups may support MC positively if they perceive the minority groups show willingness to 
contact the British people. The results indicated that if the immigrant groups preferred to adhere 
to their individual cultural values, the British majority showed less support for Multiculturalism 
(MC), therefore this effect was mediated by threat to the perceived British identity. The effect 
was reversed if the Pakistani-immigrants and people of ethnic minority (i.e., non-specified ethnic 
group) wished to adopt the British culture and desired to be in contact with British people (Tip et 
al., 2012). The researchers concluded that the perceptions of majority members towards the 
minority members rely on their acculturation preferences.  
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More specifically, in the recent British Social Attitude 31st report (Park, Bryson, & 
Curtice 2014), it was found that most of the British public still tend to show negative attitudes 
towards ethnic groups and immigrants. In light of more negativity toward diversity and the 
increasing ethnic and cultural diversity within the United Kingdom/UK (ONS, 2012), it is 
important to check that the social policies are sufficiently supported by evidence for their 
effectiveness in reducing intergroup biases, in helping to maintain strong intercultural relations, 
and with encouraging support for reducing disadvantages of ethnic communities. To achieve this 
aim, this thesis has tested various intergroup strategies including Multiculturalism (MC) and 
Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) with and without highlighting subgroup identities 
(CWO); it tested their effectiveness in reducing attitude bias and generating support for collective 
action towards ethnic minorities and immigrants, and the relationship to the political ideology. 
 Immigration and development of ethnic minorities in the UK.  
Immigration in the United Kingdom has a long history including a recent history of 
immigration and a more ancient history of invasion and immigration of Romans, Anglo-Saxons, 
Vikings, and Normans from Europe. It also, however, includes non-European immigration 
beginning in the 19th century with the settlement of ex-army men and arrival of job seeker 
immigrants from ex-British colonies (Migration Watch UK, 2014). In the post-World War II era, 
particularly in 1950s till 1960s, people from Europe (e.g., Irish, German war prisoners, 
Ukrainian, Polish, Hungarian, and Italian labourers) and from Commonwealth countries (e.g., 
Indian, Pakistani and Caribbean labourers) migrated to UK to fill labour jobs in British 
manufacturing industries to help the economy recover (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/). 
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These early immigrants, who have been permanently settled for decades in the UK British 
citizenship, however, still fall under the category of an ethnic minority, and are often still 
considered as immigrants. The research community and policymakers hardly agree on one 
definition of ethnicity due to its changing categories over time. However, in general terms an 
ethnic minority group is defined as an ethnic group is a collectivity within a larger population 
having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, and a cultural focus upon 
one or more symbolic elements which define the group’s identity, such as kinship, religion, 
language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. Members of an ethnic group are 
conscious of belonging to an ethnic group (Bulmer, 1996). Further, Modood, Berthoud, Lakey, 
Nazroo, Smith, Virdee and Beishon, (1997) defined British ethnic minority groups as a 
community with “common heritage” among its group members which distinguishes ‘us’ from 
‘them’. They also identified ethnicity as a “multi-faceted phenomenon” comprising of “physical 
appearance, subjective identification, cultural and religious affiliation, stereotyping, and social 
exclusion” (Modood et al., 1997, p.13).    
The Office for National Statistics initially operationalized a uniform ethnic minority 
categorization across England and Whales that included following aspects such as: 
• Country of birth 
• Nationality 
• Language spoken at home 
• Parent’s country of birth 
• Skin colour 
• National/geographical origin 





However, ONS has recently replaced following ethnic categories for England (and 
other regions too) in the Government Social Surveys to collect harmonised data (Version 
3.3; ONS, 2015): 
 
Choose one option that best describes your ethnic group or background 
White 
1. English / Welsh / Scottish / Northern Irish / British 
2. Irish 
3. Gypsy or Irish Traveller 
4. Any other White background, please describe 
 
Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups 
5. White and Black Caribbean 
6. White and Black African 
7. White and Asian 
8. Any other Mixed / Multiple ethnic background, please describe 
 





13. Any other Asian background, please describe 
 
Black / African / Caribbean / Black British 
14. African 
15. Caribbean 
16. Any other Black / African / Caribbean background, please describe 
 
Other ethnic group 
17. Arab 





The above ONS categorisations gives a glimpse of the ethnic diversity and multicultural 
communities of Britain and it shows that British ethnic minorities gather from all over the globe 
to contribute to its ethnic diversity. The figure below shows the ethnic population of England and 
Wales (2011). 
 




As the ONS census data (2012) revealed, the non-UK born population has had a 7% 
population growth rate since 2001 and the percentage of ethnic minorities also doubled between 
1991 and 2011 from 6% to 13% of the total population. One of these groups is the Pakistani-
British group who had migrated from Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s and settled here 
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permanently. This group, with a population over 1.12 million, is now among the top three largest 
non-UK born minority groups following India and Poland, and one of the fastest growing with an 
increase of 157% since 2001 (ONS, 2012). These facts provide one of the grounds for our 
selection of the Pakistani-British ethnic minority group as a target group in our research. 
The generations of British-born Pakistanis are bilingual, yet they prefer to communicate 
in the English language. In addition, 91.45% of Pakistani-British people identify themselves as 
Muslims. Pakistani-British Muslims account for 38% of the overall British Muslim population 
(ONS, 2012). The Muslim identity makes Pakistani-British Muslim community as a Non-
normative (a group that is seen to deviate from ingroup norms, e.g., British norms of 
superordinate or majority group; see Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Wenzel, 
Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). This distinction provides another basis for our selection of 
Pakistani-British community as a target group. 
According to the ONS UK census data (2012), Pakistani-British people are located all 
over the UK, but they are densely populated in England, particularly in London (2.7%), 
Birmingham (13.5%), Manchester (3.8%), Bradford (16.1%), Nottingham (5.48%) and Luton 
(14.4 %) as per local population percentage. In Scotland, they are mostly found in Glasgow (3.78 
%). The Pakistani-British community represents all the regions and provinces of Pakistan (e.g., 
Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) 
predominantly from Muzaffarabad (capital of AJK) and Mirpur; Mirpuri contribute to the 60% of 
the total British-Pakistani community). The Mirpuri community migrated from the Mirpur district 
of AJK (i.e., 250 villages and small towns with a population of 140,000) due to dislocation of 
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their villages caused by the construction of Mangla Dam on the river Jehlum in Pakistan during 
the 1960s. 
However, the Socio-Economic Status (SES) of Pakistani-British community has been 
comparatively lower than other ethnic communities such as Indians and Blacks. This aspect was 
evident in the recent report of Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC, 2016), which 
found that the socio-economic status of the Pakistani-British community was under poverty 
ratings at 43.9%, as compared with Black (39.9%), Indian (24.6%), and White-British (17.2%). 
The report further found an increased mean deprivation score (Deprivation is the consequence of 
a lack of income and other resources, which cumulatively can be seen as living in poverty within 
a certain area, see EHRC, 2016, p. 29) in 2012/13 among the working-age Pakistani-British, 
Black and ‘Other’ as compared with their White-British fellow citizens. A similar effect was seen 
in ethnic minority households with children and higher rates of children of Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
living in substandard accommodation (28.6%) than White (18.6%). Further, according to the 
EHRC (2016) report, in 2012/13 the Pakistani/Bangladeshi community had seen higher rates of 
over-crowded housing (21.7%) than White people (3.4%). The chair of the commission, David 
Isaac had shown concern in this report over the inequality in the education, employment, 
healthcare, policing and other service areas between the ethnic groups and the native White-
British people and called it as “worrying”. He further emphasized the urgent need for a 
“comprehensive and coherent race strategy” to overcome inequality. Yet, such concerns and 
disparities in the socio-economic status of the ethnic minorities in general, but particularly 




On the other hand, despite the comparatively low SES difference between White-British 
and Paksiatni-British families, there was no difference observed at GCSE education level among 
the children of Pakistani-British families compared with the national average of grades A* to C 
except deficient performance in English and Mathematics in some regions outside of London. 
According to the Department of Education GCSE data (Briefing on ethnicity and educational 
attainment, 2012) in 2012, 46.5% of Pakistani-British students achieved five or more A* to C 
grades, which exceeded the national average of 36.3% in England & Wales. The recent 
generations of Pakistani-British people had increased rate of earning an undergraduate degree 
that was 18% higher than their parents and grandparents (MacInnes, Tinson, Hughes, Born, & 
Aldridge, 2015). This young generation also holds a 27.6% higher education/degree level 
qualification (ONS, 2012) and since 2006 their university admissions have risen from 8,460 to 
15,015 in 2015 (UCAS, 2015), irrespective of the fact that the Pakistani-British students (and 
Black, Indian and Bangladeshis) had fewer chances of offers to be accepted by the prestigious 
universities (Higher Education Funding Council for England, 2005). Such figures of increased 
number of students achieving higher grades in GCSE results and further entering in the 
universities however do not show a simultaneous increase in the social economic status (SES) of 
the Pakistani-British community hence leave them to be socially and financially disadvantaged 
minority group. This situation is often credited to the prejudiced attitudes towards ethnic 
applicants as compared to their White-British counterparts (Noden, Shiner & Modood, 2014). 
Though Pakistani-British university graduates have a higher percentage of degree level 
qualification (27.6%) than White-British (26.8%) (EHRC, 2016; England only), their 
unemployment ratio is twice as large as White-British graduates (e.g., 5.9% versus 2.3% for 
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White graduates; TUC, 2016; EHRC, 2016 England only). Overall, the Pakistani-
British/Bangladeshi ethnic group had the highest unemployment (17.3%), whereas, White - 
British were only 6.3% unemployed in 2013 (EHRC, 2016; England only). A similar trend has 
been observed in Wales and Scotland (EHRC, 2016). Furthermore, the Muslims community 
seems to have faced higher rates of unemployment across England, Wales and Scotland (EHRC, 
2016). The literature reviewed above with reference to the social and economic disparities of 
ethnic minorities including Pakistani-British group as compared with the White-British people 
provides strong foundations to select the Pakistani-British people and/or immigrants to examine 
the attitudinal bias against them in our research. 
  Prevalence of Bias and British Policies. 
Britain has promoted equality since the abolition of the slave trade in 1807; however, the 
Alien Restriction Act of 1905 (UK Parliament, 1905) was introduced to restrict the religiously 
persecuted Jewish immigrants who fled from Russia and Eastern Europe. Later British 
governments devised the “Alien Restriction Act (UK Parliament, 1914)” and the “British 
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act (UK Parliament, 1914)” to further curtail the immigrants. 
Despite these efforts, immigrant flow continued during World War I and II. The anti-prejudice 
legislation also started in the 1960s and the Race Relations Acts (UK Parliament, 1965, 1968, & 
1976) were implemented as policy guidelines to encourage equality between minorities and the 
local communities in the provision of public services, housing, employment and guidelines for 
police to ensure equality. Most recently, the Race Relations Amendment Act (UK Parliament, 
2000) and the Equality Act (UK Parliament, 2010) have been introduced with further policy 
guidelines to improve circumstances. 
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Within the European context that includes the UK, minorities, often immigrants, have 
frequently experienced prejudice and discrimination particularly during economic pitfalls (Kuntz, 
Davidov, & Semyonov, 2017; Zick, Pettigrew & Wagner, 2008). Economic disparities have 
pushed them to live in the isolated communities with minimal interaction with the native 
majority. Fewer employment opportunities and lower wages as compared to the local/native 
Europeans further added to the disadvantaged status of the ethnic groups (Davidov & Samyonov, 
2017; Glikman & Semyonov, 2012; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017; Mallon, 2017; Musterd, 
2005). For example, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2017) analysed data from five European Social 
Surveys (ESS, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 & 2010), and selected nine EU member countries 
(Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, 
and Sweden) who welcomed mainstream immigration flow following WWII (i.e., World War II) 
but varied in immigration and integration policies. The purpose of the analysis of such 
widespread data was to explore whether the immigration status (i.e., the early generation of 
immigrants or their generation born and brought up in Europe, ) of the Non-European residents 
influenced their integration into the economic conditions (i.e., labour market) in the same way as 
the native Europeans, including women. The results showed that the comparison was similar 
across countries, regardless of their country-specific immigration and labour integration policies 
yet the Non-EU immigrant generation (both men and women) remained more disadvantaged than 
even the European immigrants in seeking employment. The results discussed the nine 
representative countries still face the issue of economically disadvantaged and unemployed Non-
EU immigrants who often have fewer chances to enter into the mainstream economic activity, 
often as a result of employement discrimination towards their ethnicity by prioritising the EU 
nationals, and also non-consideration of their skills and professional caliber as equivalent to the 
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native Europeans (see Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, & Manning, 2010; Carlsson & Rooth, 2007; 
Derous, Peperman & Ryan, 2017; Grubanov-Boskovic, Natale & Scipioni, 2017; Oreopolous, 
2011). 
In general, the experience of negative attitudes by the non–European minorities has been 
analogous throughout Europe and the UK, and these negative attitudes have been explained as 
due to a cultural, economic or safety threat and their involvement in criminal activities (Ceobanu, 
2011; Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013; Schoon & Anderson, 2017; Stephan, Ybarra, & 
Bachman, 1999; Zick, Pettigrew & Wagner, 2008). The recent wave of Islamic terrorist attacks in 
various European cities, such as the Madrid bombing (2004), London bombing (2005), Paris 
attack (2015), the Nice, France truck attack (2016), and  Manchester arena attack and London 
Bridge attack (2017) have further inflamed the anti-Muslim hostility with decreased willingness 
to stand for action towards them within Europe (Meuleman, Abts, Sloothmaeckers & Meeusen, 
2018; Van der Noll, Saroglou, Latour & Dolezal, 2018). Negative attitudes expressed by the 
native majorities might also be linked with minority and immigrant groups being more of a 
concern among British and European local population, particularly during recent economic 
downfall where unemployment and scarcity of financial opportunities was attributed to the arrival 
of immigrants (Boeri, 2010; Facchini &  Mayda, 2012; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, & Yun, 2013; 
Hatton, 2015; Mocan & Raschke; 2016; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Salamońska, 2016; 
Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Vezzali & Giovannini, 2011). 
In this context, Birkelund, Chan, Ugreninov, Midtbøen, and  Rogstad (2018) compared 
two field experimental studies (i.e., conducted seven to eight months pre and four to five months 
post terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011) in order to see the effects of terrorist attacks on the 
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employability of ethnic minorities within the Norwegian city of Oslo. They used typical Pakistani 
names compared to typical Norwegian names in the job applications. The call for interview rates 
decreased for Pakistani applicants after the attacks (e.g., 2010 = 12% and 2011 = 11%) although 
the attacker was a Jewish person with anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim intentions. However, the 
results suggested that modern Norway has not yet achieved racial equality regardless of its liberal 
and immigrant-friendly policy claims. At a broader level, the results suggested the impact of 
terrorism on attitudes (see for example US studies; Huddy et al., 2002; Traugott, Brader, Coral, 
Curtin, Featherman, Groves, Hill, Jackson, Juster, Kahn, Kennedy, Kinder, Pennell, Shapiro, 
Tessler, Weir, & Willis, 2002; Netherlands, Boomgaarden & de Vreese , 2007; Germany, 
Schuller, 2016; Sweden, Aslund & Rooth, 2005) and its association with Muslims (i.e., 
represented through several terrorist attacks and EU and American anti-terrorism policies) which 
resulted in the similar discriminatory results pre and post-attacks. Birkelund et al., (2018) 
concluded that these results contradicted some local surveys (e.g., Jakobsson & Blom, 2014) 
claiming progressive attitudinal changes among Norwegian population towards immigrants and 
Muslims following the attacks. 
Various ethnic minority groups have reported the experiences of similar discriminations 
in either securing a job or working at the job; according to the End Racism survey report (2013) 
by the Runnymede Trust UK, 3 out of 5 British ethnic minority groups (Black-Caribbean, Black-
African and Pakistani-British) reported discrimination in the fields of education and in job 
seeking and working, and with integration into mainstream society as compared to native White-
British people. The survey results revealed that prejudice was associated with the development of 
discrimination towards ethnic minorities in the process of seeking a job or working at a job. The 
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results of End Racism survey (2013) further found that 33% of Black-Caribbeans, 28% of Black-
Africans, and 23% of Pakistanis reported experiencing discrimination while seeking a job. 
However, the discrimination rates were even higher while working on the jobs for Black-
Caribbean (44%), Black-African (40%) and Pakistanis (35%) as compared to the only 3% for 
White- British. The survey further reported that the children of Gypsy, Roma, and Irish travelers 
were more prone to be excluded from schools as compared to their local fellows (see Exely, 
2016). Yet the most recent British Social Attitude Survey (BSAS, Kelly, Khan & Sharrok, 2017) 
has observed stability in the prejudiced attitudes of White-British towards ethnic minorities 
showing 26% very or very little racially prejudiced, with being 25% in thirty years prior. 
The BSAS (Kelly et al., 2017) has further found that one in every four British people has 
shown prejudice by considering other races as “less intelligent”. The survey also reported three 
groups with higher prejudice than many other groups, such as at the political level, the 
conservative party followers have been found to report more bias (33%) than the labour party 
(18%). Men showed more racial bias (29%) than women (23%), and 34% leave voters in the 
Brexit referendum (2016) found themselves racially prejudiced as compared to the 18% remain 
voters. These figures portray the patterns of prejudices and biases among various British social 
groups and their impact on the social and political relationships among the different communities; 
for example, the campaign and the results of Brexit (2016) indicated their attitudes towards 
immigrants (Wadsworth, Dhingra, Ottaviano, & Reenen, 2016). 
According to the recent ethnicity facts and figures of 2016/17 published in 2018 by the 
Home Office on the gov.uk website, 29 out of 1000 Black people were stopped and searched by 
Police in England and Wales in 2016/17 as compared to the 4 out of 1000 White British people. 
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Thus, Black people are stopped and searched eight times as often as White residents, while 
Asians are stopped and searched three times as often. Yet, the percentage of White and Black 
people within England and Wales who are arrested after a stop and search is similar (9.9% of 
White people and 8.6% of Black people), which indicates that the additional stops and searches 
are unwarranted (Tankebe & Ariel, 2016; Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2013; UK 
Ministry of Justice, 2010). Following increased anti-immigrant sentiments after the Brexit 
referendum (2016), the Home Office urged to review the safety and police practices towards 
handling these incidents by further ensuring secured and improved reporting opportunities by the 
most vulnerable immigrants i.e., asylum seekers, refugees, religious groups etc. who feel 
reluctant to report such experiences due to their immigration/visa status. 
Recently in the press release of the Runnymede Trust (2016) following the UN 
Convention on Human Rights, Geneva (2016), the Trust argued in their report that the 
colourblind (i.e., an intergroup approach focusing on the group similarities only) approach of the 
government appeared as a failure to conform to the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (UN-CERD, 2016) as well as to overcome the racial inequalities in Britain. 
Further to this, the Home Office 2016/17 report (O'Neill, 2017), found a “29 % increase in 
overall hate crimes (i.e., Race, Religion, Sexual Orientation, Disability, and Transgender) since 
2016 with 27 % based on race hate crimes only. The Home Office report (2017) further stated 
that “This is the largest annual percentage increase seen since the Home Office series began in 
2011/12” (O'Neill, 2017, p. 4). However, Home Office credited these figures to the 
improvements in the recording of the case reporting practices by the security agencies. 
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The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (UN-
CERD, 2016) report of UK and Ireland also showed serious concerns over the racist hate speech 
and hate crimes following Brexit referendum (2016). The commission report concluded (article 
15, p.4),  
“The Committee is seriously concerned at the sharp increase in the number of racist 
hate crimes especially in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in the weeks prior to and 
following the referendum on the membership of the European Union held on 23 June 2016. In 
particular, the Committee is deeply concerned that the referendum campaign was marked by 
divisive, anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric, and that many politicians and prominent 
political figures not only failed to condemn it, but also created and entrenched prejudices, 
thereby emboldening individuals to carry out acts of intimidation and hate towards ethnic or 
ethno-religious minority communities and people who are visibly different. The Committee 
remains concerned that despite the recent increase in the reporting of hate crimes, the problem 
of underreporting persists, and the gap between reported cases and successful prosecution 
remains significant. As a result, a large number of racist hate crimes seem to go unpunished. It 
also remains concerned at the negative portrayal of ethnic or ethno-religious minority 
communities, immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees by the media in the State party, 
particularly in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, as well as the rise of racist hate speech on the 
Internet. Notwithstanding these challenges, the Committee regrets that the State party continues 
to maintain its interpretative declaration on article 4 of the Convention (arts. 2, 4 and 6)”. 
The report (UN-CERD, 2016) further expressed concerns and dissatisfaction about the 
lack of implementation of UN-CERD codes towards ethnic groups and recommended the British 
Government to improve the following main areas;  




• to devise a national action plan to eradicate discrimination against African descent,  
• to invest the human and financial resources to improve the health, education, employment 
and housing of the Gypsy, Traveller and Roma community,  
• to take careful consideration of the ethnic suspects before the stop and search and review 
the impact of the implementation of such powers,  
• to thoroughly investigate the overrepresentation of Black and Ethnic minority in criminal 
cases to eradicate ‘racial prejudice and bias in criminal justice system’,  
• and also design a humanitarian immigration detention policy by providing access to justice, 
• take special measures to overcome ‘unemployment, occupational segregation and 
discriminatory practices in recruitment, salaries, promotion and other employment 
conditions’ among ethnic groups in the UK (UN-CERD, 2016, p.8). 
 
Related to this context, the academic literature, however, shows that such bias might be 
related to perceived threats. Research by Tip and colleagues (2012) has demonstrated that the 
majority White population in Britain may think of ethnic minorities as a cultural threat if they 
show an inclination to follow their own cultural values, instead of completely assimilating to 
British culture. The underlying explanation of this negative view of outgroups (e.g., Black, 
Pakistani, immigrant, etc.) may be the perceived violation or difference from core norms, values, 
or traditions of the superordinate identity group (i.e., British); if White-British people consider 
themselves as more prototypical of being British than non-white people, they may be more prone 
to experiencing threats from these outgroups, especially if they consider those outgroups more 
non-normative. This hypothesis has been supported by various researchers such as Waldzus and 
Mummendey, (2004), Wenzel, Mummendey and Waldzus (2007), Yogeeswaran and Dasgupta 
(2010), and Yogeeswaran, Dasgupta, and Gomez, (2012) in the USA among White and Black 
Americans. The British Social Attitude Survey 34th report (2017) provided further support by 
showing that changes in attitude from 2002 – 2014 among British people about their impressions 
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of the immigration as “undermining British culture” has risen six points from 32% to 38% 
(Elizabeth, Curtice, & Harding, 2017).  
As reported by Valentine and McDonald (2004), White-British participants expressed 
more explicit bias towards Asians (particularly Muslims) with concerns over their lack of 
integration in British society and their appeals for more mosques. They also show apprehensions 
about them as a threat to peace (e.g., potential terrorists) and over their persistent use of their own 
languages. However, surprisingly these concerns were culture-specific in nature and less strong 
for Black and other ethnic minorities as compared to Muslims which may indicate signs of 
Islamophobia among White-British following the 9/11 incident and other recent attacks. Such 
effects were widespread and attitude towards Muslims are more negative now than in the past 
across Europe with decreasing tolerance towards them (see Adesina & Marocico, 2015; Erisen & 
Kentmen-Cin, 2017; Hellwig & Sinno, 2017).  
1.2  How is bias defined? 
Bias is a positive or negative evaluation towards a person, or a group, based on their 
individual or group characteristics of race, sex or religion (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; 
Fiske, 1998; Nelson, 2002). Bias has been expressed in many forms, for example; overt/explicit 
and implicit/indirect. 
 Explicit Bias 
Bias can be measured directly or explicitly, or it can be measured indirectly, or implicitly, 
and the type of measurement may have different repercussions for behaviour (e.g., Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 
2009; Leitner, Hehman & Snowden, 2018; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017; Wang-Jones, Hauson, 
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Ferdman, Hattrup & Lowman, 2018). Explicit bias refers to the overt and blatant expression of a 
biased attitude towards any group or its members and is usually assessed through direct or 
explicit questions about one’s attitude (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). This type of bias 
has declined for some societal groups, such as towards the Black community due to social 
pressures (Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, 2011; Burke, Dovidio, Przedworski, Hardeman, Perry, 
Phelan, & Van Ryn, 2015; Dovidio & Gaertner; 2009), and being ethically unacceptable 
(Drakulich, 2015; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo & Krysan, 1997) followed by policy guidelines and 
lawmaking on race relations in America and Europe including Britain (e.g., Race Relations 
Amendment Act, UK, 2010). Besides the decline in explicit bias, intergroup conflict, however, 
did not significantly reduce (Dovidio, Gaertner & Pearson, 2017). During the 2008 Presidential 
elections of United States of America (USA), voters with explicit bias were less likely to vote for 
Barack Obama and more likely to vote for John McCain, and after controlling for explicit bias, 
people with more implicit bias against Black people were less likely to vote for Obama (Payne, 
Krosnick, Pasek, Lelkes, Akhtar, & Tompson, 2010). Further to this, the Associated Press poll 
(AP, 27 October 2012) reported that during the first term of President Barack Obama, there was a 
51% rise in anti-black racial bias compared to a 2008 poll. Recently in England and Wales, there 
has been a 78% rise in recorded race hate crimes since the Brexit year of 2016-2017 (O’Neill, 
2017). Similar trends were observed in the attitudes of White-Americans towards ethnic 
candidates and towards the increasing ethnic diversity, this increase in perceived threat may have 
convinced the voters to vote Trump in the 2016 Presidential US elections (Major, Blodorn & 
Blascovich, 2016).  
Explicit bias is not observed only towards people of different races or ethnicities (e.g., 
Black people, Branton & Jones 2005; Lydecker, O’Brien & Grilo, 2018; Meuleman et al., 2018). 
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It has also been expressed toward people with disabilities (e.g., Murch, Choudhury, Wilson, 
Collerton, Patel & Scior, 2018; Ottoboni, Milani, Setti, Ceciliani, Chattat, & Tessari, 2017), 
immigrants (Falomir – Pichastor & Fredric, 2013; Roth, Grace, McCool, Ma, Amageldinova, 
Schena, & Williams, 2018; Stephan, Yabarra & Bachman, 1999), Muslims (Disha, Cavendish & 
King, 2011;  Haque, Tubbs, Kahumoku-Fessler & Brown, 2018; Hutchison & Rosenthal, 2011; 
Mansouri & Vergani, 2018; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008), and communities with non-normative 
sexual orientation--Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender people (LGBTs; Boldry-Arterburn, 
2002; Nama, MacPherson, Sampson & McMillan, 2017). Such negative attitudes had been a 
great hindrance in school’s desegregation (Laurence, Schmid, Rae & Hewstone, 2018; McAvay 
& Safi, 2018; Simon & Beaujeu, 2017; Wang & Ramsden, 2018), yet the understanding that 
explicit bias is becoming less acceptable, has initiated efforts to bridge the gap among 
communities through integration and frequent interaction within policy-making process for 
minority groups, (Dovidio et al, 2002; Dovidio, Love, Schellhaas, & Hewstone, 2017).  
 Measures of Explicit Bias. 
As discussed previously, explicit bias is a subjective expression of an attitude towards an 
outroup and is usually measured using self-report questionnaires and other self-reporting methods 
such as interviews. This type of measurement involves the deliberative and conscious retrieval of 
responses built on beliefs and experiences about outgroups (Dovidio et al., 2002; Greenwald et 
al., 2009; McCartan. Elliot, Pagani, Finnegan & Kelly; 2018). McCartan, Elliott, Pagani, 
Finnegan, and Kelly, (2018) studied the effects of explicit bidimensional attitudes (i.e., negative 
and positive dimensions of explicit attitudes) and implicit bidimensional attitudes (i.e., negative 
and positive dimensions of implicit attitude) on the prediction of the speeding behaviour of the 
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drivers using Implicit Association Test (IAT) and self-reported questionnaires. Two weeks after 
the administration of the IAT and the self-reported measure, the drivers were tested on a driving 
simulator to examine their behaviour towards the speed. They observed a stronger correlation, r = 
.70 between the explicit measure and its behavioural outcomes. They found that the explicit 
attitudes positively predicted the speeding behaviour. The implicit measure had similar effects on 
behaviour (McCarton et al., 2018). Lundberg, Payne, Pasek and Krosnick (2017) have also 
observed significant effects of explicit measure (and implicit measure too) in predicting the 
prejudicial behaviours of Americans (high in racial prejudice, high in disapproval of performance 
of president) towards the “percieved state of the nation in 2009” (Lundberg et al., 2017, p. 11) 
and in the remaining tenure of President Obama. Such research evidence supports the motive 
behind the continued use of explicit measures in our research.  
It has been found that there is often a dissociation between implicit and explicit measures 
(Dovidio et al., 2002; McNamara, Muldoon, Stevenson & Slattery, 2011; Wilson, Lindsey, & 
Schooler, 2000) tested the interracial interaction hypothesis (i.e., the attitudes of Whites affect 
racial behaviours and impressions while interacting with a Black partner) with the use of 
Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993) and observed that White partners showed 
friendliness toward Black interaction partners on Explicit Bias measures, but showed negativity 
on implicit, non-verbal behaviour (i.e., more speech errors, less eye contact, more distance, etc.). 
However, implicit and explicit measures do not always diverge, and it depends on a number of 
factors including increased structural fit between the implicit and explicit measures leading to an 
increased correlation (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 
2008) and whether the current societal climate reduces social desirability pressures as may be the 
case with immigration.  
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 Implicit Bias  
According to Sritharan and Gawronski (2010), intergroup contact theorists have 
categorized overt/subtle expressions of bias with terms such as “symbolic racism” (Sears & 
Henry, 2003), “aversive racism” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), 
“automatic prejudice” (Devine, 1989), and “implicit prejudice” (Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & 
Schwartz, 1999). With the use of these terms, the researchers have been examining the 
underlying disparities between the actual beliefs and resultant behavioural expressions towards 
minority groups such as Muslims, Immigrants, Women, and LGBTs (Lesbian, Gays, Bisexual 
and Transgenders). In this context, there has been a critique of the use of self-report measures of 
explicit bias and motivation in situations that strongly influence people to avoid revealing 
thoughts and attitudes that are not in line with social standards (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Payne et al., 2005; Sritharan & 
Gawornski, 2010).  
Implicit biases stem from known or unknown former experiences that affect the thoughts 
that can eventually lead to biased attitudes or discriminatory actions towards other social groups 
(Byrne & Tanesini, 2015; Hardin & Banaji, 2013). Unlike explicit biases, implicit biases are 
indirect behavioural representations and are often automatically activated, and maybe beyond 
intentional control (Amodio, & Swencionis, 2018; Hardin & Banaji, 2013; Payne et al., 2005). 
Implicit bias has been shown to influence a variety of behaviours. It may influence people 
to see and observe others  based upon their pre-conceived ideology, which could result in 
intergroup biases among people, as well as  professionals such as teachers (Montenson, 2018), 
health care professionals (FitzGerald, & Hurst, 2017; Maina, Belton, Ginzberg, Singh, & 
Johnson, 2018; Merino, Adams, & Hall, 2018), and judges and police (Peterson, 2018; Peterson, 
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Krivo, & Russell-Brown, 2018). These biases often lead to a variety of negative behaviours in 
intergroup interactions, such as 1) lack of friendliness in non-verbal behaviours towards each 
other, and 2) unfair recruitment decisions based on bias (Klienberg & Raghavan, 2018; Zigert & 
Hanges, 2005) and forming discriminatory impressions (Asplund & Welle, 2018).  
 Measures of Implicit Bias 
Since the emergence of implicit bias measures, there has been huge progress in the 
development and validation of implicit measures. De Houwer and Moors, (2010) characterized 
the implicit measures as being either task performances, for instance; Implicit Association Test 
(IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), or target priming (Fazio et al., 1995; Payne, et al., 2005; 
Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park,1997). Above all, the implicit measures of biased attitudes require the 
least conscious efforts to dig into the mental content, and the responses to an implicit measure 
have been observed as generally uncontrollable due to the association (i.e., priming) induced in 
the task (Payne et al., 2005). Based on these aspects of implicit measures, social psychological 
and social cognition researchers have developed some very effective performance-based 
associative tasks. So, in our current research, we have used the Affect Misattribution Procedure 
(Payne et al., 2005) to measure the implicit bias, which has been demonstrated to be a reliable 
and valid indirect measure of bias towards ethnic groups (Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Payne et al., 
2008; Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010; Payne & Lundberg, 2014; see details of measure in 
Chapter 2 methods).  
1.3 Approaches for bias reduction.  
Group interactions and the frequently observed biases have underpinned wide research to 
reducing bias. However, limited research has investigated the simultaneous reduction of bias and 
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increased support for social change to improve the status of disadvantaged groups (Dixon, 
Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Hayward, Tropp, Hornsey & Barlow, 2018; Saguy, Tausch, 
Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Tropp & Barlow, 2018; Wright & Baray, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 
2009). This gap in the literature was one major aim of the current research. 
Experience of contact between advantaged and disadvantaged groups could potentially be 
the predictor of decreased bias and boosted motivation to stand for group rights (Tropp & 
Barlow, 2018). For example, most recently, Hayward and colleagues (2018) examined the role of 
positive and negative contact and collective action intentions between the advantaged (White-
Americans) and the disadvantaged (Black and Hispanic-Americans) groups. Their findings were 
consistent with the earlier research cited above (e.g., Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, & Heath, 2011; 
Tropp, Hawi, Van Laar, & Levin, 2012), and they concluded that although the positive contact 
among both groups was found to be consistently effective in reducing perceptions of 
discrimination among disadvantaged (Black and Hispanic-Americans), however at the cost of 
reduced collective action intentions to challenge the status quo and raise voice for equality 
between White-Americans and their minority groups. 
Recently, research studies have observed changing trends in the attitudes of the 
White/advantaged groups towards the acknowledgment of the racial inequalities and lack of 
support of equal social policies by them (Becker, Wright, Lubensky, & Zhou, 2013; Dixon, 
Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010). Tropp and Barlow (2018) reviewed the intergroup contact 
literature and suggested three major outcomes; 1) building empathetic attitude towards 
disadvantaged groups, 2) considering outgroups as humans like themselves, and 3) making cross-
group friendships to closely look into the plight of the out-groups. They suggested this could 
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possibly reduce biases, discriminations, and inequalities along with inducing a sense of care and 
concern with the development of the efforts to stand up by the side of the disadvantaged groups.  
Within the UK, though, very little research has focused on the investigation of the 
simultaneous reduction of bias and increasing of support for collective action to improve the 
status of disadvantaged groups. However, Shepherd, Fasoli, Pereira, and Branscombe (2018) 
have recently tested the role of threat, certain emotions (such as anger, fear, and angst), and 
prejudice in eliciting willingness to engage in collective action towards immigrants. They used 
White-British sample in the study 1 with a control condition in which participants were told that 
the British immigrant population is unlikely to change in the next four decades, and in the threat 
condition the participants were told that the immigrants will outnumber the White population. 
The results showed the indirect effect of threat via both prejudice and emotions to predict a 
willingness to take collective action among White-British participants (i.e., advantaged). They 
replicated these results with Italian sample too and discussed that threat and emotions (even the 
negative emotions such as anger, fear, and angst) could change the progress of collective action 
efforts among the socially advantaged groups. These findings enhanced the insight into further 
explaining how the involvement of advantaged groups to take collective action towards 
disdvantaged could make a difference through emotions and threat despite the fact whether the 
collective action is in support of the disadvantaged groups or againts them to oppose the equality 
policies. Consequently, their conclusions possibly support our research in which we intend to 
discover the aspects of bias reduction and willingness to engage in collective action (i.e., against 
the inequalities being experienced by disadvantaged groups) among the advantaged (white-
British) towards disadvantaged (Pakistani-British/immigrants).  
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The current dissertation research is aimed at exploring the dynamics of reducing bias and 
increasing support for collective action in relation to the Pakistani-British group. Political 
orientation has also been measured because it has often been associated with preference for 
different types of social biases, especially in relation to ethnicity and immigrants. The bias 
reduction strategies that we are investigating include a Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) 
that focuses on commonalities or on recategorisation of two sub-groups as a single super-ordinate 
group (e.g., British), and Multicultural (MC) approach that emphasizes both similarities and 
differences among groups. These strategies emphasize conflict resolution and bias reduction 
among diverse groups in a multi-ethnic and diverse society, but they do so in diverse ways. 
 Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) and Recategorisation. 
 The Common Ingroup Identity Model focuses on recategorising group boundaries to 
reduce bias (Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, Houlette, Kelly & Elizabeth, 2000); it accomplishes this 
goal by having a person redefine the perceptions about their ingroup in such a way that they now 
categorise themselves as belonging to the same larger group (e.g., British) as someone who was 
previously categorised as belonging to an outgroup (e.g., Minority group). The ingroup and 
outgroup categories merge into new ingroup following the salience of original identity categories 
(Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Thus, the main elements are recategorisation and commonality. 
Several research studies have tested the common ingroup identity model, and they generally have 
shown reduced bias and better attitudes toward the outgroup (Bagci & Çelebi, 2017; Banfield & 
Dovidio, 2013; Curtis, 2014; De Freitas, & Cikara, 2018; Guerra, Rebelo, Monteiro & Gaertner, 
2013; Kunst, Thomsen, Sam & Berry, 2015; Sengupta & Sibley, 2013). Common Ingroup 
Identity Model has also been observed to be widely acceptable solution of social cohesion and 
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integration of diverse socities. Recatogrisation has manifested positive intergroup relations, 
positively improved intergroup perceptions and reduced outgroup hostilities (Banfield & 
Dovidio, 2013).  
Vezzali, Stathi, Crisp, Giovannini, Capozza, and Gaertner, (2015) studied CIIM with the 
Imagined Contact Theory (defined by Crisp & Turner, 2009 as “the mental simulation of a social 
interaction with a member or members of an outgroup category”, p.234) to assess outgroup 
helping intentions of children and adults within common ingroup imagined contact condition vs 
control condition. They tested two different age groups of Italian students in their experiments. In 
one of the experiments, they used a sample of elementary school children and instructed them to 
imagine they were having an interaction with an immigrant fellow as a member of a common 
group. In Study two, they used a sample of university graduate students and asked them to 
imagine a similar contact as children did. Both samples were tested against control conditions in 
which the group membership (i.e., ingroup/outgroup) of the partners were not specified. The 
results observed outgroup helping behavioural intention between both samples towards 
immigrants following the imagined interaction, and the commitment to help immigrants in real 
situation was still significant even after a two-week time gap following the intervention. Thus, 
CIIM along with the imagined contact could potentially be effective in development of positive 
attitudes and helping intentions towards outgroups.  
Stoeckle (2016) analysed the data of European exchange (Erasmus proggrame) students 
of 38 German universities who visited other EU countries in the context of their interaction with 
the other transnational and EU students in the host countries. One of his hypotheses examined the 
role of common identity based on shared experiences and its stability over a certain period 
following the contact. So, he collected data in three waves by panel surveys. These three waves 
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included surveys from German Erasmus programme students before they started their study in 
another EU country (i.e., wave 1), during their study period in the other EU country (wave 2) and 
six months following their return from the other country (wave 3). The results found that the 
students who had weak national identities had shown strong identification with the European 
(superordinate) identity following their interaction with international students based on shared 
experiences and this identity effect remained stable even for a period of at least six months of 
their return to Germany, t(25) = 0.47, p = .64 (two-tailed), d = .02. Hence, Stoeckle (2016) 
concluded that common identity appeared to be significant following interacting with 
international students in another country which indicated a personal meaning to a transnational 
collective identity by meeting the equal group contact conditions of intergroup contact theory 
(e.g., Allport, 1954). 
Ufkes, Otten, Van Der Zee, Giebels, and Dovidio, (2012) investigated the integrative 
effect of CIIM and the Ingroup Projection Model, which emphasised thinking of a common group 
as diverse to avoid negative evaluations (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). They found a positive 
relationship between a common ingroup identity and outgroup attitudes of majority groups in low 
and high prototypical conditions (i.e., perceiving ingroup members to be identical with the 
superordinate group identity instead of subgroup identity). In order to measure perceived 
prototypicality (e.g., low vs high), the participants were required to rate the seven diagrams of 
two increasingly overlapping circles each named after subgroup and urban district name. The 
proximity of the circles increased gradually and in the seventh diagram the circles completely 
overlapped with each other. The participants rated the proximity of the diagrams from 1 = lowest 
perceived prototypicality to 7 = highest perceived prototypicality by perceiving the best 
representation of closeness with either subgroup or urban district group. In this sample of native 
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Dutch people and immigrants in the Netherlands, two field studies revealed that the majority 
group members (i.e., Native Dutch) had more positive attitudes towards outgroup members (i.e., 
immigrants), but only when they perceived their ingroup as low in prototypicality (i.e., Dutch as 
high in diversity versus low in diversity). In general, these findings showed improved tolerance 
towards the multicultural neighbours when considering a common ingroup identity and seeing it 
as diverse.  
To explore the generalizability of the positive effects of the superordinate identity (in this 
case European) of European people in relation with their attitude towards EU/non-EU immigrants 
(e.g., inclusive or exclusive/negative or positive), Curtis (2014) studied the role of CII Model 
within the 27 European member states. The researcher used survey based Eurobarometer 71.3 
(Papacosta, 2009) which asked seven questions from the participants to conclude a combined 
dependent veraible Pro-immigration Attitude Index. Those seven questions included whether 
immigrants pose a security risk, enrich culture, cause unemployement, fill labour jobs, replace 
EU’s agining population, help improve tolerance and intergroup understanding, and pay more 
taxes than earn benefits. They assessed the independent variable; superordinate identity through 
“Feel European”, “Feel National” and “Feel Regional”. The findings concluded that the CII 
model proved effective in decreasing intergroup hostility as well as positive and inclusive attitude 
towards immigrants. This study further added that European identity showed positive attitudes 
towards non-EU immigrants alongwith EU immigrants. They also concluded that strong national 
identities were found to be associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants, however 
regional identity did not show such effects on immigrant attitudes.  
However, Banfield and Dovidio, (2013) found that the emphasis on commonalities in the 
CII Model undermines the majority group member’s ability to understand the disparities and 
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disadvantages experienced by minority groups (Study 1). In study 2, they tested an all-White-
American sample with the common identity approach and with support for collective action as 
the dependent variable. White participants in the commonality condition showed poor detection 
of subtle discrimination as well as reduced willingness to support change policies that produced 
injustice that a Black job applicant had faced. These results support other work in which the 
majority group shows reduced willingness to act for equality when commonalities between 
majority and minority groups are emphasised (Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012; Saguy et al., 2009; 
Tausch, Saguy & Bryson, 2015; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright & Lubensky, 
2009). 
Recently, Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, and Dovidio (2016) have also studied the CII model 
in relation to the collective action. In research using two studies, the researchers highlighted the 
common US identity among the Black and Latino participants and observed a demotivation for 
the collective action efforts, and also decreased the sense of unequal treatment in the society. 
Ufkes et al., (2016) concluded that “creating a strong sense of common ingroup identity” could 
demotivate the disadvantaged group from taking collective actions, so the mere focus on CII was 
enough to decrease Collective Action/CA but not the process of recategorisation. They further 
concluded that if the salience of common ingroup identity and the dual identity (i.e., ethnic/racial 
identities) was simultaneous then they did not affect the CA among the Black and Latinos. A 
similar aspect of common ingroup identity on bias reduction and support for CA was earlier 
examined by Tausch, Saguy and Bryson (2015) with identical results.  
Although such findings suggest the effectiveness of CIIM in improving intergroup 
relations by reducing bias, yet it is not clear whether bias could be reduced while increasing 
support for CA. Therefore, in order to examine CIIM further within British diversity context 
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alongside Multiculturalism (MC) and Common Identity without highlighting (CWO; see below), 
we looked into this question in chapter 2 in three experimental studies.  
 Multiculturalism (MC) Approach.  
Multiculturalism has generally been framed as an approach that endorses the 
acknowledgment and appreciation of ethnic, cultural, and group identities. In general, this 
approach asks people to acknowledge the similarities and differences between groups. The MC 
approach emphasises the value of cultural uniqueness that is formed through social, historical, 
political, and economic experiences of a particular society; this idea has been explained by 
Triandis, (1988) as “One of the realities of different subjective cultures is that they result in 
different expectations and different perceptions of the interactions. Thus, the greater the 
heterogeneity within a given society, the greater the possibility that the interactions will be 
costly” (p.33). According to this explanation, MC aims at decreasing the conflicts by developing 
an understanding and gaining insight about how the groups interact and form experiences about 
others (Wolsko et al., 2000).   
Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner, and Wagner, (2013) in their meta-analysis of representative 
survey data from twenty-three (23) European countries, to seek an interplay of Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA- a socio-political attitude based on conformity to traditions, Altemeyer, 
1988), a relationship between MC and attitudes towards immigrants and feelings of threat. RWA 
has been associated with higher perceptions of a dangerous world, which are related to higher 
perceptions of threat (Duckitt & Sibley; 2010; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). In study 1, Kauff and 
colleagues used the data of round 4 of European Social Survey (ESS, 2008) to assess on Migrant 
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, 2012), to observe if RWA would show an effect on the MC 
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and attitudes towards immigration relationship. The results observed that the individuals high on 
RWA demonstrated negative attitudes towards immigrants and increased feelings of threat when 
encountered the MC ideology. However, they argued that this negative relationship was stronger 
if a country endorsed a liberal immigration policy (i.e., acceptance of differences and allowing 
immigrants to be inclusive of equal rights), since liberal policy reflects the multicultural and 
diversity-oriented policies of a country. So, it is comprehendible here that the individuals high on 
RWA lack positive attitudes towards immigrants. To further replicate the findings of the meta-
analysis, in their second study they manipulated multiculturalism in the laboratory settings. They 
showed a video clip containing a multicultural group of German people (i.e., families of German 
football team) and required participants to rate the video. Consistent with the survey results 
(study 1), they found lower pro-diversity beliefs and enhanced prejudice in individuals with high 
RWA beliefs when confronted with MC condition as compared to the control condition which 
confirmed the negative effect of RWA (or conservative ideology) on MC and attitudes towards 
immigrants.  
In a different set of experiments, Richeson and Nussbaum (2004) manipulated 
Multicultural (MC) and Colourblind (CB) perspectives; the colourblind approach decatogrises the 
social group memberships (e.g., cultural and ethnic categories), and has people consider all 
members as one group in a manner similar to the CII Model, but it is not similar to the 
assimilation approach, which explicitly emphasises that the majority group’s traits and values are 
important and that people should assimilate to the majority group values. Richeson and 
Nussbaum had participants read the MC or CB ideology-endorsing prompts that were identical to 
those used by Wolsko, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2000). Following reading the prompts, they 
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instructed the participants to write about why that perspective was good for intergroup relations 
(i.e., list 5 free responses). Later they presented the participants with the 21 response statements 
from the previous participants for them to identify those statements which matched their own 
responses. The aim of using previous responses was to help participants elicit their own responses 
like those listed. In order to assess the automatic (implicit) and explicit racial biases in relation 
with MC and Colournlind (CB), the researchers used an IAT (Implicit Association Test; 
Greenwald et al., 1998) and thermometer ratings (for explicit bias).  
Richeson and Nussbaum (2004) predicted that participants in the CB condition would 
show a more negative attitude towards Blacks than Whites in comparison to the MC condition. 
To examine their predictions, they analysed the response latencies (i.e., the time taken to respond 
each pairing) of the “White – Good” and “Black – Good” pairings to indicate whether the 
participants showed pro-white or pro-black racial attitude in either condition. Thus, the results 
indicated that the participants in the CB perspective showed more implicit and explicit bias than 
those in the multicultural condition. These outcomes further concluded the MC being a positive 
ideology to harness intergroup harmony (see review Wolsko et al., 2000), as well as the changing 
nature of the racial attitudes according to the endorsement of an ideological perspective, at least 
within a US sample. Ng Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten, (2018) concluded the impact of intergroup 
ideologies dependant on the national framework. They found that the majority Hindu community 
of Mauritius shows less intergroup bias in MC as compared to a CB, a Polyculturalism (i.e., 
“ideology focusing on interactions and connections among racial/ethnic groups”, Rosenthal & 
Levy, 2012) or control condition.  
Within this context, Visintin, Birtel and Crisp (2017) designed an experiment with a 
British sample to explore the interactive effect between the ideologies (MC vs CB) and typicality 
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(typical outgroup vs atypical outgroup) on warmth (e.g., ratings of friendly, likable, and helpful) 
and competence perception (e.g., ratings of intelligent, competent, and capable) during an 
imagined contact manipulation. They used the same MC and CB prompts and methodology as 
used by Richeson and Nussbaum (2004) to involve the participants in the imagined contact with 
typical outgroup member (i.e., unknown British Muslim who reads the Quran, says prayers five 
times a day and does not drink, etc.) and atypical outgroup member (i.e., unknown British 
Muslim who does not live a typical Muslim way of life) by exposing them either to MC or to the 
CB conditions. They observed less positive outgroup perceptions in MC-atypical condition as 
compared to the MC-typical condition and in both CB-typical and CB-atypical conditions. The 
results suggested the effectiveness of the MC in the development of positive outgroup perception 
in imagined contact with only a typical group may correspond to the focus of MC ideology on 
differences, hence restrict the outcome of imagined contact (Visintin et al., 2017). When MC 
ideology compared with CB and Assimilation ideologies, MC observed a negative relationship to 
implicit and explicit prejudices, whereas, CB observed a negative relation and Assimilation 
indicated a positive relationship with explicit prejudice (Whitley & Webster, 2018). These 
findings showed proximity between decreased prejudice and MC as compared to CB or 
Assimilation. In general, in conjunction with the above research, there is a good amount of 
evidence demonstrating that a multicultural perspective improves interethnic attitudes and 
behaviours (Arslan, 2018; Levrau & Loobuyck, 2018; Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; Sam, 
2018; Verkuyten, 2005; Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009; Wolsko et al., 2000). 
The MC approach with the above noted strengths, however, has gone through criticism in 
recent years. There is some evidence that the majority group members believe multiculturalism is 
a threat (both realistic and symbolic) to their ingroup values based on their perception of 
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threatened national and cultural values by the outgroups (e.g., immigrants) (Ben-Nun Bloom, 
Arikan & Lahav, 2015; Morrison et al., 2010; Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, & Stellmacher, 2007; 
Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). Nations high in national identity perception (i.e., identifying strongly 
with a national identity, for example a British identity) feel higher threat (Badea, Iyer & 
Aebischer, 2018; Yitman & Verkuyten, 2018) from the immigrant’s lack of assimilation efforts 
which leads to prejudiced attitudes (Mahfud, Badea & N’Gbala, 2015; Verkuyten, 2009a). 
However, to verify the mediating role of perceived immigrant threat in relation to the support for 
multiculturalism, Badea, Iyer and Aebischer (2018) predicted whether the prejudice of the French 
majority group would be affected by the role of national identification (i.e., emphasising on 
national identity over sub-regional and ethnic identities, Verkuyten, 2009b), endorsement of 
multicultural or assimilation ideology, and perceived threat. The main aim of the study was to 
find out a link between the factors related to negative attitudes towards immigrants in France. 
The results showed that higher levels of national identification resulted in higher threat which 
was related to the endorsement of assimilation and resultant prejudice. However, on the other 
hand, the results found increased multiculturalism leading towards decreased prejudice against 
immigrants as compared to the assimilation. Although study highlights the positive role of 
multiculturalism in reducing bias (see Plaut, Thomas, Hurd & Romano, 2018; Wolsko, Park, & 
Judd, 2006; Yitman & Verkuyten, 2018), it also verifies the role of the perceived threat leading 
towards negative attitudes towards immigrants (Badea, Iyer & Aebischer, 2018). 
Guimond, Crisp, De Oliveira, Kamiejski, Kteily, Kuepper, and Sidanius, (2013) 
investigated four different nations with a notion that multiculturalism (MC) or assimilation (AS) 
may produce different effects in different countries depending on the intergroup norms of that 
country influenced by the pro-diversity policy at low, medium or high level. Assimilation (AS), 
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in this research, could potentially be framed as a commonality approach by participants to reduce 
the negative implication of endorsing assimilation. They applied the model of intergroup 
attitudes, which incorporated factors which belonged to that country (i.e., attitudes and perceived 
norms related to the diversity policy in that country) and the social-psychological factors (i.e., 
social dominance orientation/SDO which is defined by the social hierarchies maintaining the 
power and status quo among the powerful and dominant groups of society, Sidanius & Pratto, 
2001). Results showed that countries varied in their support for a Multicultural approach versus 
an Assimilation approach to intergroup relations and attitudes towards ethnic and religious 
groups depending on their pro-diversity policies. Endorsement of a multicultural norm was 
highest in Canada (M = 4.45), medium in the US (M = 3.74) and the UK (M = 3.49) and lowest in 
Germany (M = 2.95). Thus, there is some evidence that a multicultural approach may be as 
effective in the UK as it is in the US due to lack of national and personal endorsement of pro-
diversity/multicultural policy in the recent years. This lack of MC endorsement was indicated by 
David Cameron; Ex-Prime Minister of England and Wales on many different occasions, and the 
incidents of 9/11 in the US and the following political attitudes. Similarly, Germany was also 
observed to be avoiding MC policies as stated by German Chancellor, Angela Merkal as “failure 
of Multiculturalism” within their country regardless the fact there was no national MC policy 
being practiced in Germany during the time. In addition, results also demonstrated that prejudice 
was low toward Muslims in Canada, and was highest in Germany, whereas, in the U.S. and the 
U.K. they were neither low nor high (between these extremes). Consequently, MC appears to be 
lacking in support within EU context of perceived diversity, and attitudes towards immigration 
(currently highly divided) which needs to be further tested with reference to the prejudice and 
improvement of intergroup relationships. 
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1.4  Support for Collective Action. 
A majority advantaged group’s support for collective action to improve the status of a 
minority group (termed as collective action model of social change by Wright & Lubensky, 2009) 
may depend on the perception and empathetic acknowledgment of the unequal treatment and 
unjust policies (Kende, Lantos & Krekó, 2018; Selvanathan, Techakesari, Tropp & Barlow, 2017; 
van Zomermen, Postmes, Spears & Bettache, 2011). Similarly, perceived inequalities in resource 
distribution and fair treatment accompanied by the intergroup biases may drive minority groups 
to challenge the status quo to achieve common goals (Hasan-Aslih, Netzer, van Zomeren, Saguy, 
Tamir & Halperin, 2018; Simon & Klanderman, 2001; Stewart & Tran, 2018; Van Zomeren et 
al., 2011; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). According to Social Identity Model of Collective Action 
(SIMCA; Van Zommerman, Postmes & Spears, 2008), three underlying socio-psychological 
factors; Identity, Injustice, and efficacy (i.e., emotional involvement based on group identities) 
reinforce the protest and joint action among the disadvantaged groups of the society. Theories of 
intergroup contact and social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and bias reduction (Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2000) provided the fundamental motives to develop SIMCA with the aim of improving 
the intergroup relations in a diverse and multicultural society. Yet in this research, we aim to 
explore support for collective action from the majority group (e.g., White-British) perspective, 
which has shown to have variable support for collective action. 
Involvement in collective action by majority and minority groups has been examined and 
explored in many different settings (e.g., industry - Costie, Holm & Berardo, 2018), with a 
variety of (mediating/moderating) variables (e.g., threat, emotions and prejudice – Shephered et 
al., 2018; political ideology - Moreira, Rique Neto, Sabucedo & Camino, 2018). However, recent 
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investigations have established a point of view that an emphasis on commonality (i.e., 
highlighting the common group identity) may diminish the perception of the social inequalities 
among the majority groups resulting in decreased willingness to support for collective action 
against minority groups (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). The research with the main focus on the 
commonalities shows a lack of majority group involvement in collective action while 
simultaneously reducing biases and group differences (Dixon et al., 2012; Johnston, & Glasford, 
2017). The pioneering work by Gaertner and colleagues (2000) has shown some evidence based 
on the role of commonality in improving intergroup contact (by reducing negative intergroup 
attitudes, has not been shown increase in support for CA). They have, however, also tested a dual 
identity strategy, which uses aspects of the Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact, a subgroup 
(e.g., immigrants) and a superordinate group identity (e.g., British) are made salient 
simultaneously to allow differences in circumstances to remain noticeable. Banfield and Dovidio 
(2013) showed that, in the U.S., a dual-identity increased majority-group members’ willingness 
to support collective action (i.e., willingness to protest on the behalf of a disadvantaged group). 
However, they did not test the influence on prejudice. Further lack of evidence on the 
support for collective action and a concurrent decrease in bias regarding the inter-community 
perspective (e.g., support for CA towards British-Pakistani group in our current research) has 
been indicated by Pettigrew and Hewstone (2017) as a future direction. The background 
explained above suggests testing an alternative model of majority group’s support for CA and 
reduced bias against minority groups. Given that our research was begun in 2013, there were a 
lack of studies testing this simultaneous effectiveness at that time, and a lack of studies showing 
the potential of alternative approaches (e.g., Dual Identity approach); thus, we initially focused on 
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Multicultural and Common Ingroup Identity approaches in our first set of experiments (i.e., 
chapter 2). 
Further, our research aimed to explore the role of majority group (White-British) 
member’s willingness to show support towards the policies favouring outgroups (here Pakistani-
British and immigrants) and collective action to oppose the social injustice and inequalities to 
reduce bias at the same time. This notion is based on the impact of the supportive collective 
action of the majority in favour of the minority which contains paramount significance in an 
ethnically diverse society (Kende et al., 2018; Selvanathan et al., 2017). In other recent work, 
intergroup contact based on the quality (not the quantity) of the contact increased the willingness 
to engage in collective action towards an outgroup with empathy as the mediator of the 
relationship (Johnston, & Glasford, 2017), but it was focused on the minority perspective, yet not 
much of the research share shows the perspective of the majority group in support for collective 
action. 
In addition to the role of MC and CIIM in CA, we are interested in exploring the influence 
on threat perceptions. Shephered et al., (2018) tested this aspect in two different samples from the 
UK and Italy to compare the role of emotions (angst, fear and anger), distinctiveness threat (i.e., 
threat to the prototypicality and distinctive identity of a group; Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1997) 
and prejudice in predicting the willingness to involve in collective action efforts among White 
majority groups. In study 1, they assessed these variables against the immigrants by manipulating 
that the immigrants will replace the White British majority in the impending fourty years (UK 
sample). The study 2 was replicated with the Italian sample. The results showed the mediating 
role of the threat by emotions in predicting the willingness to participate in the collective action 
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in both samples. Shephered et al., (2018) concluded that the underlying factor of engaging in 
collective action toward outgroups may be the result of the emotions and distinctiveness threat.  
1.5  Threat. 
The arrival of immigrants and other ethnic minority groups in any country may create a 
sense of threat among the local and majority groups in terms of their cultural values and 
resources. Such threats may increase defence mechanisms among the majority groups regarding 
protection of their groups. Such defence mechanisms can take the form of intergroup biases, 
stereotypes, outgroup exclusion, discrimination, and demand for assimilation outgroups to the 
values of the majority or dominant group. Such outgroups can be varied in terms of immigration 
status, linguistic ability, skin tone, or religion, any of which could be perceived as threats to the 
majority group (Abbas, 2007; Atwell Seate & Mastro, 2016; Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 
2015; Caricati, Mancini & Marletta, 2017; Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Matera, Stefanile & 
Brown, 2015; Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Stephan, Yabarra & Morrison, 1999). The 
investigation of these intergroup threats has a long history in social psychology from the initial 
Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Sherif, 1966), which has influenced later theories such as the 
Integrated Threat Theory (ITT: Stephan, Ybarra & Morrison, 2009). The Integrated Threat 
Theory (ITT) has incorporated the four underlining causal elements or antecedents of threat and 
negative intergroup contact; these include realistic threats, symbolic threats, negative stereotypes, 
and intergroup anxiety. The ITT theory was revised and called the Intergroup Threat Theory and 
the main change was moving negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety to be antecedents of 
symbolic and realistic threat (Stephan, Yabarra & Morrison, 2009; 2015). In this revised 
Intergroup Threat Theory, the researchers theorized that the mere perception of the threat was 
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enough to elicit biased attitudes towards minority/outgroups. Much recent research has focused 
on symbolic and realistic threats and has found support for a strong correlation between threat 
and prejudice (Caricati et al., 2017; Obaidi, Kunst, Kteily, Thomsen, & Sidanius, 2018; Riek et 
al., 2006; Roebroeck, & Guimond, 2018). 
 Realistic Threat.  
Stephan and Stephan (1996) described that the realistic threat resulted from the 
subjectively perceived struggle over political power and economic and physical resources. The 
communities perceive a fear that the scarcity of these resources would cause loss for their 
community. This perception eventually generates outgroup threat leading towards the negative 
intergroup attitudes. Accordingly, such fear perception has been a key factor behind the biased 
attitudes against outgroups and immigrants (Caricati et al., 2017, Stephan & Stephan, 2000).  
 Symbolic threat. 
Stephan and Stephan (1996) referred to the symbolic threat as a threat to the religious and 
cultural values, and beliefs, and ideologies. These are the perceived ideological differences 
between the majority and minority groups with effects on intergroup contact as similar as the 
realistic threat from outgroups or immigrants (Caricati et al., 2017; Stephan & Stephan, 1996). 
An example of symbolic threat could be shown from the attitudes towards Black African 
Americans who have been treated with hostility due to perceived contradictory values of the 
White-Americans (Esses et al., 1993; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears; 1988). Actual 
differences and threats are not necessary for this effect; the mere perception of a threat is enough. 
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 Threat and bias. 
Stephan and colleagues (1999) conducted a study based on the Intergroup Threat Theory 
(ITT) and confirmed that symbolic and realistic threats were significant predictors of prejudice 
towards Asian, Cuban, and Mexican immigrant groups. Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, and 
Martin, (2005, study 1) further tested the effects of symbolic and realistic threats on prejudice 
against immigrants of Tutsi tribes of Rwanda. They used newspaper articles about the Rwandan 
immigrants discussing either realistic or symbolic threats, or even a combination of both or not 
threat to the ingroup. The results indicated higher levels of negative attitudes toward Rwandan 
immigrants in the combined realistic and symbolic threat condition showing how students 
perceived threats to their symbolic views and physical resources. When they compared realistic 
threat with symbolic threat, the former showed amplified effects on the perception of the 
legitimacy of the group status while reducing the prosocial response towards immigrants and 
raising the levels of group favouritism (Wlodarczyk, Basabe & Bobowik, 2014). In addition, 
Florack, Piontkowski, Rohmann, Balzer, and Perzig (2003) manipulated perceived threat to see 
the attitudes of German workers towards Turkish immigrants regarding acculturation (i.e., social 
or behavioural changes following cross-group interactions; Berry, 1997) and reported that the 
host community not only perceived the immigrants as a cultural and economic threat but also less 
likely to assimilate with the host culture. Threat perception among those who highly identify with 
the national identity also increases the endorsement of acculturation ideology which in turn gives 
rise to the anti-immigrant bias (Badea et al., 2018).  
Rohmann, Florack, and Piontkowski, (2006) also observed the role of cultural difference 
between the host country (Germany) and immigrants (Turkish and Italian) and whether there was 
a relationship to the attitudes of the locals. They found that as the cultural difference increased, 
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the threat from immigrants increased too, but on the other hand, the threat declined when the host 
culture was seen as being adopted by the immigrants. Albarello and Rubini (2018) studied the 
implicit and explicit bias towards Roma community via threat (both symbolic and realistic) 
perception. Among the Italian sample, they used the language abstraction (i.e., describe the Roma 
people using verbs and adjectives, which were later coded as a positive and negative description 
for the analysis purpose) as a subtle and implicit measure of discrimination and feelings 
thermometers as explicit measures of affective prejudice. In the results, the participants indicated 
increased levels of negative abstractions instead of positive which reflected the augmented 
implicit and explicit prejudice under threat perception.  
The evidence above indicates the potential importance of threat in maintaining biased 
attitudes against immigrants and other ethnic groups, thus provide us a justification for our 
research to add threat to verify its role as a mediator.  
1.6 Political ideology. 
Generally within the literature of social and psychological sciences, the political ideology 
construct has been measured on a left-right spectrum. The left-wing and right-wing terms 
developed from the French revolution of the 18th century with reference to the seating 
arrangements of the members of the legislative bodies, where the speaker sat in front of the house 
and the members seated either left (Commoners) and right (Aristocrats), (Knapp & Wright, 
2006). The terms have evolved with “liberals” commonly referred to as on the “left” and the 
“conservatives” on the “right”. There are personality differences between the liberals and the 
conservatives, and these ideological differences play a vital role in shaping the thoughts and 
actions of the individuals who endorse either end of the spectrum (Ordabayeva & Fernandes, 
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2018). Liberals tend to perceive the people more positively, are more prone to seek experience 
and change than the conservatives who emphasize on maintaining status quo and social groups 
inequality (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Hibbing, Smith & Alford, 2014; Jost, Nosek & 
Gosling, 2008). Researchers have also demonstrated a relationship between the political ideology 
spectrum (liberal & conservative) and personality characteristics and showed good evidence for a 
relationship between more liberalism and less “Opposition to Change” and less “Acceptance of 
Inequality (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost et al., 2017; Sibley, Osborne & 
Duckitt, 2012).  
Political conservatism has also been shown frequently associated with the biased and 
stereotyped attitudes towards outgroups that are low in status or non-normative (e.g., Caruso, 
Mead, & Balcetis, 2009; Jost et al., 2003; Krosch, Berntsen, Amodio, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013; 
Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). In 
one example, Krosch et al., (2013) tested the principle of hypodescent (i.e., a process of 
categorising the ambiguous socially subordinate multiracial group members as Blacks instead of 
Whites (see also Halberstadt, Sherman, & Sherman, 2011; Ho, Sidanius, Levin, & Banaji, 2011) 
to see the labelling differentiation of ingroup or outgroup between the politically liberals and 
conservatives. The researchers manipulated the racial categorisation task by presenting 11 face-
type (created as a member of ambiguous race) stimuli in random order across three studies. The 
racial categorisation task consisted of 11 subcategories of morphed male faces (ranging from 
100% Black/White to 0% Black/White) created from original faces with the use of a morphing 
software (Morph Age Express 4.1, Creaceed Software, 2011; as cited in Korsch et al., 2013). 
They presented the image stimuli on grey background with a flashing fixation cross while the 
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images stayed on the screen until the participants chose to categorize the images either Black or 
White. The results across the three studies found the conservatives categorised the ambiguous 
faces as Blacks only, which support the principle of hypodescent. The researchers further 
discussed that these results indicated the excluding attitude of the conservatives towards the 
racially ambiguous members while not considering them as belonging to ingroup (e.g., White).  
Likewise, such biased attitudes by the conservatives are not restricted to one ethnic group 
(Black people) but appear towards other non-normative outgroups such as ethnic minorities, 
immigrants, international students, people with disabilities, sexual minorities and even women. 
For example, Quinton (2018) studied the underlying factors of prejudice among university 
students towards international students and found conservatism as the key feature of negative 
attitudes and prejudice. Similarly, Hoyt and Parry (2018) found that increased political 
conservatism based on the higher levels of prejudice, fostered the negative attitudes and 
discrimination in the job recruitment evaluation process towards the sexually stigmatized 
individuals; i.e., characteristics that others perceive as deviant or undesirable (see also Hodson & 
Busseri, 2012; Van der Toorn, Jost, Packer, Noorbaloochi, & Van Bavel, 2017). 
However, to narrow down our discussion within the British social attitudes and 
immigration context, Brexit (the referendum to help Britain exit from European Union in 2016) 
appears as the most recent and striking incident of conservative ideology that emerged from anti-
immigrant sentiment (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). According to the Gov.UK webpage, the 
conservative voters’ percentages increased in three general elections: 2005 (32.4%), 2015 
(36.9%) and 2017 (42.3%). However, with a 71% turnout rate in the Brexit (2016), the 61% 
conservatives voted for leave along with 95% UK Independent Party (UKIP) supporters. Earlier, 
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Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann, (2011) in their European report also added that British people 
with right-wing political ideology show higher levels of prejudice towards the minority groups 
(i.e., they assessed negative attitudes towards EU immigrants).  
In the decade from 2000 until 2010, the free movement of EU immigrants encouraged 
pensioners, working class, and White-British people with low qualifications to develop an anti-
immigrant attitude (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). These individuals were highly identified with 
British identity and nationalist ideology and perceived the immigrants as the social and economic 
threat, particularly at the times of the crippling economy. However, the liberal and conservative 
parties both failed to adequately address the concerns of these groups, which may have paved the 
way for the rise of the support for the UKIP (far-right British political party, Dennison & 
Goodwin, 2015) who used the opportunity to highlight the threats of uncontrolled immigration by 
attracting the conservative mindsets among those at least 67% individuals had shown voting 
interests in the UKIP prior to the Brexit in general elections (Evans & Mellon, 2016; Ford & 
Goodwin, 2017). The results of the Brexit (i.e., the leave vote won by overall 51.9% and 53.4% 
in England) indicated that the majority supporters of the “Leave Vote” belonged to the voters 
with conservative ideology (i.e., 61%, gov.uk), those concerned by immigration, geographically 
less diverse (i.e., White-British majority residential areas) areas/cities, had lower GCSE level 
qualifications (70% leave voters) and were more likely members of the working class (Ford & 
Goodwin, 2017).  
Dennison and Goodwin (2015) discussed the data of the British Election Study (BES, 
March 2015) on attitudes to immigration by vote intentions among the supporters of the six main 
parties (i.e., Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democratic party (LibDems), Scottish National Party 
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(SNP), UK Independent Party (UKIP) and Green party) contested for 2015 general elections. 
Negative attitude about immigration was assesed on three effects—"bad for economy”, 
“undermines culture”, and “burden on welfare state”. The results revealed that supporters with 
conservative ideology perceived immigrants more negatively as compared to  the supporters with 
liberal ideology on all three effects. So the UKIP supporters perceived the immigrants negatively 
between 80% - 90%, the supporters of the Conservative party perceived them negatively between 
45% - 67%, while comparing with Labour party supporters who were between 33% - 44%. 
Dennison and Goodwin (2015) concluded their analysis of the election outcomes and its political 
and social impact as following; “UKIP deliberately set out to target and mobilise long-standing 
public anxieties over immigration—putting the issue at the heart of a broader narrative about 
national loss, threat and abandonment, which was directed strongly to lower-middle-class and 
working-class white Britons” (p. 18). They further added that the lack of dedication to deal with 
the resentment of the British middle class over the perceived threats of uncontrolled immigration 
could give rise to the far-right ideology which later was evident in the initiation of Brexit 
campaign by the conservative party.  
Within the context of our research, it is important to discuss the role of political 
orientation in biased attitudes towards outgroups/immigrants within MC and Commonality 
ideologies. With reference to this aspect, a recent research conducted by Yogeswaran and 
Dasgupta (2014, study 3) provides some evidence to show the role of political orientation in MC 
and its impact on the attitudes and behaviours towards outgroups. The researchers designed the 
study to see if the conservatism or liberalism (political orientations differences) would moderate 
the multicultural construals (abstract vs concrete) on attitudes towards Hispanic-Americans. The 
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conservatives, however, not only moderated the prejudicial attitudes towards Hispanic-Americans 
in concrete MC construals but also had shown symbolic threat (mediator) to the national identity. 
This study provides the support for our research to explore the role of political orientation 
differences in the UK towards a Pakistani-British group considering the similarity in conservative 
attitudes towards immigrants in the US and other diverse societies. 
1.7 Political Ideology, uncertainty threat model and Bias relations. 
 
Research suggests that motivational underpinnings of Conservative political ideology 
relate to the endorsement of uncertainty, social instability and threat perception (Jost et al., 2007), 
and that conservative beliefs become strong following threatening experience (e.g., terrorism) or 
interaction and mortality salience (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Steele, & Thompson, 2009). In the 
recent years, US census (US Census Bureau, 2008) revealed that by 2042 American ethnic 
minorities will take over the American majority which some scholars called as so-called majority 
and argued that this was shown to pose a future threat to the Republican Party in order to attract 
political support. However, the common US White-majority group, when perceived their group 
as a future minority within their own country expressed negative attitudes and emotions (Craig & 
Richeson, 2014; Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012). Resultantly, high ethnic identification 
of White-Americans triggered perception of a threatened decline in their racial group and 
formation of biased attitudes towards non-Americans which appeared explicitly following 
Donald Trump win in the 2016 Presidential elections. The central theme of the political campaign 
of 2016 presidential election led by Donald Trump was immigration control and immigrant 
related security and economic threats (Major, Blodorn & Blascovich, 2018). The Trump win in 
US and the Brexit referendum success in UK appeared similar in conservative ideology among 
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the majority group (i.e., White- British/White-Americans) which was developed by their 
threatened view of increasing racial diversity. Thus, thinking about this triangular relationship 
between political conservatism and biased attitudes influenced by threat being widely studied 
within US ethnic and racial diversity context (e.g., Giles & Hertz, 1994; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 
2011; Jost et al., 2007) we have considered to replicate the Jost and colleagues (2007) model of 
Uncertainty-Threat within American White majority groups in chapter 3. Further, the similarities 
between American and British political attitudes towards immigrants based on the Trump win 
and Brexit compelled us to extend this model beyond UK to seek the validation and 
generalizability (e.g., by recruiting US general adult sample instead of young university students) 
of political ideology and bias relationship.  
1.8 Current research overview.   
Considering the current context of intergroup relations within diversity oriented societies 
and the effective role of Multiculturalism and Common Ingroup Identity Model in development 
of positive intergroup relationships, the current research was designed to explore which of the 
intergroup relation approach (i.e., MC, CIIM, and Commonality without highlighting 
subgroups/CWO) would influence bias reduction and support for collective action according to 
politically conservative and liberal ideology. This influence was required to seek the effect for 
particularly non-normative ethnic minority groups (e.g., here Pakistani-British ethnic minority 
group) and immigrants with reference to assessing support for Collective Action from the 
perspective of White-British population. This facet of intergroup relationships has not gained 
significant attention in literature yet and we hope to fill the gap in this context. We also 
considered the role of political ideology where liberals appeared to be less biased (significantly 
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more implicitly) and more supportive towards outgroups, and then incorporated research beyond 
British context whilst collecting data from American general population to find the 
generalizability of the threat model of political conservatism. As we have discussed within the 
literature review above, generally, it has been observed that more conservatism was significantly 
related to more outgroup bias and negative attitudes due to threat perception. So in the 
experiments 2 and 3 we have included threat to observe whether political and bias relation was 
mediated by threat . The mediational findings in conjunction with the consistent Implicit Bias 
findings would lead us to examine the further role of Threat Management and Uncertainty-
Avoidance based upon the Uncertainty-Threat Model (Jost et al., 2003, 2007 & 2017) in order to 
explain this relationship against immigrants (unspecified) in Chapter 3. 
Thus, our current research project is divided into two research dimensions in Chapters 2 
and 3. In Chapter 2, we will present the experimental studies testing the influence of intergroup 
prompts MC, Commonality (CIIM and CIIM without highlighting subgroups/CWO) on 
implicit/explicit bias and support for Collective Action (CA), while also measuring political 
orientation within the models. We initially hypothesised that Multiculturalism may decrease bias 
(both implicit and explicit) while also increasing willingness to support for CA among the White-
British participants, and we hypothesised that the CIIM would decrease bias while 
simultaneously reducing willingness to support for CA. In experiment 1, we will test the effects 
of MC and Commonality manipulations on explicit bias, implicit bias, and support for CA. 
Experiment 2 was designed with added control condition to replicate the results of Experiment 1. 
Experiment 3, however, included the CIIM and CIIM without highlighting (CWO) conditions 
with MC (MC being a comparison with CIIM and CWO prompts) to further explore the 
intergroup approach manipulations to observe simultaneous bias reduction and increased support 
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for CA. Our primary motivation for including political ideology in all 3 experiments as an 
important predicting factor along with intergroup approaches was to validate the role of bias 
(implicit/explicit) towards ethnic minority and immigrant groups. Therefore, we further intend to 
replicate the Uncertainty-Threat Model of political conservatism by Jost and colleagues (2007) in 
3 studies of chapter 3.  
Following the reliable results of political ideology on bias relationship while threat being 
a mediator to this relation, Chapter 3, will be explaining the wide gulf between liberals and 
conservatives through extending the Uncertainty-Threat model to intergroup relationships and 
attitudes toward immigrants with a sample from USA. Considering the role of liberals showing 
less bias toward non-normative groups, in Study 4, we investigated whether liberals would show 
less explicit bias toward immigrants and whether this relationship would be mediated by both 
uncertainty-avoidance and threat management. We further tested if threat management was a 
more influential factor. In a follow-up Study 5, we extended threat management to include 
perceived realistic and symbolic threats toward abstract outgroups and bias to negativity. In 
Study 6, we again use the standard perceived threat measure which we had used in Study 4 but 
added an implicit measure of bias to test whether the effects of explicit bias replicated with 
implicit bias toward immigrants. The chapter 4 of the thesis will elucidate the results further to 
grasp their meaning within the literature and conclude the discussion of implications and future 
directions based on our findings of intergroup approaches within Pakistani-British context and 






2 CHAPTER 2: DO MULTICULTURALISM OR COMMONALITY 
APPROACHES REDUCE BIAS AND INCREASE SUPPORT FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION SIMULTANEOUSLY? 
 
2.1 Abstract. 
The intergroup approaches such as Multiculturalism (MC) and Commonality (CIIM) appear to 
have shown effective outcomes in reducing intergroup biases, and in the development of positive 
attitudes towards minority groups. However, the question whether these approaches achieve this 
goal simultaneously remains undiscovered. To achieve this goal, current research investigates the 
concurrent effects of these approaches on Intergroup Bias and support for Collective Action (CA) 
towards Pakistani-British ethnic minority within the perspective of White-British majority group 
(Experiment 1 & 2). A newly coined Commonality without highlighting subgroup identity 
(CWO) is also tested with MC and CIIM within the intergroup context (Experiment 3). Political 
Orientation (Liberalism/Conservatism) is included as a predictor variable, whereas perceived 
threat from Pakistani-British is added to examine a mediating relationship between political 
ideology and bias. The results observed unpredictable and contradictory findings of MC within 
all 3 Experiments which showed more (not less) bias than CIIM (Experiment 1 & 2), and less 
bias in Experiment 3. Multiculturalism also consistently produced less support for Collective 
Action than did the Common Identity approach. Thus, the simultaneous effects of intergroup 
approaches on reducing bias and generating support for CA remained mixed and inconclusive. 
Liberals, as opposed to conservatives, however consistently replicated the significant effect of 
less bias and more support for CA in Experiments 1 through 3. Within Experiment 2 & 3, 
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perceived threat mediated the relationship of political ideology with bias and support for 
Collective Action.  
2.2 Introduction. 
 Multiculturalism, Bias and support for Collective Action. 
The multiculturalism approach, or the acknowledgment and appreciation of 
commonalities and differences between groups, has often been found to be effective in producing 
less intergroup bias and enhanced tolerance levels, in producing more positive attitudes towards 
immigrants, and bridging the attitudinal (negative perceptions) gap between immigrants and 
majority groups (Apfelbaum, Norton, & Sommers, 2012; Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; 
Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2014; Ryan, Casas, & Thompson, 2010; Wolsko et al., 2006; 
Reicheson & Nussbaum, 2004). However, other recent research has begun to show situations and 
countries in which the multiculturalism approach may be less effective and one such place may 
be the United Kingdom (Heath & Demireva, 2014; Guimond et al., 2013; Tip et al., 2012; 2015). 
Within this Chapter, we set out to review some of the common approaches used to reduce bias 
and increase support for collective action toward disadvantaged groups. 
Though the British government has not incorporated the term Multiculturalism within the 
official policy documents, the government’s policies, however, were introduced with an emphasis 
on integration of different ethnicities but keeping their individual and group liberties within 
British society. The main aim of the integration and cohesion policy was to overcome the racial 
discrimination and develop intergroup harmony among diverse communities (Favell, 2001; 
Howarth & Andreouli, 2016; Parekh, 2000), and this focus helped to essentially generate a 
multicultural policy in practice. Though, this practice has received less support from the 
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government since 2010. The fundamental philosophy of multiculturalism was to maintain the 
cultural colourfulness as a positive aspect of a diverse society in order to encourage acceptance 
and positive intergroup attitudes (Ashcroft & Bevir, 2018; Kymlica, 2012; Mathieu, 2018; Plaut 
et al., 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkeutyn, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000). Further, the 
multiculturalism research focus was in the context of endorsement by the majority or minority 
groups and it observed a trend of minority groups favouring the ethnic identity (Liebkind, 
Mähönen, Varjonen, & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2016; Schalk-Soekar, 2007; Verkuyten, 2005; 
Verkuyten, & Fleischmann, 2017) whereas, majority groups preferred the national 
(superordinate) identity (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2008; Guerra, Gaertner, António, & 
Deegan, 2015; Kunst et al., 2015; Staerklé et al., 2010). This aspect was also observed by Hui, 
Chen, Leung, and Berry, (2015) and Verkeutyn and Martinovic (2006) that the ethnic minorities 
favour multiculturalism more than the dominant majority groups. The causal factor behind such 
contradictory perceptions is considered as the perceived threat to social and cultural values 
(Stephan et al., 2000, 2009; Verkuyten, 2009). Within this context, Tip and colleagues (2012) 
observed negative perception of MC among White-British people when they saw Pakistani-
British people adhering to their individual culture. However, Sivanandan (2007) reflected on his 
approach on multiculturalism in the UK as a means of cultural diversity leading to take the course 
towards either integration or separatism depending on the political and social context in the 
country. People with politically liberal ideology may endorse MC more positively and show more 
willingness to CA than the conservatives since conservatism is associated with ethnocentrism and 
focuses on maintaining the status quo (Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost, et al., 2003; Tip et al., 2012). 
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Within the global perspective, one of the first official multicultural policy was introduced 
by the government of Canada in 1971. This policy statement clearly defined the role of 
government, local Canadians, and immigrants/ethnic groups by emphasising the individual 
freedom, intergroup contact ensuing mutual acceptance and cultural cohesion under the 
supervision of government (Berry 1984; Berry & Kalin, 1995). Berry and Kalin (1995) provided 
an overview of the National Survey of Canada (Reid, 1991) in which they assessed the need to 
maintain multicultural and ethnic attitudes on four levels; 
1. “there needs to be general support for multiculturalism, including acceptance of various 
aspects and consequences of the policy, and of cultural diversity as a valuable resource for a 
society”, 
2. “there should be overall low levels of intolerance or prejudice in the population”, 
3. “there should be generally positive mutual attitudes among the various ethnocultural 
groups that constitute the society”, 
4. “there needs to be a degree of attachment to the larger Canadian society, but without 
derogation of its constituent ethnocultural groups” (p. 302).  
 
The results of the 1974 to 1991 survey data found that Canadians not only maintained 
their support of the multicultural ideology, but actually showed increased levels in later years 
(i.e., the mean level of support increased from 4.71 to 5.95). Researchers also found an 
augmented acceptance for a diverse Canadian society with no considerable evidence of bias and 
discrimination. On the aspect of attachment to Canada, the positive attitudes were observed 
where the attachment to Canada did not reduce the adherence to the individual cultural identity 
and vice versa. These findings indicate the role of multiculturalism as a pillar of intergroup 
relationships where groups perceive each other positively following frequent contact and 
interaction (Allport, 1954; Hui et al., 2015).  
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In this context, Wolsko et al., (2000) examined the role of multiculturalism and 
colourblindness (often operationalised as a focus on intergroup commonalities) in relation to 
intergroup contact and bias reduction within the United States. They observed that both 
approaches were equally effective in reducing bias and low stereotypic attitudes towards 
outgroups. People who endorsed the MC approach perceived outgroups more positively due to 
the nature of MC as being accepting of the inter-ethnic differences (Wolsko et al., 2006). 
Verkuyten (2005), however, explored the differences of MC endorsement and perception of 
ingroup and outgroup in opposite directions between ethnic majority and minority groups of the 
Dutch society. Comparing an assimilation (i.e., expectation from immigrants to adopt the host 
culture) condition to an MC condition, the researchers observed that the minority group members 
in the MC condition perceived their ingroup positively, but the majority group members in the 
MC condition considered the minority group negatively, and positively only in the assimilation 
condition. 
Other most recent evidence by Whitley and Webster (2018) conducted meta-analysis of 
the 97 studies, divided in 42 US and 57 non-US experimental and correlational research on 
intergroup ideologies (i.e., MC, CB and Assimilation) and their relationship to prejudice. The 
results found a negative association between MC and explicit prejudice (g. = -0.26) which 
indicated that the endorsement of multiculturalism would lead to decreased prejudice. However, 
this relationship was stronger in correlational studies as compared to the experimental studies 
included in this meta-analysis. The assimilation ideology was strongly and positively related to 
bias in correlational studies. Further, subsequent research based on the findings of Yogeeswaran 
and Dasgupta (2014) on the Abstract and Concrete representations of MC, this meta-analysis 
57 
 
identified studies that primed those representations with MC to observe the priming effects with 
control conditions. There was slight increase in explicit prejudice (g. = 0.20) with concrete MC 
priming (e.g., consistent with Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014), but with abstract priming the 
results showed a slight decrease in implicit prejudice (g. = 0.07), although both effect sizes were 
small. According to the discussion of Yogeeswaran and Dasgupta (2014), the concrete 
representations of MC stimulated the feelings of symbolic threat which cause prejudice, similarly 
conservatives also showed increased levels of prejudice with concrete representations. When the 
results of the meta-analysis compared the relationship between CB/MC and reduced prejudice, 
MC and reduced prejudice showed larger association (g = 0.15) as compared to CB and 
prejudice, hence confirmed the previous research (e.g., Neville et al., 2013; Rattan & Ambady, 
2013; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010; Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013). The 
findings of this most recent meta-analysis support the literature by indicating that MC is the most 
promising intergroup approach to prejudice reduction and improving intergroup relationships 
while compared with CB and Assimilation. In Chapter 2, we have used the MC and CB (i.e., 
Commonality) approaches that have been used by previous researchers (Richeson & Nussbaum, 
2004; Wolsko et al., 2000; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). 
Considering the rise of cultural and ethnic diversity leading to biased interactions which 
may interfere with the efforts to induce intergroup harmony and support for each other for both 
implicit and explicit behaviours of majority group members within the U.S. (Dovidio, Kawakami, 
& Gaertner, 2002), the purpose of introducing intergroup strategies (i.e., MC or 
Commonality/Common Ingroup Identity, or Assimilative strategies) was to test their 
effectiveness in reducing biases (implicit and explicit) (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew, 
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Wagner, Trop & Christ, 2011). Varour, Gagnon and Sasaki (2009) examined antiracism and used 
Colourblind (i.e., Common Ingroup Identity) and Multiculturalism approaches to test how the 
dominant group (White Canadian) and minority groups (Aboriginal Canadians) responded to 
identity salience manipulations in intergroup contacts. They manipulated these intergroup 
approaches in the controlled laboratory settings and White participants read the information about 
their partner who belonged to the opposite ethnic group (no actual contact involved) prior to be 
randomly assigned to the conditions (i.e., White Canadian was supposed to read a sheet 
indicating the ethnicity of Aboriginal and an Aboriginal had to read about the White Canadian; 
Study 1). They also adapted the MC and CB prompt manipulations by Wolsko et al., (2000). 
Their hypothesis was to explore if MC would generate positivity towards outgroups among the 
dominant groups and CB would have negative effect accompanied by the concerns about the 
identity of minority members. In their study 2, they studied real interpersonal contact through a 
discussion session to see the mediating effect of “enhanced other-focus” on behaviour in the MC 
prompt condition. These researchers found consistent results with their hypotheses and observed 
that MC generated positive outgroup attitudes and direct outward attention following intergroup 
interaction as compared to Colourblind prompts among both the White Canadians and the 
Aboriginal ethnic group. Further, Plaut, Thomas, and Goren (2009) investigated the 
psychological engagement of the minority colleagues and observed that the White majority 
members, in MC condition, perceived better engagement of their minority partners during 
interactions than in the CB condition, which improved their positivity towards diversity in 




Visintin, Birtel, and Crisp (2017) assessed the effectiveness of an imagined contact 
intervention (i.e., in which participants imagine contact with an outgroup and reflect about that 
imagined contact) within intergroup ideologies with the British sample. In their research, they 
primed participants with either MC or CB manipulations (adapted from Wolsko et al., 2000) to 
observe the effects of outgroup attitudes comprising of warmth and competence perceptions on 
the members of typical or atypical outgroups. The researchers knew the MC ideology had shown 
positive perception towards an outgroup following an imagined contact better than CB in the 
literature (see also Brown & Hewstone, 2005), however, this trend was opposite towards atypical 
groups in which imagined MC contact towards atypical group did not show any difference of 
attitudes than the CB. Their target groups were British Muslims, Moroccans, Asians (typical of a 
group) and, physically disabled people and people with Schizophrenia (atypical groups). 
Participants imagined contact with these groups and a conversation with an unknown British 
Muslim. The results found that those who were primed with an MC approach perceived atypical 
groups less positively than those in the CB approach. However, the MC approach produced more 
positive attitudes for the typical groups than the CB approach, thus as the researchers suggested 
that a consideration of the group typicality while designing studies and interventions looking into 
intergroup relations may be vital (Visintin et al., 2017). 
Besides the significant role of MC in the promotion of positive intergroup interaction, and 
in bias reduction, recently MC has been criticised for its emphasis on maintaining individual 
identities, which may undermine the efforts of integration and acceptance within countries in 
which there is growing perceptions of threat from outsiders. The incident of 9/11 and the 
following Islamophobia paved the way for media to target multiculturalism with reference to the 
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immigrants / Muslims. The critics argued that MC developed a widespread political divide where 
liberals support the MC ideology on the one hand, and on the other hand, conservatives feel 
threatened by it (Morrison et al., 2010). Threats have been measured in relation to core values 
(i.e., perceived symbolic threats) and fear of scarcity of resources of the host groups (i.e., 
perceived realistic threats), which surfaced in the form of intergroup biases (Stephan et al., 1998, 
1999, 2002; 2015; Thomas & Plaut, 2008; Verkuyten, 2004, 2006). These threats do not have to 
be objectively real; the simple perception of a threat has been linked to negative intergroup 
attitudes and biases (Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2009; 2015).  
The ex-British Prime Minister, David Cameron (Kuenssberg, 2011) declared MC as a 
failed policy leading to community segregation and his speech about MC proved to be an official 
backlash to the multicultural policy. The further war on terror to curb Al-Qaeda and Taliban may 
also have inflamed the biased mindsets against immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants in 
the UK and the Western European communities. Other factors involved include the perceived 
economic threat among disadvantaged sections of the host society and perceived threats to the 
fundamental British values. Consequently, the public has had an increased islamophobia and fear 
of interacting and supporting the immigrants (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Hagendoorn, 2007). 
The criticism on MC has begun to be studied in order to explore the perceived side effects of MC, 
how the efficacy of MC could be improved in diverse countries, and any mediating factors 
(Banting & Kymlica, 2012). 
In an academic research project with White American students, Morrison and colleagues 
(2010) examined whether MC would negatively, or positively influence the intergroup attitudes 
of White Americans in the context of their level of ethnic identification within the U.S. In study 
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1, they manipulated the passages about Multicultural (MC) and Colourblind (CB) and 
hypothesised that MC prime would bring up increased support for group-based dominance 
among White-Americans college students (i.e., Social Dominance Orientation / SDO) if they 
were highly identified with their ethnic identity. The results of the study 1 were consistent to this 
hypothesis, however, they further tested the model for the generalisability by including an adult 
sample other than students, and by changing the manipulation in Study 2. Explicit Prejudice 
against Asian-Americans, Black-Americans and Latinos was measured as a dependent variable in 
this study. The results supported the predictions and found that the participants in MC condition 
who identified strongly with their American identity, expressed higher prejudice against ethnic 
groups than participants in CB or Control conditions. The researchers claimed that the results 
supported the criticism on MC as one source of intergroup problems. Further, the results also 
supported the Intergroup Threat Theory because highly identified majority members responded 
less positively to the MC approach, which would potentially be due to experiencing higher levels 
of threat (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; Morrison, Plaut & Yabarra, 2010; Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 
2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). This research, however, did not measure perceptions of threat 
in relation to multiculturalism, but other research has.  
Amid the widespread criticism across Europe on multiculturalism as leading towards 
social isolation of ethnic/immigrant groups, and entrenchment as disintegrated identities of a 
society, Heath and Demireva (2014) used the statement of Ex-Prime Minister David Cameron 
concerning the failure of MC in the UK and collected data from 2010 Ethnic Minority British 
Election Survey (EMBES). The survey respondents were a sample of people from various ethnic 
minority and religious groups of UK such as; Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and Christians from 
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Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, black Caribbean and black African background. The main aim of 
the survey was to explore the ethno-religious integration under the “thin” (i.e., less explicit and 
vague) implementation of Multicultural policies among British ethnic groups. The ethnic groups 
represented at least three generations (i.e., Non-British born grandparents/adults, British born 
parents, and British born young generation). Nearly all the generations found themselves 
compatible with the British identity along with their individual ethnic identity. Yet, on the other 
hand, ethnic groups agreed that perceived discrimination was the causal factor underlying the 
poor integration claims. However, the researchers claimed that their results were consistent with 
the similar findings of Koopmans (2010) and Wright and Bloemraad (2012) who had found 
British people more favourable towards integrating the immigrants than their other European 
countries (for review, Koopmans, 2010; Wright & Bloemraad, 2012).  
Yet other research has investigated attitudes towards multiculturalism within the UK, 
Germany, the US, and Canada, and has found a different result. Guimond et al., (2013) 
investigated four different nations with a notion that multiculturalism (MC) or assimilation (AS) 
may produce different effects in different countries depending on the intergroup norms of that 
country. Assimilation (AS) is an approach in which people believe that all groups should 
assimilate to the values and beliefs of the dominant or majority group within the country, and as 
such, is not the same as an approach that focuses on commonalities between groups. Results 
showed that countries varied in their support for a Multicultural approach versus an Assimilation 
approach to intergroup relations; endorsement of a multicultural norm was highest in Canada  
(M = 4.45), then the US (M = 3.74), the UK (M = 3.49), and Germany (M = 2.95). Thus, there is 
some evidence that a multicultural approach may not be as effective in the UK as it is in Canada. 
63 
 
This finding lends some evidence to investigating the effects within the UK and recent research 
supports the idea that multiculturalism may be experienced as threatening within the UK; 
research indicates that people experienced more threat from multiculturalism within the UK if 
they believed minority group members wanted to maintain their culture as opposed to wanting to 
adopt the British culture (Tip et al., 2012; Tip et al., 2015).  
Thus, there is a good amount of evidence showing the positive role of a multicultural 
approach in reducing bias. Yet, there also is some evidence that the effect of a multicultural 
approach may not be as effective within the UK. Given that our research for this dissertation 
began in 2013, the current set of Chapter 2 studies sought to test the unique role of MC within 
British context in comparison to a Commonality approach.  
 Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM). 
To fully review factors of intergroup bias and conflicts, it is essential to review the 
Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) that has been studied as parallel with MC, and which 
has been used extensively as a Commonality approach. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) created the 
Common Ingroup Identity Model based upon Sherif’s (1961) work on intergroup contact and the 
use of a superordinate identity (an identity that two subgroups can both identify with such as 
ethnic groups being British), and on the conceptual framework of Self Categorisation theory 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) and Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). They used the CII Model as a basis for a Commonality approach to intergroup 
relationships and have conducted extensive studies on its use as an effective strategy to reduce 
intergroup bias. The model relies on recategorisation of social categories and identities. Social 
categorisation can divide people on the bases of a variety of identities in order to differentiate 
64 
 
from one group to the other such as gender, ethnicity, class, race, culture, and religion. Group 
categorisation tends to minimise the differences within group members (i.e., forming ingroup) 
which leads to ingroup favouritism but overemphasise the differences between groups (i.e., 
forming outgroup) that develops outgroup enmity and bias (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy,2015; 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Tajfel, 1969). The process of minimising of social identity categories 
and of group boundaries is labelled as recategorisation. This process involves the development of 
the “us”, “we” and “our” terms emphasising inclusivity of previously outgroups into ingroups 
(see review Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2015; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) by involving them into 
superordinate group membership such as “British” (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) to overcome 
intergroup biases and to develop harmony. 
 Common Ingroup Identity, Bias, and Support for Collective Action. 
The Commonality approach based upon the Common Ingroup Identity Model encouraged 
recategorisation of sub-group identities into the superordinate identity in order to benefit social 
relations by reducing biases through positive interaction (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, 2012; 
Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Trust, 1993). The perception of inclusiveness within a 
superordinate group is the aim of the Commonality approach. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) 
discussed the “Circle of inclusion” of Allport (1954, p. 43) which described the hierarchical 
variations among groups and its members and the common ingroup identity goal accomplishment 
was carried over by the non-salience of this hierarchy.  
To examine whether the CIIM approach would show effects on the evaluations (study 1) 
and behaviours (study 2) of White-Americans towards Blacks, Neir and colleagues (2001) 
induced a common identity in both Black and White participants within the U.S sample. In 
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condition 1, participants were to perceive the confederate as a fellow group member, and in 
condition 2 as an individual person (e.g., outgroup). White participants had to interact with either 
a Black or a White confederate to rate them as favourable or unfavourable. It was found that, 
White participants had rated Black confederates more favourably when they were in the 
Commonality condition as opposed to the Individuation-focused condition. The researchers also 
tested the effects of CIIM on behaviour in the field during a football match between two 
universities. The interviewers were White and Black participants and their task was to request an 
interview from the fans of any university team. Consistently, the results showed the willingness 
of fans to give an interview to a Black interviewer if he belonged to the university team they were 
supporting. CIIM had induced prosocial behaviour among majority group members towards even 
a racial minority group based on their social affiliation (Black / University affiliation). The results 
indicated the positive role of CIIM for development of positive evaluations and behaviour 
towards those outgroups who share a common identity with the ingroup (Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, 
Banker & Ward, 2001).  
Although Common Identity approach does not make multiple identities vanish in the 
process of recategorisation, it may be a flexible approach to help resolve the intergroup conflict 
by forming an ingroup and changing perspective towards the previous outgroup to which they 
belonged (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2009; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Gaertner, Rust, 
Dovidio, Bachman and Anastasio (1994) designed a field survey for a multicultural, high-school 
students to test the perceptions of the conditions of contact hypothesis (i.e., improved intergroup 
relationships when groups interact under similar conditions, Allport, 1954) and its role in 
intergroup bias in the context of CIIM. The researchers hypothesised that some aspects of the 
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contact hypothesis; such as cooperative interdependence (e.g., groups interact in conditions 
required intergroup cooperation), equal status and interpersonal interaction and supportive norms 
would transform the student’s perceptions from belonging to varied student groups (i.e., subgroup 
identities) into one inclusive student body (i.e., common identity). The survey results established 
the effectiveness of the CIIM in reducing bias among students while inducing a sense of 
inclusivity in them by transforming their cognitive representations of “us” and “them” to “we” 
within a natural environment (Gaertner et al., 1994).  
Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, Matoka, Johnson and Frazier (1997) explained this 
phenomenon when they observed that recatogrisation and an emphasis on inclusive identity led to 
reduced bias within the framework of intergroup behaviour of helping, evaluations and self-
disclosure in the intergroup relations (Dovidio et al., 1997). This process also directed the group 
members to prefer common identity when the common resources found to have exhausted and 
urged group collectiveness to save and share resources among similar groups (Wit & Kerr, 2002). 
Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz, (2018) has recently observed that the non-Muslim Americans 
(ingroup) expressed less prejudice towards Muslims (outgroup) following a common narrative 
(i.e., discussion and belief over common issues) based interaction between both groups. 
However, CIIM has found to be effective in reducing bias and improving the motivation to move 
on engaging in intergroup contact among members of superordinate common group (i.e., 
previously belonging to ingroup, outgroup etc.) particularly when these group members act as 
being negatively influenced by their fellow group members (Gomez, Dovidio, Huici, Gaertner & 
Cuadrado, 2008).  
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Our further discussion leads us towards the aspect of cultural diversity within Europe, 
including the UK. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) had pointed out that the aspect of categorising 
people based on their cultural backgrounds and associated stereotypes could lead people to 
compare themselves as a competitive entity resulting into intergroup conflict and bias (see also 
Putnam, 2007). Thus, group prototypicality plays a key role in the perception of such groups 
towards each other. In this context, majority group members may perceive their group as more 
prototypical of the overarching group (i.e., British within the UK), and minority group members 
may also perceive in the similar way to the other groups. In this case, both groups could 
discriminate against one another in these categories. Ufkes, and colleagues (2012) conducted two 
field studies to examine the role of a common identity for minority and majority members of the 
culturally diverse neighbourhood of Netherlands. They chose native Dutch inhabitants as a 
cultural majority group, whereas residents with non-Western identity were chosen as a cultural 
minority with a prediction that both groups would have a strong identification with their shared 
district (superordinate common identity). The results of both studies validated the role of CIIM to 
advance the intergroup contacts where the majority and minority groups perceived each other 
more positively following the knowledge that the other cultural groups belong to same district as 
themselves. In our current project, we will examine the perspective of majority group (White-
British) towards minority group (Pakistani-British) with reference to the influence of CIIM in 
reducing bias and generating support for Collective Action (Ufkes et al., 2012). 
Majority and minority perspectives within the context of Common Identity approach may 
cause overlooking of individual differences and of disadvantages experienced by groups (i.e., 
minority groups). Due to the majority group’s efforts to possess higher social status to flout the 
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group disparities, their superordinate group appears homogeneous which undermines efforts of 
any social action towards minority groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). 
The dissolution of individual identities into common superordinate identities undermine the 
efforts of minorities to challenge the status quo and stand up for their collective rights or gather 
support for collective action due to the non-existence of apparent differences (Dixon et al., 2010). 
The subsequent power struggle created by imbalanced approaches in identity representations 
strain the group relations ending in conflict (Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy & Johnson, 
2010). This dilemma has been observed as the conflicting preferences of the majority and 
minority groups. Majority groups prefer to maintain higher social status quo as common identity, 
whereas minority groups often wish to have their group-identity remain intact (Dovidio, Gaertner 
& Saguy, 2009; Gaertner et al., 1989; Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008; González & Brown, 2003). 
In numerous studies in White and Black Americans relations, induction of the common American 
identity in both groups, appeared to reduce ingroup bias and promoted group harmony, but at the 
same time reduced the sensitivity of Whites to realise any discriminations for disadvantaged 
groups (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Saguy et al., 2009, Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, 
Pratto & Singh, 2011) or to take collective action to reduce disadvantages ((Dixon, Durheim & 
Tredoux, 2007; Glasford & Dovidio, 2011).  
Banfield and Dovidio (2013) sought to observe the effect of the Common Identity 
approach on majority group member’s perceptions of discrimination and willingness to help 
protest.  In Experiment 2, they found that a commonality focus led to less detection of subtle 
discrimination, but not blatant discrimination. In Experiments 2 and 3, they found that a common 
identity led to less willingness to protest blatant discrimination in comparison to a dual-identity 
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focus; which emphasises a focus on the common identity and the relevant subgroup identity. The 
current dissertation research within Chapter 2 began prior to the publication of the Banfield and 
Dovidio study, thus the Chapter 2 research did not initially set out to test the effects of a dual-
identity approach, and instead focused on a multiculturalism approach. Overall, while CIIM 
appears effective in reducing bias and improving intergroup relations, it may not show promising 
results towards identification of disadvantaged treatment and unfair attitudes towards minorities 
which would possibly lead to support for collective action (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Ufkes et 
al., 2016).  
A similar trend is observed by the minority group members under the umbrella of single 
superordinate identity who accept the status quo and system injustices and, ignore the deprived 
status of their group resulting in lack of interest to take collective action (Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 
2004). Thus, this phenomenon creates ‘irony of harmony’ as Saguy and colleagues (2009) termed 
it and explained within the minority, majority CIIM framework (Ufkes et al., 2012; Ufkes, 
Dovidio & Tel, 2015). Saguy and colleagues (2009, study 2) explored the lack of support for 
social action to change among Arabs who found themselves in favour of Jews through positive 
intergroup interaction which was associated with minimum levels of social support. Friendships 
between majority and minority groups also reduced intergroup bias, but this positivity 
undermined the recognition of group disparities, which could reduce efforts for social action 
(Dixon et al., 2010; Saguy et al., 2011; Saguy & Chernayak Hai, 2012). 
2.3 The current Research. 
Following such conflicting results of CIIM and Multiculturalism with reference to bias 
reduction towards outgroups (including ethnic minority and religious groups) and collective 
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action efforts, we sought to examine the effects of a Common Identity approach in comparison to 
the Multiculturalism approach in Experiments 1 and 2. At the time that we had begun this 
dissertation research, no research had examined the effects of these approaches on both Bias and 
Support for Collective Action within the same study, so we aimed to measure them both at the 
same time. Moreover, these studies were conducted prior to many of the dual-identity research 
that showed its negative effects on discrimination detection and collective action support among 
majority groups (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Ufkes et al., 2016); thus, we had not included this 
approach within the initial experiments. Finally, the conflicting results of the CIIM and 
Multicultural approaches, and the results of our Experiments 1 and 2 led us to test a variation on 
Common Identity approach in which the group identity (i.e., Pakistani-British / White-British) 
was ‘NOT’ highlighted / made salient (CWO; see Appendix H, choose response items without 
highlighting subgroup identities). This Common Ingroup Identity without highlighting subgroup 
identities (CWO) is a newly coined term by us and we aimed to examine its effects on reducing 
bias and willingness to support for CA among White-British sample. The CWO ideology draws 
attention to non-salience of group identities. In Experiment 1 and 2, we have used the 
Commonality approach manipulation from Richeson and Nussbaum (2004), which included the 
19 items to choose from such items the participants would find most like their own probable 
responses. These items had been adapted so that Pakistani-British and White-British identities 
were highlighted (underlined) and in experiment 3 we manipulated these items by removing the 
highlighted (underlined) group identities in order to make the subgroup identities non-salient (see 
methodology experiment 3). 
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Within these experiments, we included political ideology as a critical predicting factor 
within the statistical analysis model as a means of controlling for ideological effects on the bias 
outcome measure. In general, based on the research that demonstrated that liberals show less 
acceptance of inequality and thus may support collective action more and may show less bias 
toward the immigrant outgroup (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 
2009; Jost et al., 2003). In addition to that, political liberalism has been shown to be associated 
with more positive attitudes toward gays and lesbians, Muslim Americans, and Arabs 
(Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; Nisbet & Shanahan, 2004; Webster et al., 2014; Whitley 
& Lee, 2000; Webster, Burns, Pickering, & Saucier, 2014), show less outgroup hostility (Kugler 
et al.,  2014), and have more positive feelings toward non-normative groups (Luguri, Napier, & 
Dovidio, 2012) and low-status groups such as immigrants (Brooks, Manza, & Cohen, 2016; 
Pettigrew et al., 2007). Thus, we included the factor of political ideology in the model of attitudes 
towards Pakistani-British. 
The current research covers three experiments that test the first line of our two-line 
research. In this Chapter, we examine the role of Multiculturalism (MC), Commonality (CIIM), 
and Commonality Without Highlighting (CWO) in relation to the bias reduction towards 
Pakistani-British people (minority group) and willingness to support for Collective Action by the 
White-British people (majority group). Our research will be exploring the simultaneous role of 
these intergroup approaches on bias reduction and support for collective action. The aim of the 
Experiment 1 will be to test whether Commonality or Multiculturalism will be effective 
approaches in reducing bias and increasing support for CA, we further predict that political 
conservatives will significantly show more bias and less support for CA than the liberals. In the 
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Experiment 2, we will include control condition to find the consistency in the efficacy of the 
findings of MC and commonality within the same variables and measures used in Experiment 1. 
The Experiment 3 will further test the CIIM and CWO with MC to explore if the same CIIM 
prompt used as CWO prompt with the removal of identity highlighting would have a parallel 
effect on bias reduction and support for CA. 
2.4 Experiment 1 
 Introduction. 
Earlier research showed multiculturalism more effective in reducing bias than 
commonality approaches (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Voraurer et al.,2009), though these 
findings are contradictory, yet willingness to support collective action has usually not been 
assessed alongside these intergroup approaches (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005; 
Vorauer et al., 2009; Dixon et al., 2011). Further, many of this research has been conducted in 
countries that perceived multiculturalism positively (e.g., U.S. and Canada), however, some 
research has begun recently to show that different countries may be less supportive of 
multiculturalism including UK, and this view may change reactions to this approach (Guimond, 
et al., 2013). In view of the effect of MC and CIIM on bias reduction, it was unclear if the same 
effect would be observed on support for Collective Action because reducing bias may be 
incompatible with increasing support for Collective Action because it may minimize intergroup 
comparison and perceptions of disadvantage (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Dixon et al., 2011). We 
predicted political orientation to observe whether this would interact with intergroup approaches 
considering some previous research has shown that people with conservative ideology react more 
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negatively to the idea of multiculturalism, so this being a crucial empirical question we tested this 
also.  
2.5 Methodology 
 Hypotheses.    
 In the Experiment 1, we predicted that Multiculturalism prompt will show less bias than CIIM 
condition while increasing support for CA towards Pakistani-British group. This means that 
lower scores by the White-British participants on both implicit and explicit bias measures was 
indicated by less bias. Political ideology hypothesized that liberalism would be related to less 
implicit and explicit bias and more support for CA compared with conservative political 
ideology. We also predicted an interaction between intergroup prompt and political orientation on 
implicit and explicit bias reduction. The aim of the experiment was to examine the effectiveness 
of these approaches in reducing bias and support for CA concurrently. 
 
 Participants. 
Fifty-eight (N = 58) Psychology undergraduate students at the University of Birmingham 
completed the lab study in compensation of course credits. No formal power analysis had been 
conducted at this time because almost no studies had provided measures or effect size or critical 
information for calculating effect sizes (i.e., Means, Confidence Intervals, and Standard Error). 
Thus, we aimed to obtain approximately 30 participants per condition, which was often used in 
these types of studies. The final data analysis included fifty-four (N = 54) participants due to 
filtering of participants. We used the standard procedure for removing three participants who 
failed to follow instructions and who responded on the AMP implicit bias measure with the same 
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key response on ninety-eight or more of all test trials (Payne 69 & Lundberg, 2014); as in past 
research, we also removed one participant who could speak Chinese and therefore read the AMP 
stimulus materials. The age of participants ranged between 18 and 31 years (M = 19.72, SD = 
2.50). There were 98.1% Caucasian and 88.9% female participants in the final sample. 
 Design.   
This experiment used a 2 (intergroup prompts: Multiculturalism and Common Ingroup 
Identity Model) ×2 (Political Orientation: liberal vs conservatives) research design with 
intergroup prompt as a between participant factor and political orientation as a measured, 
continuous variable. Implicit Bias, Explicit Bias, and Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-
British people were the outcome variables.  
 Materials. 
 Intergroup Prompts: Participants first read the instructions based standard paragraph 
introducing the topic of our interest in people’s impression of various ethnic groups, which was 
adapted from Richeson and Nussbaum (2004, see Appendix A). We adapted this paragraph to say 
that we would be asking them about their perceptions regarding two different ethnic groups, 
Pakistani-British people and White-British people. They then read a paragraph endorsing either a 
Multicultural or a Common Ingroup Identity approach (see Appendix B/E); these prompts were 
adapted from Richeson and Nussbaum (2004). Following the paragraph, participants completed 
five free responses (i.e., thought listings) in which they stated why they considered either of the 
approach (MC/ CIIM depending on the prompt they saw) as a positive intergroup approach. In 
the last section of the prompt manipulation, participants finished by circling responses that were 
most like their own potential responses from a list of nineteen responses selected from Richeson 
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and Nussbaum (see Appendix C). These responses endorsed either multiculturalism or the 
commonality approach depending upon the condition. The reason for using free responses (e.g., 
thought listings) and circle responses was to encourage the agreement of the participants with the 
ideological perspectives endorsed within the prompts presented in each condition (Richeson & 
Nussbaum, 2004).  
 Lexical Decision Task (LDT): Following prompt manipulation, we used a Lexical 
Decision Task (LDT, Meyer & Schvanevel, 1971) to separate the prompt manipulation from the 
bias measures. Two blocks consisted of 96 trials each based on 6 sets of words (LDT Negative = 
7, LDT Positive = 7, Negative stereotype = 7, Positive Stereotype =7, Non-words = 20, Words = 
4, see Appendix I); these words were matched on length, evaluative extremity, and frequency of 
use within the English language and non-words were matched on length.  Participants were 
briefed about how we were interested in the way people make simple but quick decisions in a 
vocabulary processing task. Then they were instructed that they will be presented a letter and 
their job was “to determine as quickly and as accurately as possible, whether the letters make up 
a word or not”. In each trial, a fixation mark (+) appeared for 500ms/milliseconds and was 
replaced immediately by either a word or non-word. The word or non-word remained on the 
screen until participants responded “Yes / No” on the keys labelled as “Yes” and “No”. 
Participants first completed 8 practice trials, and then they completed the two blocks of critical 
trials.  Within each block of 96 trials, participants saw each of the 28 words two times for a total 
of 56 trials and each of the non-words two times for a total of 40 trials. 
 Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP): We used the AMP to measure implicit attitude 
bias toward Pakistani-British; this measure has been shown to be a valid indirect measure of 
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attitude bias (Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2008; Payne et al., 2010; 
Payne & Lundberg, 2014). In the AMP instructions, the participants were shown a 
Pakistani/Indian face as immigrant whereas, a White face was shown as a non-immigrant 
example. We used the standard timing and number of trials for the AMP (Payne et al., 2005). On 
each trial, participants briefly saw either a photograph of a Pakistani-British face, a White face, or 
a neutral Grey square as the prime image (75ms/milliseconds), and then this photograph was 
replaced by a black screen for 125ms, and then the blank screen was replaced with the drawing (a 
Chinese pictograph) that was presented for 100ms. After the pictograph disappeared, a television-
static pattern mask appeared and remained on the screen until participants responded to the 
pictograph by pressing either the key labelled Pleasant or the key labelled Unpleasant. 
Participants were instructed to ignore the real-life images of faces and instead make quick 
judgements about each drawing by judging whether the pictograph drawing appeared to be more 
or less pleasant than average. They had four practice trials to familiarise themselves with the task 
prior to completing the 72 critical trials. Seventy-two pictographs were shown one time each for 
each of the 72 critical trials, while 12 Pakistani faces, 12 White faces, and 12 Grey squares were 
presented once within the first block of 36 trials and once within the second block of trials (i.e., 
once in each block of 36 trials for a total of 72 trials). Each prime was randomly paired with 
pictographs within each block of 36 trials (see Figure 1 for AMP Process & see Appendix J). We 
used the standard scoring procedure from past research by taking the percentage of pleasant 
responses after White faces and subtracting the percentage of pleasant responses after Pakistani 
faces; thus, scores can range from 1 to -1 and higher scores indicated more positive bias toward 
White faces in comparison to Pakistani faces (AMP; Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010).  
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Figure: 1. AMP process. 
            
        
               
 
               
 
 
     
                                                                                                    
 
  
Pakistani face, White face, or Grey square prime:  75ms 
then disappears 
(Randomized White or Pakistani face) 
Drawing: 100ms presentation then disappears 
TV Static: Remains on screen until the participant responds  
Response:  Unpleasant or Pleasant (Using U/P keys) 
Black mask:  125ms presentation then disappears 
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Collective Action Measure: Support for collective action was assessed using Collective 
Action scale adapted from Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, and Pratto, (2009). The scale was based on 
three questions which were concerned with various levels of support people might have for 
policies related to Pakistani-British people and life within the UK. The participants were required 
to rate their responses using a five-points rating scale of (1) Support Not at All to (5) Support 
Completely. The example of items is “I support legislation through which Pakistani-British 
people will be guaranteed equal work opportunities as White-British people in the UK” (see 
Appendix K). The questions were randomized within the scale. Higher scores indicated more 
support for collective action (M = 3.26, SD = 1.42, α = .74).  
Filler Tasks: Participants completed some filler tasks to separate the collective action and 
the implicit bias measures from the explicit bias measures. They completed a single question that 
asked them “To what extent would you consider the inequality between White-British and 
Pakistani-British groups as fair or just”? They were required to rate their responses on five-point 
scale (1) not at all just to (5) completely just. Next, they completed two items that asked them 
“how often do you feel that you, personally, are discriminated against because of your race”, and 
“how often do you feel that members of your race group are discriminated against in this country. 
The answers were labelled on five-point rating scale from (1) Not at All to (5) Very Much. 
Finally, they answered a Subjective Happiness Scale that included four items that required 
participants to describe themselves on a seven-point scale, e.g., “Compared with most of my 
peers, I consider myself”; (1) not a very happy person to (7) a very happy person (see Appendix 
L). Higher scores indicated more subjective happiness (M = 4.87, SD = 2.38, α = .89). 
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 Explicit Bias Measure: The next measure was a five-item Feeling Thermometer scale 
used to assess the explicit bias, which has been previously validated in intergroup research 
(Haddock, Zanna & Esses 1993; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). In this measure, participants 
rated their feelings toward Pakistani-British people on a nine-point Likert scale, ranging along the 
extremes of each of the following five dimensions: warmth = (1) Extremely warm to; (9) 
Extremely cold; positivity = (1) Extremely positive to (9) Extremely negative; friendliness = (1) 
Extremely friendly to (9) Extremely unfriendly; trustworthiness = (1) Extremely trusting to (9) 
Extremely suspicious; admiration =  (1) Extreme admiration to (9) Extreme disgust (see 
Appendix M). Higher scores indicated a more negative evaluation of bias (M = 4.24, SD = 1.79,  
α = .84). 
 Debriefing and Manipulation Checks: Participants were further asked to answer filler 
questions to allow them to express their opinion and to further obscure the specific purpose of the 
experiment so that later participants would not be made aware of the exact hypotheses prior to the 
completion of the experiment. First question related to the purpose of the experiment “What do 
you think the purpose of the study was? Next question was “How many experiments or studies 
have you been in today” with maximum seven numbers to respond. Following this, they were 
asked, “How hard did you try at the task where you rated the pleasantness of the drawings”, to 
respond on a five-point scale (1) Not at all hard to (5) extremely hard with moderately hard as 
the mid-point.  
 Demographics: At the end of the experiment, participants completed demographic 
variables including age, gender (male, female) and ethnicity (southeast Asian, White, African, 
African American, Middle Eastern or North African, Indian or Indian Subcontinent, Latino or 
Hispanics, Other, see Appendix N). Participants were also asked three filler questions about the 
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English as foreign language. Those questions were “Is English your first language (i.e., your 
native language)” to answer with “yes/no”; “How many years have you spoken English? Please 
type in a number (e.g., 10)”; “How many years have you been able to read English?   Please type 
in a number (e.g., 10)”; and “How many years have you lived in the United Kingdom?” Finally, 
participants rated their personal political orientation on a nine-point, vertical scale from (1) 
extremely conservative to (9) extremely liberal, with a moderate as the mid-point (5) as was used 
in Jost et al (2007). This political orientation item has often been included within demographics 
in previous research (Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Fitzgerald & Wickwire, 2012).  
2.6  Procedure. 
To recruit the participants from the school of Psychology, we used the online Research 
Participation Scheme (RPS) in which psychology students completed the experiment in exchange 
for course credit. In each session, the research assistant greeted a maximum of four participants 
and randomly assigned each of them to one of the four lab cubicles with a randomisation of 
condition. Participants read and signed the consent forms and started the experiment on the 
computers using Medialab and Direct RT (version 2012, Empirisoft Corporation, 2008) software 
for stimuli and questionnaire presentation. They then completed either the Multiculturalism 
prompt manipulation or the Common Identity manipulation depending on which condition they 
were randomly assigned. Next, participants completed the filler LDT Task that provided a small 
separation between the Intergroup Prompts and the AMP Implicit Bias measure, which they 
completed next. They then completed the Collective Action scale, the Filler Tasks (e.g., 
subjective happiness scale), then the Explicit Bias measure, and finally the final filler tasks and 
the demographic variables. Participants were debriefed and thanked after experiment completion.  
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2.7 Results.  
A multiple linear regression analysis was performed to analyse the effect of the Intergroup 
Prompt (Multiculturalism vs Common Identity) on Implicit Bias with Political Orientation 
included as a predictor variable, and the two-way interaction included within the regression 
equation model. Higher Implicit Bias scores indicated more positive bias toward White faces in 
comparison to Pakistani faces (or alternatively, more negative bias toward Pakistani faces in 
comparison to White faces; the AMP can be calculated in either direction, but the statistical 
implications remain the same). Fifty-four participants were included in the final analysis. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are in the Tables 1 and 2 below. Including this, in all the 
following experiments, data were checked for linearity, normality, outliers (using degrees of 
freedom betas), and homoscedasticity. All data met these regression assumptions and no 
participants had to be removed. 
 In the first multiple regression analysis the data was found normally distributed, 
Intergroup Prompt was effects coded (-1 = MC, 1 = CIIM) and Political Orientation was 
standardized (hence it is referred to as zPoilitical) prior to the Prompt x Political interaction being 
created as recommended for multiple regression interactions (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 
2003). We found a significant simple effect of Intergroup Prompt on Implicit Bias toward 
Pakistani-British in which Multiculturalism produced more Implicit Bias than the Common 
Identity approach; R2 = .07, β = 0.26, t = 2.05, p = .046 (see Figure 2); the direction of this effect 
was contrary to the general consensus within the intergroup literature within North America 
where MC always showed reduced bias (MC, M = 0.12, SD = 0.28; CIIM, M = -0.02, SD = 0.20). 
In the further analysis, political orientation was a significant negative predictor of Implicit Bias, 
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R2 = .12, β = -0.35, t = -2.73, p = .009, which indicated that liberals showed significantly less 
Implicit Bias than did conservatives, which is consistent with much of the intergroup literature 
(see Figure 3). However, the Intergroup Prompt x zPolitical Orientation interaction was non-
significant, R2 = .001, β = .03, t = .27, p = .789 in this model.   
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 








Variables   M SD    1 2 3 4 
1. White ingroup 
bias 
   .052 .256     -    
2. Prompts   .074  1.00    .268   -   
3. zPolitical   .004 .977     -.345 .011   -  
4. PromptsxzPol    .011 .977     .035 .003  .002   - 
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Table 2. Discriptive Statistics 
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
Dependent Variable: Support for CA, N = 54 
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Simple effect of effects-coded Intergroup Prompt (-1 = MC, 1 = CIIM) on Implicit 



















































Variables   M SD 1 2 3 4  
1. Support CA   3.284 .993      
2. Effects coded 
conditions 
 .074 1.01 -.273 -    
3. zPolitical  .004  .978 .011   .403 -   
4. PromptsxzPol   .011 .978   -.016   .003 .002 -  





Figure 3: Simple effect of Political Orientation on Implicit Bias toward Pakistani-British people. 
  
 A second multiple linear regression was conducted on Support for Collective Action with 
effects-coded Intergroup Prompt, the standardised Political Orientation, and the Prompt vs 
Political interaction included in the regression equation model. This analysis found a significant 
simple effect of Intergroup Prompt on Support for Collective Action, R2 = .07, β = - .27,  
t = - 2.19, p = .033 (see Figure 4); In this effect, a Common Identity approach produced more 
support for collective action, which was contrary to much of the literature that suggested this 
approach would reduce awareness of disadvantages and support for Collective Action (CIIM,  
M = 3.573, SD = 1.01; MC, M = 3.0345, SD = 0.91). We also observed a significant simple effect 
of standardised Political Orientation on Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-British 


















































Collective Action, which is consistent with the general literature. The Intergroup Prompt x 
zPolitical Orientation interaction was non-significant for support for CA; R2 < .001, β = -.16, t = 
.27, p = .89. 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Simple effect of effects-coded Intergroup Prompt (-1 = MC, 1 = CIIM) on Support for 


























































Figure 5: Simple effect of Political Orientation on Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-
British people.  
 
We further analysed intergroup prompts and political orientation in relation to Explicit Bias 
in a multiple regression. We observed a significant simple effect of effects-coded Intergroup 
Prompt (Commonality versus Multiculturalism) on Explicit bias; R2 = .09, β = 0.31, t = 2.31,  
p = .025. Again, a Multiculturalism approach produced higher explicit bias than did the 
Commonality approach (MC, M = 4.54, SD = 0.97; CIIM, M = 3.90, SD = 1.05).  In contrast to 
the previous outcome variables, we observed a non-significant simple effect of Political 
Orientation on Explicit Bias, R2 = .01, β = -.12, t = - .91, p = .369. We also observed a non-







































            Within Experiment 1, we observed that Multiculturalism produced an increase in Implicit 
Bias and a decrease in Support for Collective Action in comparison to a Common Ingroup 
Identity approach. This result was contrary to our expectations for Bias, though the evidence to 
support a directional prediction was mixed and there appeared to have been country and region-
specific differences that would have supported increased bias within the UK for a 
multiculturalism approach (Guimond et al., 2013). As such, we determined to conduct a second 
experiment in which we once again manipulate a multicultural and a common identity approach, 
but also include a control condition (i.e., discussing just intergroup relations between Pakistani-
British and White-British people) in order to observe whether multiculturalism increases Bias or 
a common identity decreases bias in relation to the control condition. The results of Support for 
Collective Action were more clearly contrary to expectations that argued that a common identity 
reduces the salience of the intergroup categories, and thus, reduces the focus on any 
disadvantages that the lower status group may suffer. Experiment 2 will be able to test whether 
this increased support for collective action in the commonality condition replicates. 
 
2.9 Experiment 2 
2.10 Methodology 
 Hypotheses. 
We included control condition to replicate the effect of MC and CIIM in the Experiment 
2, within the same variables and measures used in Experiment 1. First, we hypothesised whether 
MC would increase bias, or CIIM decrease bias by including a no-policy, control condition (i.e., 
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discussed only the intergroup relations between Pakistani-British and White-British people).We 
included perceived threat measure in this experiment in order to find whether intergroup prompts 
will significantly differ from each other on threat. We then predicted if liberals would show less 
implicit bias (i.e., or conservatives will show more bias), and more willingness to support for 
Collective Action. Being aware of the conservative ideology associated with increased bias due 
to perception of outgroup threat, we also predicted if this would show a mediating role between 
political ideology and implicit bias relationship. 
 Participants  
One hundred and seventy-three (N = 173) White Psychology Undergraduates from the 
University of Birmingham participated in the Experiment in compensation of course credits. 
Based upon an a priori power analysis for the observed effects of study 1 for some of the main 
analyses, we determined that we would need at least 142 participants to observe the effects with 
.75 power. When conducting the experiment, we had collected 173 participants because it was 
unclear how many we would lose due to incomplete responding or failing to follow instructions 
on the AMP measure. In accordance with Experiment 1 and the standard procedures for the AMP 
implicit measure, we removed thirteen participants who had failed to respond on the AMP as 
instructed, and we removed one person who could read Chinese, and three participants whose 
data was lost due to a computer 82 error. The final sample was 156 participants who were 84.6% 
female with a mean age of 18.97 years (SD = 1.34). 
 Design. 
The Experiment used a 3 (Intergroup Prompt: multicultural, common identity, vs control) × 2 
(political orientation: liberal vs conservatives) with intergroup prompt as a between participant 
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factor and political orientation as a measured, continuous variable. Implicit Bias, Support for 
Collective Action, and Explicit Bias were the primary outcome variables. Perceived threat was 
included as a mediator to test whether threat mediates the political to bias relationship.  
 Materials.  
 All materials were the same as in Experiment 1 with the following changes: 1) we added a 
Control condition in which participants received the same introductory paragraph (see Appendix 
D) as was seen in the Multicultural and the Common Identity conditions to think about Pakistani-
British people and White-British people, and then they were asked to do a thought listing task 
similar to the MC and CIIM conditions. Participants in the Control condition, however, were told, 
“We have found that it helps to first reflect on some issues relevant to ethnic interactions prior to 
completing the questionnaire in order to make your views more accessible. In the space below, 
list five ideas, thoughts or reactions that come to mind as you think about the groups Pakistani-
British and White-British in the United Kingdom.” 2) a second change to Experiment 2 was the 
addition, immediately after the explicit bias measure, of two Filler Tasks (i.e., Need for Cognition 
scale; see Appendix P and a Mindfulness scale; see Appendix Q) in order to separate the explicit 
bias measure from the scale of Perceived Threat from Pakistani-British people. 3) Finally, we 
added a validated scale of Perceived Realistic and Symbolic Threats that is used by research 
based upon the Intergroup Threat Theory, which was adapted to measure perceived threats from 
Pakistani-British people (Stephan et al., 1999; 2009; 2015; see Appendix R). These new 






  Need for Cognition: The Need for Cognition scale is a validated scale about how much 
people enjoy thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). It consisted of eighteen questions. An example 
item is “I prefer complex to simple problems”, to be rated on five-point scale from (1) extremely 
unlike me, to (5) extremely like me (see Appendix P). Higher scores indicated a higher need for 
cognition (M = 3.37, SD = 0.58, α = .87). 
 Mindful Attention Awareness Scale: This was an eleven-item scale that taps 
mindfulness by asking about how much participants attend to themselves and the situations they 
experience (Brown & Ryan, 2003; see Appendix Q). An example item includes, “I could be 
experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until sometime later,” which is answered 
on a six-point scale from (1) almost always to (6) almost never. Higher scores indicated a higher 
need for cognition (M = 3.70, SD = 0.67, α = .77). 
Perceived Threat Scale: This measure was used to gauge the level of perceived realistic 
and symbolic threats and was a fifteen-item scale adapted from Stephan et al.’s scale (1999; 
2009; 2015; see Appendix R). The scale was split into two subcategories including 7 items on 
perceived symbolic threats (e.g., Pakistani-British immigrants should learn to conform to the 
rules and norms of UK society as soon as possible after they arrive) and 8 items on perceived 
realistic threats (e.g., Pakistani-British immigrants get more from this country than they 
contribute). Participants responded on a seven-point scale from (1) Disagree Strongly to (7) 
Agree Strongly and the items were randomised within the scale. Higher scores indicated more 




Once again, participants were recruited through the Research Participation Scheme in 
which psychology students received course credit for participation. In each session, the 
researcher greeted up to four participants who were then randomly assigned to one of the three 
Intergroup Prompt conditions (Multiculturalism, Common Identity, or Control). They then read 
the introductory paragraph and then completed the relevant intergroup prompt materials. 
Participants then completed the filler LDT Task and then the AMP Implicit Bias measure, the 
Collective Action scale, the first Filler Tasks (e.g., subjective happiness), then the Explicit Bias 
measure. In this experiment, participants then completed the second set of Filler Tasks (i.e., Need 
for cognition and Mindfulness measures) and then the Perceived Threat scale and finally the 
demographic variables. At the end, participants were debriefed and thanked after experiment 
completion.  
2.12 Results. 
We once again conducted a multiple linear regression analysis with Intergroup Prompt as a 
between participants factor, Political Ideology as a measured predictor, the Prompt x Political 
interaction in the model and Implicit Bias as the outcome variable. Initial descriptive analysis of 
political orientation as continuous variable with dependent variables; implicit bias, support for 
collective action and threat mediator are reported in the Tables 3, 4 and 5. Intergroup Prompt was 
dummy coded so that the Control condition was the comparison condition for the other (i.e., MC 
to Control and CIIM to Control comparisons). To examine whether the MC to Control 
comparison and the CIIM to Control comparison influenced Implicit Bias towards Pakistani-
92 
 
British people, multiple regression analysis was conducted with Political Orientation standardised 
prior to creating the Prompt x Political interaction term and including it in the analysis. The MC-
Control comparison was found to be non-significant in the model, R2 = .001, β = 0.04, t = 0.43, 
 p = .665. The CIIM-Control comparison was also found to be non-significant, R2 = .01,  
β = -0.11, t = -1.24, p = .217 (MC, M = 0.18, SD = 0.26; Control, M = 0.18, SD = 0.31, CIIM,  
M = 0.12, SD = 0.24; See Figures 6 and 7). MC produced more bias than CIIM in this 
experiment, it was not significant within the full model (p = .102, R2 = .02) or on its own (p = 
.506, R2 < .01). However, Political Orientation was observed to be significantly related to 
Implicit Bias, R2 = .04, β = -0.39, t = -2.59, p = .012, which showed that liberals exhibited less 
Implicit Bias. Furthermore, the interaction between Political Orientation and MC-Control 
comparison on bias, R2 = .11, β = 0.002, t = 0.018, p = 0.986 and Political Orientation and CIIM-











Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
 
Dependent variable: White/Implicit Bias, N = 156 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
Dependent Variable: Support for CA, N = 156 
 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Whitebias .155 .278 -      
2. D1: MC-
Control 
.318 .467 .063 -     
3. D2: CIIM-
Control 















































Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. SupportCA 3.42 .986  -      
2. D1: MC-Control .318 .467 -.048 -     

















































Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 










Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Threat 3.42 .957  -      
2. D1: MC-
Control 
.325 .467 -.021 -     
3. D2: CIIM-
Control 



















































Figure 6: Simple effect of dummy-coded Intergroup Prompt (i.e., MC to Control and CIIM to 




























































Figure 7: Simple effect of Political Orientation on Implicit Bias towards Pakistani-British 
people. 
 
 A second multiple regression was conducted on Support for Collective Action with 
dummy-coded Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-Control and CIIM-Control comparisons), 
standardized Political Orientation, and both Prompt x Political interaction terms included in the 
equation model. We observed a non-significant effect for the MC-Control comparison in relation 
to Support for Collective Action, R2 < .001, β = 0.03, t = 0.32, p = .750. We, however, did 
observe a significant effect of the CIIM-Control comparison, R2 = .04, β = 0.23, t = 2.61, p = .010 
(MC, M = 3.35, SD = 0.89; Control, M = 3.22, SD = 1.06, CIIM, M = 3.65, SD = 0.96; See Figure 
8). We also observed a significant simple effect of Political Ideology on Support for Collective 

















































for Pakistani- British Immigrants (see Figure 9). Interaction of zPolitical and MC - Control for 
Collective Action was non- significant; R2 = .14, β = -.014, t = -.116, p = .908 and also non-




Figure 8: Simple effect of Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-Control and CIIM-Control) on 














































Support for Collective Ation





Figure 9: Simple effect of Political Orientation on Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-
British people.  
 
 We also analysed the additional Perceived Threat variable in a multiple regression with 
Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-Control and CIIM-Control), standardised Political 
Orientation, and the two Interaction terms. We observed a non-significant comparison of MC-
Control on Threat R2 < .01, β = - .06, t = - .70, p = .487. We, however, observed a significant 
comparison of CIIM-Control R2 = .03, β = - .20, t = -2.31 p = .022 (MC, M = 3.39, SD = 1.01; 
Control, M = 3.60, SD = 0.92, CIIM, M = 3.26, SD = 0.93; See Figure 10). In addition, the 
Political Orientation simple effect was significant effect, where conservative ideology found to 











































Support for Collective Action
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Figure 11). Once again, neither interaction was significant; zPoitical x MC -Control, R2 = .19, β = 
- .090, t = - .795, p = .43 and zPolitical x CIIM – Control, R2 = .19, β = - 031, t = - .270, p = .78. 
Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: Simple effect of Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-Control and CIIM-Control) on 









































Figure 11: Simple effect of Political Orientation (-1 SD = Conservative, +1 SD = Liberal) on 
Perceived Threat from Pakistani-British people.  
 
We also conducted two separate regression analyses for MC – Control and then CIIM – 
Control in order to see whether the results were different than the regressions in the same model 
above. We did not find difference in these effects of MC – Control comparison and CIIM – 
Control on implicit bias, support for CA and threat. For example, effect of MC – Control on bias 
was non-significant; R2 = .08, β = .097, t = 1.23, p = .22. It was also non- significant for support 



































Further, the results for the CIIM – Control comparison also did not differ from the 
previous results; i.e., bias, R2 = .10, β = .130, t = -1.67, p = .022; support for CA, R2 = .13, β = 
.22, t = 2.831, p = .005 and Threat, R2 = .18, β = - .165, t = -2.223, p = .028.  
In the separate regressions political observed significant effects on Bias, R2 = .08, β = - 
.206, t = -2.106, p = .037; support for CA, R2 = .09, β = .290, t = 2.97, p < .01; and Threat R2 = 
.16, β = - .350, t = -3.74, p < .01.  
Mediation Analysis. 
To examine the mediation hypothesis for Threat from Pakistani-British group, we 
conducted mediation analyses for Bias using PROCESS analysis in SPSS with bias corrected 
confidence intervals/BCIs to 5000 samples as recommended by Hayes (2013, version 2. 13.1). As 
predicted, we observed a significant indirect effect of Perceived Threat on Implicit Bias (see 
Figure 12). This represents a medium to large effect, Complete Standard Indirect Effect / CSIE = 
- .20 [- .29, - .12], K2 = .20, CI [.13, .28], which indicates that the indirect effect being about 











Figure 12.  Mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Threat as mediators. Brackets represent 
95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test. 
 
We used the combined Threat measure because the Symbolic and Realistic Threat 
subscales were highly correlated (r = .73, p < .001), because the subscales share a common theme 
of threats to the ingroup (Stephen et al., 1999), and because the overall scale had a high reliability 
(α = .90).  In addition, including all fifteen items in a single measure has been done routinely for 
this measure (Tipp et al., 2012; Tausch, Hewston, Kenworthy, Cairns & Christ, 2007; Schmidt & 
Muldoon 2015; Verkuyten, 2009). Nevertheless, we sought to complete some additional tests to 
check these conclusions. We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis and a structural equation 





b = -.24, p < .001 
Implicit Bias 
b = .14, p < .001 
 Indirect, b = -.04, CI [-.05, -.02], CSIE = -.20 
        Total Effect, b = - .04, CI [-.07, -.02] 
Direct Effect, b = - .01, CI [-.04, .01] 
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Because we did not initially aim to conduct factor analyses within this research, our 
sample sizes may be less than optimal; there are a variety of recommendation for minimal sample 
sizes with many researchers advocating for 10 participants per item included within the model 
(~200 participants) to other researchers indicating that 200 participants would be a fair sample 
size and 300 would be a good sample size (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012; MacCallum, Widaman, 
Zhang, & Hong, 1999). With 157 participants within our sample, we may not have had an 
adequate sample size to have good fit, but we would have an adequate sample to compare a one-
factor model to a two-factor model. We tested our models with Implicit Bias as the dependent 
variable, Political ideology as the predictor, and either combined Threat as the mediator or 
Symbolic Threat and Realistic Threat as the mediators. The fit indices demonstrated that the one-
factor model fit the data better than did the two-factor model (i.e., one-factor model RMSEA = 
.099, TLI = .810, CFI = .835; two-factor model RMSEA = .117, TLI = .733, CFI = .772).  
 
2.13 Discussion. 
 The current Experiment was designed to test the effectiveness of multiculturalism (MC) 
and Common Identity (CIIM) approaches in reducing bias and increasing support for collective 
action in comparison to a Control condition to determine the direction of the effect (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2000; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Thomas & Plaut, 2009; Verkuyten, 2005; 
Verkuyten, 2009; Vorauer et al., 2009; Wolsko et al., 2000;). Contrary to expectations, we 
observed that the Multiculturalism failed to produce more Implicit Bias than the Control 
condition and the Commonality condition also failed to produce significantly less Bias than the 
control condition. The only hypothesis supported was that Political Ideology was significantly 
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related to Implicit Bias in which liberals showed less bias. Unlike Experiment 1, we did not find 
any significant effects for Explicit Bias in Experiment 2. This Implicit and Explicit dissociation 
of bias effects is fairly common for socially sensitive topics for bias toward minority groups. As 
such, we have focused on Implicit Bias and Support for collective action in Experiment 3. In 
order to discuss the results observed for Collective Action, MC did not differ from Control 
condition which means it did not show support for CA, but the Commonality condition did differ 
and show an increase in support for collective action. In addition, Multiculturalism even showed 
significantly less support in comparison to the Commonality condition and it did so when using 
the Bonferroni Correction for multiple comparisons. Following these patterns, Multiculturalism 
was not significantly different from the Control condition on Threat, but the Commonality 
condition produced significantly less threat. These inconsistent findings of MC in comparison to 
CIIM show contrary results found in the previous literature on the effectiveness of MC in 
reducing bias or on perception of inequality that trigger action-oriented behaviours to overcome 
group discriminations.  
 Further, in regard to political ideology, liberalism has been found to be associated with 
reduced bias towards low status groups and outgroups regardless of the intergroup prompt 
participants received, which confirmed our hypothesis (Altemeyer, 1988; Critcher, Huber, Ho, & 
Koleva, 2009; Jost et.al. 2003, Krosch et al, 2013; Perkins & Bourgeois, 2006; Tetlock & 
Mitchell, 1993; Zick et al, 2011;). These results not only confirm the previous literature on the 
role of political ideology in taking perspective towards outgroups/immigrants, but also show 
some effects on increased support for collective action. These attitudes may be the reflection of 
their ideology to remain socially dominant and having hierarchy based pre-existing beliefs 
(Crawferd, Kay & Duke, 2015; Perkins & Bourgeois, 2006; Sears & Henry, 2003). 
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 Contrary to the previous literature, but in accordance with Experiment 1, the Multicultural 
approach produced increased bias in relation to the Commonality condition (Correll, Park & 
Smith, 2008; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). However, neither the Multiculturalism nor the 
Commonality conditions were significantly different than the Control condition, so we did not 
find evidence that either MC or CIIM increased and reduced bias, but we did find that a 
Commonality approach produced less bias than a Multiculturalism approach (Holoein & Shelton, 
2012; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2010). We will need to replicate the effect of Commonality prompt on 
bias in our future studies to identity if the effect remains consistent with previous research and to 
test a new hypothesis based upon these findings. In analysing our MC and CIIM manipulations 
based on previous research, we have discovered that previous research had highlighted sub-group 
identities (e.g., White-British and Pakistani-British) within only the Multiculturalism 
manipulation. Within the Commonality condition these groups were not highlighted. However, 
within the Common Ingroup Identity Model, we would expect that both the larger superordinate 
group (i.e., British) and the two sub-groups should be noted in order to recategorize the two sub-
groups into the larger superordinate group. In Experiments 1 and 2, we had naturally done this to 
the manipulations (in particular within the final step of circling similar responses). However, 
because we observed that the Commonality approach increased support for collective action, our 
manipulation of highlighting the subgroup identities and then focusing on commonalities may 
have tapped into a different phenomenon (i.e., closer to a dual identity perspective, which we 
discuss later in the chapter). Thus, for experiment 3, we decided to compare the Multiculturalism 
approach to our Commonality approach with subgroup identities highlighted (CIIM), and to a 
Commonality approach without highlighting subgroups (CWO), which is more in line with the 
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classic Commonality manipulations (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000; 
Yogeswarran & Dasgupta, 2014).  
 In this Experiment, threat appeared to be a moderately strong mediator of political to 
implicit bias relationship. Thus, conservative ideology was linked to more perceived threat from 
the Pakistani-British group than liberals and thus perceived threat mediated the relationship to 
Implicit Bias (Altemeyer, 1996; Bierbrauer & Klinger, 2002; Bilali, & Vollhardt, 2015; Choma, 
Hanoch, Hodson, & Gummerum, 2014; Duckitt, 2001; Riek et al., 2006; Schlüter, Schmitt & 
Wagner 2008; Sibley & Duckitt, 2012; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Zick et al, 2011). In the 
remainder studies in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3, we explored the role of threat on intergroup bias 
in relation to political ideology more thoroughly.  
 
2.14 Experiment 3 
 Introduction 
We designed Experiment 3 to replicate the effects of MC and Commonality in addition to 
a newly devised Commonality without highlighting the subgroup identities (CWO) approach to 
compare its effects on reducing bias and support for CA. In the CWO approach, the group 
identity was ‘NOT’ highlighted. We used the same commonality (i.e., CIIM prompt) prompt and 
the CIIM list of 19 choose responses that we used in first two experiments. However, to create a 
variation from CIIM and to emphasise on the non-salience of group identities to see if this would 
affect bias and support for CA, within the list of 19 responses we removed the underlining of 
identities; i.e., ‘White-British’ and ‘Pakistani-British’.  
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2.15 Methodology  
 Hypotheses. 
In the Experiment 3, first, we compared MC and CIIM with CWO prompt to replicate the 
findings of Experiments 1 & 2. We also predicted to replicate the consistent effects political 
ideology on bias and support for CA in Experiments 1 and 2. Finally, we predicted if perceived 
threat would also replicate the mediated effect of Experiment 2 on the relationship between 
political ideology and bias.  
 Participants. 
Three Effect sizes in Experiment 2 were dramatically smaller than in Experiment 1, so we 
increased the number of participants we obtained to be closer to the effect size of R2 = .04. 
According to this power analysis, we needed to obtain approximately 235 participants for .8 
power. Three hundred and one (N = 301) participants from University of Birmingham completed 
the Experiment in compensation of course credits. In this experiment, we wanted to include more 
than just White participants, but wanted to restrict Pakistani participants because this group was 
the focus of the bias measure and restrict immigrants because they may show more favourability 
toward another group that is often perceived as an immigrant group as opposed to the group’s 
ethnic classification. Thus, we removed seven Pakistani participants, fifty-three immigrant (i.e., 
non-UK born) participants, and then one participant who failed to follow the AMP Implicit Bias 
instructions. Two hundred and fourty participants (N = 240) were included in the final analysis. 
The age range of participants was between 18 and 21 years (M = 18.96, SD = .84) with 83.3% 





            This Experiment used three conditions of intergroup prompts: Multiculturalism (MC), 
Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM), and Common Identity without highlighting subgroups 
(CWO). Political orientation (liberal vs conservatives) was measured predictor variable, and 
Support for Collective Action, Implicit Bias, and Threat were the outcome variables.  
 Materials 
 All materials were the same as Experiment 2 with the following exceptions: 1) We 
replaced the Control condition with a Common Identity without highlighting (CWO) 
manipulation. Again, participants read the standard Introductory paragraph, and then received the 
same Common Identity prompt as the CWO condition. The main change was that the subgroup 
identities (White-British and Pakistani-British) were not highlighted in the circle similar 
responses part of the task at the end of the manipulation (see Appendix H). The objective to 
manipulate this prompt as CWO was to see that participants might be thinking the standard 
Common Ingroup Identity Model manipulation, hence they should be focused on “one group” or 
“commonalities”, so they ignore outgroups, and thus, fail to think about Pakistani-British.  They 
would then fail to appreciate the disadvantages that Pakistani-British people face and thus would 
not think that Collective Action is needed. Though this condition was closer to the standard CIIM 
manipulation within the literature, yet without the subgroup identities highlighted within the list 
of 19 responses. 2) In order to reduce the length of the already long experiment, we included just 
one Filler Task (i.e., Need for Cognition) between the Collective Action measure and the 
Perceived Threat measure; thus, the Mindfulness measure was dropped. 3) We also dropped the 
Explicit Bias measure. 4) Finally, we used the same general procedure for the AMP Implicit Bias 
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measure, but we changed the Chinese pictographs to Korean pictographs that represented non-
words (see Appendix J). This change was made in order to avoid having to remove participants 
who could speak Chinese or Korean. We used Korean because it has a similar look to the Chinese 
pictographs, but fewer people speak it. In addition, we used Korean non-words so that even 
Korean speakers would not have to be removed because the non-words would not have any 
meaning to them. 
2.16 Procedure. 
Like experiment 1 and 2, participants arrived at the lab and they were randomly assigned to 
one of the three Intergroup Prompt conditions (MC, CIIM, vs CWO). They completed the filler 
LDT, then the AMP implicit measure, then Collective Action scale, followed by Need for 
Cognition, Perceived Threat, and then the Demographic variables.  
2.17 Results. 
We used the Multiculturalism condition (MC) as a comparison and coded the conditions to 
create two contrast comparisons (MC to CIIM, and then MC to CWO (Commonality without 
highlighting). We conducted a multiple regression analysis with dummy-coded Intergroup 
Prompt (D1: MC-CIIM and D2: MC-CWO) as a between participants factor, standardised 
Political Orientation as a continuous predictor, and the two Interaction terms in the regression 
equation on Implicit Bias. The descriptive statistics of political Orientation as a continuous 
predictor and implicit bias, support for CA and Threat as dependent variables are reported in 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 below. Following our analysis, we observed a significant effect of the MC to 
CIIM comparison, R2 = .02, β = 0.16, t = 2.34, p = .020, and also a significant effect of the MC to 
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CWO comparison, R2 = .03, β = .20, t = 2.85, p = .005. However, unlike the previous 
experiments, Multiculturalism produced significantly less and not more bias than the Common 
Identity with highlighting (CIIM) approach and significantly less bias than the Common Identity 
without subgroup highlighting (CWO), though the bias in the CIIM condition was lower than the 
CWO condition (CIIM, M = 0.05, SD = 0.21; MC, M = -0.02, SD = 0.21; CWO, M = 0.07, SD = 
0.22; see Figure 13). In addition, the Political Orientation simple effect was in the expected 
direction, but was not significant in the model, R2 = .01, β = - .18, t = - 1.79, p = .075 (see Figure 
14). Neither of the interaction terms were significant in the model; zPolitical x MC-CIIM, R2 = 
.82, β = .02, t = .24, p = .82 and zPolitical x MC-CWO, R2 = .09, β = - .14, t = - 1.69, p = .92. 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics 
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
Dependent Variable: White/Implicit Bias, N = 240 
 
 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. SupportCA 3.943 .801   -      































































Table 8. Descriptive Statistics 
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 













Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Wbias .031 .213   -      
2. zPolitical .000 1.00 -.232   -     
3. D2: MC-
CWO 


























































Table 9. Descriptive Statistics 
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 












Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Threat 2.85 .822   -      
































































Figure 13: Simple effect of Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-CIIM and MC-CWO) on 


























































Figure 14: Simple effect of Political Orientation (-1 SD = Conservative, +1 SD = Liberal) on 
Implicit Bias towards Pakistani-British people. 
 
We next conducted the regression of dummy-coded Intergroup Prompt, standardised 
Political Orientation, and the Interaction terms onto Support for Collective Action. In accordance 
with the previous two experiments, there was a significant effect of the Multiculturalism to 
Commonality (CIIM) comparison, R2 = .03, β = 0.20, t = 2.93, p = .004, but a non-significant 
effect of the MC to CWO comparison, R2 < .01, β = 0.04, t = 0.58, p = .563. Support for 
Collective Action was higher in the CIIM condition than in the MC condition, but there was a 
minimal difference between CWO and MC (CIIM, M = 4.38, SD = 0.69; MC, M = 3.80,  
SD = .89; CWO, M = 3.87, SD = .77; see Figure 15). In accordance with the previous two 
















































significant in the model, R2 = .05, β = .36, t = 3.78, p < .001 (see Figure 16). Both interaction 
terms were non-significant; zPolitical x MC-CIIM, R2 = .18, β = -.09, t = -1.23, p = .22 and 




Figure 15: Simple effect of Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-CIIM and MC-CWO) on 





















































Figure 16: Simple effect of Political Orientation (-1 SD = Conservative, +1 SD = Liberal) on 
Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-British people.   
 
We also conducted the regression of dummy-coded Intergroup Prompt, standardised 
Political Orientation, and the Interaction terms onto Perceived Threat. In this experiment, we 
observed a non-significant effect of the MC to CIIM comparison, R2 < .01, β = .06, t = .85,  
p = .398, and non-significant effect of the MC to CWO comparison, R2 = .01, β = .09,  
t = 1.34, p = .182. Overall, there were no significant differences on Perceived Threat (CIIM,  
M = 2.78, SD = .85; MC, M = 2.82, SD = 0.73; CWO, M = 2.92, SD = .88; see Figure 17). In 
accordance with Experiment 2, the Political Orientation simple effect was significant in the 











































Support for Collective Action
117 
 
zPolitical x MC-CIIM on threat was non-significant, R2 = .19, β = .10, t = 1.28, p = .19 and also 




Figure 17: Simple effect of Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-CIIM and MC-CWO) on 









































Figure 18: Simple effect of Political Orientation (-1 SD = Conservative, +1 SD = Liberal) on 
Perceived Threat from Pakistani-British people.  
 
Yet again in this experiment, following the separate regression analysis used in 
experiment 2, we conducted two separate regressions on implicit bias, support for CA and Threat. 
In MC – CIIM comparison we saw non-significant effects on bias; R2 = .005, β = 0.068, t = 
1.076, p = .283. The effect on support for CA, however, was significant R2 = .176, β = .180, t = 
3.032, p < .01, but non-significant for Threat R2 = .187, β = .013, t = .221, p = .825. 
The separate regression effect for MC – CWO comparison was non-significant on bias, R2 
= .085, β = .121, t = 1.93, p = .54; support for CA, R2 = .147, β = -.005, t = -.913, p = .59 and on 

































Within these separate regression analyses, zPolitical show significant results with MC – 
CIIM comparison; R2 = .054, p < .001 and significant with MC – CWO comparison; R2 = .017,   
p = .042.  This effect was in expected direction, however, in the previous Model it was non-
significant for (p = .075, R2 = .01). Although within separate regressions we observed significant 
effects, however, our overall results did not change due to this effect.   
 With reference to the separate regressions in experiment 3, MC-CIIM comparison 
observed non-significant. Though, this was a very small effect size (R2 = .02, p = .02), so this 
complicates our interpretation, however, due to the very small effect size we did not intend to 
follow up this experiment. We observed similar findings in MC – CWO comparison which could 
be explained by the extra error variance accounted for by adding MC-CIIM to the model with 
MC-CWO allowed us to see the effect (R2 = .03, p = .005).  
 To conclude the inconsistency of results in Experiment 3, we can argue that the Implicit 
Bias results appeared more confusing with the Separate Regressions which we have discussed in 
discussion section in more details. Most of the differences were related to very small effects, so 
this did not change our overall interpretations of the results.  
 
Mediation Analysis: 
To examine the mediational hypothesis for Threat from Pakistani-British group, we 
conducted mediation analysis for Threat (mediator) on the Political Ideology (predictor) to 
Implicit Bias (outcome) relationship and used PROCESS analysis in SPSS with bias corrected 
confidence intervals/BCIs to 5000 samples as recommended for mediation by Hayes (2013, V2. 





Figure 19.  Mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Threat as mediators. Brackets represent 
95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test. 
 
 
As expected, there was a significant indirect effect of Perceived Threat mediator on 
Implicit Bias (see figure 19). The effect size of this mediation was not as large as in Experiment 
2, but it did represent a medium effect size, CSIE = - .09 [- .16, - .05], R2 = .04, CI [.01, .08], K2 = 
.09, CI [.04, .14] which means that experiencing more Perceived Threat was related to more 
Implicit Bias and to more conservativism instead of liberalism. We once again tested whether a 
one-factor model (i.e., Threat as the mediator) or a two-factor model (i.e., Symbolic Threat and 
Realistic Threat as mediators) fit the data better. We tested our models with Implicit Bias as the 





b = -.199, p < .001 
Implicit Bias 
b = .15, p < .001 
 Indirect, b = -.03, CI [-.16, -.05], CSIE = -.09 
        Total Effect, b = - .02, CI [-.07, -.01] 
Direct Effect, b = - .01, CI [-.03, .01] 
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demonstrated that the one-factor model fit the data better than did the two-factor model (i.e., one-
factor model RMSEA = .111, TLI = .682, CFI = .724; two-factor model RMSEA = .115, TLI = 
.661, CFI = .771).  
In addition, the Symbolic and Realistic Threat subscales were again highly correlated (r = .62,  
P < .01) and the overall Threat scale had a high reliability (α = .87).   
 
2.18 Discussion. 
The aim of the Experiment 3 was to examine the replication of effects of MC and CIIM in 
the first two experiments on bias and support for CA with inclusion of newly coined 
commonality without highlighting (CWO) subgroup identities manipulation. The findings of 
Experiment 3, with reference to implicit bias and MC-CIIM and MC-CWO comparisons, showed 
significant effects and MC appeared to produce significantly less implicit bias than CIIM and 
CWO (within simple effect only) which contradicted the effect of Experiment 1. However, bias 
in CIIM was lower than CWO (i.e., a small difference). Such effects resulted in unclear and 
inconsistent findings with a lack of evidence regarding simultaneous effect of the intergroup 
approaches in reducing bias and increasing willingness to support for CA. Further, the MC-CIIM 
comparison significantly predicted support for CA towards Pakistani-British, but there was an 
opposite effect in MC to CWO relation. So comparatively MC showed less support than CIIM 
and CWO, but then there was a very small difference between MC and CWO. Following the 
results of Political Ideology in initial experiments, conservatives consistently showed more 
implicit bias and less support for CA than the liberals. In this experiment, we also examined the 
effect of intergroup prompts on perceived threat from Pakistani-British within interaction and 
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observed that none of the prompts differed significantly on perceived threat. We included this test 
based on the previous research which observed MC related to perceived threat towards the 
minority groups (Guimond et al., 2013). However, political ideology had an effect and the 
conservatives showed more perceived threat from Pakistani-British than the liberals. Further, 
perceived threat mediated this relationship between political ideology and implicit bias. So, 
overall across all the experiments of this chapter intergroup approaches (particularly MC) showed 
mixed results on bias (i.e., implicit and explicit), but the more consistent effect on bias was 
Political Ideology, and then perceived threat as a mediator (Experiments 2 & 3), which directed 
us to further test these effects within wider outgroups (i.e., effects of these variables on 
immigrants and unspecified outgroups within chapter 3).  
2.19 General Discussion 
Across three studies, the Multicultural prompt demonstrated an inconsistent pattern. 
Within Experiment 1, Multicultural (MC) approach produced significantly more (not less) 
outgroup attitude bias in comparison to Common Identity (CIIM) approach. Within Experiment 
2, MC produced more implicit bias as compared to CIIM in the model, but it was not significant 
within the full model or on its own. In addition, within Experiment 2, MC did not produce 
significantly more implicit bias than the neutral Control condition and the Common Identity 
(CIIM) approach did not produce significantly less bias than the Control condition, even though 
the implicit bias was descriptively lower. The results of Experiment 3 were contrary to 
Experiments 1 and 2. In this case, MC produced significantly less and not more implicit bias than 
the CIIM and the CWO conditions. So, Experiment 2 did not support significantly increased 
implicit bias by Multiculturalism that had been observed in Experiment 1 while Experiment 3 
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supported the opposite finding in which Multiculturalism produced less implicit bias in 
comparison to the Commonality (CIIM) condition. Thus, the overall pattern of results in relation 
to both implicit and explicit bias were inconsistent. Yet, given that there was some indication that 
the Common Identity (CIIM) approach may have been more effective, we will review another 
approach (e.g., Dual Identity) later that may be similar to this approach, but that may have some 
unique characteristics that may allow it to be effective. 
Although we conducted separate regression analyses in experiments 2 and all the results 
were similar in their effects as in the same models with both comparisons. However, the results 
of experiment 3 did not match with our regressions in the same model, yet, this did not change 
the explanation of our results to interpret differently due to very small effect sizes unable to be 
replicated in future studies. For example, if we would replicate these effects it would require over 
600 participants to replicate these findings at .8 power which did not worth the time within our 
time limited project duration. 
The pattern for support for collective action was more consistent. Multiculturalism (MC) 
produced significantly less support and not more support for collective action than CIIM within 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and Experiment 3, though the effects were small to medium in all 
three experiments. However, MC was not significantly different from the Control condition in 
Experiment 2 or the Commonality without highlighting condition in Experiment 3. Thus, a main 
finding is that multiculturalism produced significantly less support for collective action than did 
the commonality condition, but MC did not significantly decrease support in comparison to either 
the control in Experiment 2 or the Commonality without subgroup highlighting in Experiment 3. 
However, within Experiment 2, there also was evidence that showed that the Common Identity 
approach increased Support for Collective Action in comparison to the Control condition  
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in addition to producing more support than Multiculturalism. Given the consistent advantage of 
the Common Identity approach with subgroup highlighting, it is worth pursuing this approach 
further and also comparing to the Dual Identity approach, which shares some important 
characteristics and that we review later in this discussion.  
In all three experiments, Political Ideology remained consistent in predicting willingness 
to support for collective action and significantly predicting bias in Experiments 1 and 2), though 
Experiment 3 was not significant with both of the non-significant interactions in the model but it 
was when just the simple effects were included. Overall, more conservatism was significantly 
related to more implicit bias towards Pakistani-British and less willingness to engage in support 
for CA to help Pakistani-British people improve their situation. Finally, in both Experiment 2 and 
3, we found that Perceived Threat from Pakistani-British people significantly mediated the 
Political Ideology to Implicit Bias relationships in which more perceived threat was related to 
less Liberalism and to more Implicit Bias. These mediational findings in conjunction with the 
consistent Implicit Bias findings led us to examine mediating role of Threat Management and 
Uncertainty-Avoidance based upon the Uncertainty-Threat Model (Jost et al., 2003, 2007 & 
2017) in order to explain the relationship between political ideology and negative attitude bias 
against immigrants in Chapter 3.  
In the context of inconsistent results with the Multicultural, Common Identity, and 
Common Identity without subgroup highlighting, we move towards considering the potential 
effectiveness of other intergroup approaches. Given that the Common Identity approach which 
highlighted subgroups sometimes reduced Implicit Bias in comparison to Multiculturalism (i.e., 
significantly in Experiment 1, and non-significantly in Experiment 2, and increased Support for 
Collective Action in all three Experiments, we wanted to review how the highlighting might have 
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altered the Common Identity approach to be similar to a Dual Idenity approach. A dual identity 
strategy uses aspects of the Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact in which a subgroup (e.g., 
immigrants) and a superordinate group identity (e.g., British) are made salient simultaneously to 
allow differences in circumstances to remain noticeable; this approach could be similar to our 
commonality approach (British focus) with later highlighting of both subgroups (i.e., White-
British and Pakistani-British), but may be different in that it highlights both the common identity 
(British) and the subgroup identity (Pakistani-British) at the same time. Some recent research has 
initiated testing this approach in relation to intergroup bias and collective action. Banfield and 
Dovidio (2013) showed that, in the U.S., a dual-identity approach increased majority-group 
members’ willingness to support collective action (i.e., willingness to protest on the behalf of a 
disadvantaged group). However, they did not test the influence on prejudice/intergroup bias. 
Similar research has found that a dual-identity strategy produced a lower stress response to 
intergroup interactions in the Netherlands, though they did not also examine support for 
collective action (Scheepers, Saguy, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2014). Further, some other evidence 
that has been conducted after we completed Experiments 1 through 3, also shows the 
effectiveness of a focus on the dual -identity (i.e., the salience of common group identity and 
separate group identity at the same time) in reducing bias and generating support for CA (Ufkes 
et al., 2016).  
We propose that there is some good, preliminary-evidence for the dual-identity strategy, 
but that there are critical unknowns that need to be investigated to move the research forward. For 
example, researchers have shown that perceived threat to status (Wenzel et al., 2003) may 
influence prejudicial responses (i.e., higher status groups experienced more threat), and two of 
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our experiments (Experiments 2 and 3) have shown large effects of perceived threat toward 
ethnic minorities in the UK. Other researchers have also found that UK citizens were more 
negative toward a multicultural policy (Guimond et al., 2013) and that people experienced more 
threat from multiculturalism if they believed minority group members wanted to maintain their 
culture as opposed to wanting to adopt British culture, and perceived threat may inhibit 
willingness to help (Tip et al., 2012; 2015). In addition, some researchers argue that reducing 
prejudice inevitably leads to less support for collective action because people are not focused on 
disadvantages and are less motivated to help (Dixon et al., 2012). Thus, it will be important to 
test the dual-identity strategy in these conditions and within the UK to determine its 
effectiveness.  
According to the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA), even an 
advantaged, majority group can identify with an objective outgroup (e.g., Pakistani-British), and 
that increasing this identification can lead to collective action by the advantaged majority group 
when they feel a connection with the disadvantaged group (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 
2008). Recent research by van Zomeren and colleagues (2011) has shown that reading about a 
violation of a universal moral value toward Dutch Muslims led to more identification with the 
disadvantaged Dutch Muslims. Thus, the simultaneous activation of the British identity and the 
Pakistani-British subgroup identity may help to reduce bias more than our Commonality with 
highlighting manipulation because the potentially threatening subgroup identity (i.e., Pakistani-
British) is highlighted at the same time as the common identity (i.e., British) and not at the same 
time as the potentially threatened identity (i.e., White-British). In addition to reducing threat, it 
may allow for British participants to identify with and feel a connection to the disadvantaged 
Pakistani-British group. This approach could also increase support for collective action because it 
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allows for the subgroup identity to remain salient, which could allow for disadvantages to be 
noticed and acted upon. In our future research, we could seek to test these ideas in relation to 
Multiculturalism, Common Identity, and Dual-Identity approaches.  
In order to summarise our above discussion of chapter 2, we can conclude that 
inconsistent findings of intergroup approaches made it difficult to further pursue this line of 
research due to lack of evidence about dual identity and the time constraints at the time these 
experiments were conducted. Hence, we decided to divert the direction of our research to focus 
exclusively on political ideology and further expansion of the threat model of mediation in more 
depth. So, to follow up the significantly consistent findings of political ideology and bias relation 
via outgroup threat as a mediator from chapter 2 we designed the studies of chapter 3 based on 
the Uncertainty-Threat model (Jost et al., 2007). Though the sample in the chapter 3 was from the 
USA, however, due to the similarity in the results of the political ideology measure in both UK 
(e.g., observed in our experiments of chapter 2) and USA (found in previous research 
summarised in the literature review above) we decided to choose this sample. Another reason was 
the easy and rapid availability of a large number of American adult sample via online participant 
recruitment platforms such as MTurk.com for a compensation of $ .50 per participant. In addition 
to that, also the immigration patterns of both countries appear similar in terms of diverse ethnic 
and religious backgrounds thus we considered to test the political attitudes beyond British context 






3 CHAPTER 3: BRIDGING CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DIVIDES: 
PERCEIVED THREAT AND UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE HELP 
EXPLAIN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND 
IMMIGRANT ATTITUDE BIAS WITHIN INTERGROUP CONTEXTS. 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 The political divide between liberals and conservatives has become quite large and 
stable, and there appear to be many reasons for disagreements on a wide range of issues. 
The current research sought to explain these divides and to extend the Uncertainty-Threat 
Model to intergroup relations, which predicts that more dispositional, perceived-
threatanduncertainty-avoidancewillberelatedtomorepolitical conservatism. Given that 
conservatism is also often related to more negativity to low status groups such as 
immigrants, the relationship between political ideology and negative attitudes toward 
immigrants may be mediated by more threat and uncertainty avoidance. Study 4 tested this 
mediational hypothesis in a correlational design and showed that both uncertainty-
avoidance and perceived realistic and symbolic threat significantly mediated the 
relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants, and that perceived 
threat was the more influential mediator. Study 5 extended threat management to perceived 
threats from unspecified outgroups, as opposed to the immigrant outgroup, and it replicated 
all significant mediations. Study 6 replicated the mediations observed in Studies 4 and 5 for 
political ideology to attitudes toward immigrants with uncertainty-avoidance and perceived 
threat from immigrants as mediators; it further replicated the mediations to the negative 
attitudes measure that had been used in Study 5 and it extended it to an objective and 
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indirect bias measure [i.e., Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP)]. Overall, almost all of 
the results supported the idea that perceived threat and uncertainty-avoidance both mediate 
the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants, and that threat 
management, as opposed to negativity bias, may be a central concern separating liberals 
and conservatives. Within all three studies, we also observed more evidence for the 
Uncertainty-Threat Model predictions than we did for the alternative Extremity Hypothesis, 
which predicted a quadratic relationship between political ideology and threat and 














The cultural divide and polarization between liberals and conservatives has become 
steadily wide, and is potentially expanding (Hibbing et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2009; Jost, Stern, 
Rule, & Sterling, 2017). These political groups tend to disagree on a wide range of issues that 
often appear to not have a common underlying motivation (e.g., same-sex marriage, taxes, flag 
burning, animal testing, immigration, etc.). To complicate matters, there are several factors that 
have been proposed to explain the differences between these groups including differences in 
social dominance orientation (SDO), differences in negativity bias, and differences in 
endorsement of moral foundations (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Hibbing 
et al., 2014; Ho, Sidanius, Pratto, Levin, Thomsen,  Kteily, & Sheey-Skeffington, 2012). We 
believe that an essential difference on these divides revolves around risk and threat acceptance or 
avoidance.  
One promising recent theoretical model proposes critical differences that relate to threat, 
which can shed light on these cultural divides, and may help to bridge this divide and improve 
dialogue between ideological groups (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017; Jost & Napier, 2012). In 
their Uncertainty-Threat Model, Jost and colleagues (2007; 2012; 2017) provide some evidence 
that liberals and conservatives differ in their attention to and management of threats (i.e., Threat 
Management related to perceived terrorism, belief in a dangerous world, or death anxiety), and in 
the avoidance of uncertainty (i.e., Uncertainty-Avoidance), where more uncertainty avoidance 
and more attention to threats was associated with less liberalism and more conservatism (Jost, 
Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfal, & Ostafin, 2007). Here we use Jost’s broad “Threat 
Management” terminology, which encompasses many different types of threat (i.e., threat to self-
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esteem, mortality salience, ideological threat to the system, etc.); however, we sought to extend 
research in this area and test a specific type of threat—perceived threat toward one’s group, 
which is a fundamental motive within intergroup relations (Kurzban, et al., 2001; Stephan et al., 
2009) and which may be included within the broader threat management classification that Jost 
uses; however, this threat is untested within this model. 
The Uncertainty-Threat Model may provide theoretical insights into observed differences 
between liberals and conservatives on a variety of issues, including negative responses to low 
status or non-normative groups such as immigrants. In Jost and colleagues’ original review of the 
political orientation research (Jost et al., 2003), they posited that “In the context of political 
conservatism, this means that (a) a temporary motive (such as the need for cognitive closure or 
prevention focus or terror management) could lead one to express liberal as well as conservative 
beliefs, depending on one’s chronically accessible ideology (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999), and (b) some people 
might adopt conservative beliefs out of a desire for certainty, whereas others adopt the same 
beliefs because of a threat to self-esteem or an ideological threat to the system [i.e., a chronic trait 
or personality motive].” Thus, they argued that a conservative shift could be related to a 
dispositional preference (from personality or trait measures of threat and uncertainty avoidance) 
in which conservatives have a higher affinity than liberals with threat and/or uncertainty 
avoidance, or it could be due to temporarily activated motives [i.e., priming] that temporarily 
shifts and leads to an increase in affiliation with threat and/or uncertainty avoidance. Jost et al., 
(2007) provided some of the first evidence to explicitly test these ideas. In their paper, “Three 
studies are conducted to assess the uncertainty–threat model of political conservatism, which 
posits that [chronic] psychological needs to manage uncertainty and threat are associated with 
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political orientation. Results from structural equation models provide consistent support for the 
hypothesis that uncertainty avoidance (e.g., need for order, intolerance of ambiguity, and lack of 
openness to experience) and threat management (e.g., death anxiety, system threat, and/or 
perceptions of a dangerous world) each contributes independently to conservatism (vs. 
liberalism). No support is obtained for alternative models [i.e., worldview validation, Greenberg 
& Jonas, 2003], which predict that uncertainty and threat management are associated with 
ideological extremism or extreme forms of conservatism only” (Jost et al., 2007). The 
Uncertainty-Threat Model argues that “both temporary, situational factors and chronic, 
dispositional tendencies pertaining to the avoidance of uncertainty and the management of threat 
are therefore hypothesized to affect ideological preferences” (Jost et al., 2007; Jost et al., 2017). 
While this model could be insightful, there is debate about whether and how uncertainty 
and threat relate to political ideology and how it might relate to intergroup relations. Our primary 
goal in this research is to seek to explain this cultural divide by being the first to test the ability of 
measured/dispositional uncertainty-avoidance and threat management to mediate the relationship 
to political ideology within an immigration context that is highly relevant to current political 
debates within a diversifying world, and debates that are likely to continue for decades to come as 
countries grapple with the need for immigration; this need is likely to continue because economic 
growth is tied to increased efficiency and increased population growth, which will depend upon 
immigration because the current US birth rate is below population replacement levels. In our 
research, we test the hypothesis that measured dispositional uncertainty-avoidance and perceived 
threat are related to political ideology (i.e., less liberalism and more conservativism). We also test 
the hypothesis that more liberalism is related to less attitude bias to immigrants and that higher 
uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat will mediate this relationship. At this early stage, we 
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do not focus on the temporary conservative shift hypothesis and instead seek to test the chronic 
personality hypothesis. 
A secondary goal of the current research is to test the model against the extremity 
hypothesis. Several researchers argue that needs to reduce uncertainty and threat should lead to 
endorsement of any extreme ideology (i.e., extremity hypothesis) regardless of one’s beliefs and 
political ideology (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Hogg, 2012; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & 
Spencer, 2001). Thus, needs to reduce threat and uncertainty should be higher at both ends of the 
political range. One standard way to measure this would be to test the linear and quadratic 
regression effects between political ideology and threat and uncertainty-avoidance. A quadratic 
effect would show that as political ideology became more liberal or more conservative, the 
relationship to threat and uncertainty-avoidance would be stronger (i.e., a u-shaped relationship). 
A linear only trend would be counter to the extremity hypothesis as advocated by this worldview 
validation perspective, and instead would support the Uncertainty-Threat Model because it would 
show that more conservatism and less liberalism was related to more threat and uncertainty 
avoidance in a linear fashion. 
Little research evidence, however, has examined either the extremity hypothesis or only 
extreme responding on both sides of the political spectrum, and the research that does exist is 
ambiguous (Jost & Napier, 2012). Jost and colleagues (2003) found that 7 of 13 studies in their 
meta-analysis observed only a linear relationship between uncertainty and conservatism (i.e., 
support for the uncertainty-threat model), while 6 studies showed both a linear relationship and a 
quadratic relationship (i.e., support for uncertainty-threat model and for extreme responding on 
both ends of the political spectrum). Thus, according to Jost and Napier (2012) "psychological 
needs to reduce uncertainty and threat are associated with political conservatism in particular and 
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not ideological extremity in general.” In newer research, van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Pollet 
(2015) have observed that people on the left and right political extremes showed more derogation 
of immigrants and more derogation of societal groups in general than did political moderates; 
however, their research tested attitudes to multiple groups simultaneously, instead of 
individually, which could have changed participants’ responses compared to having multiple 
participants rate only a single group; such question order context effects have been demonstrated 
previously in which the order of questions frames the questions that follow; thus, the order of 
questions regarding multiple societal groups could easily affect the interpretation and response to 
those groups (Schwarz, Munkel, & Hippler, 1990; Schuldt, Roh, & Schwarz, 2015); future 
research will need to investigate this phenomena more thoroughly. Regardless, van Prooijen et 
al., (2015) observed only a very small relationship to derogation of immigrants (R2 = .01), and 
they showed that there was still a significant and larger linear relationship in which there was 
more derogation by conservatives and less by liberals. Overall, there is some research showing 
that people at the political extremes show more extreme responding, but the research also 
demonstrates more extreme responses by conservatives on negative responses to societal groups 
in general and toward immigrants. A further investigation of the evidence is needed here. 
Jost and colleagues (2012; Jost et al., 2007) have, however, provided further evidence of 
the relationship between conservatism, and uncertainty and threat reduction. In their original 
work, Jost et al. (2007) showed that political conservatism was related to uncertainty-avoidance 
and threat management, but these factors were not significantly related to ideological extremism 
noted in the extremity hypothesis; this pattern was demonstrated reliably in three different studies 
conducted in three different geographic regions within the US. We sought to replicate these 
relationships between political ideology and threat and uncertainty-avoidance, and to extend them 
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to immigration. We predicted that liberals would show less threat and less uncertainty avoidance 
than conservatives, and that we would observe a linear relationship only and not a quadratic 
relationship as suggested by the worldview validation perspective (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; 
Hogg, 2012). While this prediction is contrary to Burke and colleagues’ meta-analytic findings, 
Burke’s analysis focused on mortality threats, which was not the main focus of our research; we, 
instead, focused on perceived threat to one’s ingroup (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013). We also 
predicted that liberals would be more positive toward immigrants and conservatives less positive. 
Thus, if the extremity hypothesis from the worldview validation perspective were to be 
supported, a chronic tendency toward threat and uncertainty-avoidance would be related to 
participants being more polarized in their view of immigrants as their chronic tendency to avoid 
threat/uncertainty was greater (i.e., very liberal participants would be more positive and very 
conservative participants would be more negative). Thus, the quadratic relationship test could be 
applied to bias toward immigrants in addition to threat or uncertainty-avoidance. This hypothesis, 
however, was a secondary interest of the current paper, but one which still could be examined 
within the current data.  
A recent review by Crawford (2017), has indicated that the way threat has been defined 
within the motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003) and negativity bias (Hibbing et al., 2014) 
perspectives is too broad. He argues that threats can be differentiated into meaning threats and 
into physical threats, which are defined respectively as threats to “systems of meaning and value” 
and threats to “existential realities,” such as mortality salience (e.g., Burke et al., 2013), and he 
argues that while liberals and conservatives are differentially influenced by physical threats, they 
are similarly influenced by meaning threats. Within the current set of studies, we do not use 
physical threats (i.e., mortality salience); instead, we have focused on a measure of perceived 
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threat to one’s group resources and values (Stephan et al., 1999; Stephan et al., 2009); thus, our 
measure of perceived threat is in line with the category of meaning threats, this is particularly 
true if we focus only on the subscale of symbolic threat to one’s group values. Thus, the current 
research used a concept of threat that is more closely tied to meaning threats and also not in the 
realm of mortality salience, which has sometimes been conflated within the research related to 
the Uncertainty-Threat Model. 
Overall, the hypotheses derived from the Uncertainty-Threat Model have yet to be tested 
in an intergroup context such as immigrants. The finding of liberals showing less avoidance and 
conservatives showing more avoidance of uncertainty and more of a focus on threats could be 
increased when encountering intergroup situations. Research has shown that thinking about or 
encountering intergroup situations can increase uncertainty and perceived threat (Grieve & Hogg, 
1999; Stephan et al., 2009). Thus, in intergroup situations of non-immigrants thinking about 
immigrants, being motivated by uncertainty avoidance and threat management should be 
predictive of responses to outgroups that are emphasized by the intergroup context (Jost et al., 
2003; Jost et al., 2017). There is, however, little research on threat and uncertainty together, and 
less on the relationship between political ideology, threat, uncertainty, and immigrants. Thus, we 
next examine these separate areas of research. 
Some researchers argue that uncertainty can increase deliberation or compromise in 
negotiations and reduce confidence (MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010; Marcus, 
Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). This position would then argue that increased uncertainty should 
also lead to less biased responding. Yet, increased uncertainty has been demonstrated to be 
related to increased intergroup bias in both minimal group paradigms and with real-world groups 
(Federico, Hunt, & Fisher, 2013; Grieve & Hogg, 1999) and to increased confidence in one’s 
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attitudes and social identity, which can lead to more bias (Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Van Den Bos, 
Poortyliet, Mass, Miedema, & Van Den Ham, 2005). Thus, more reliance on avoiding uncertainty 
could be related to more bias.  
Previous research, however, has also demonstrated that conservatives are more influenced 
by uncertainty in situations in which threats have been highlighted (Hass, 2016). In her research, 
she measured support for a compromise on the Affordable Care Act (i.e., Obamacare), and 
manipulated uncertainty and threat by asking participants to imagine either a home invasion 
scenario (threat) in which the culprit was either inside the house (certain) or trying to get in 
(uncertain). In the low threat control condition, participants imagined someone arriving at home 
during the day and ringing the doorbell; the person was either someone they knew (certain) or did 
not know (uncertain; Haas & Cunningham, 2014). This research observed that conservatives 
expressed less support for compromise with liberals, but only when uncertainty was paired with 
threat (Haas, 2016). This research would indicate that conditions that paired threat and 
uncertainty may increase bias for conservatives. 
Regarding threat, it is clearer that attention to threat can often lead to a variety of biases at 
the intergroup level. In Riek and colleagues’ meta-analysis (2006) using 95 samples, the 
intergroup threat was shown to have a large influence on the increased intergroup bias (average r 
= .43). Numerous other studies have also indicated that perceiving more threats are linked with 
increased intergroup bias (Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011; Pereira et al., 2010; Zarate, Garcia, Garza, 
& Hitlan, 2004). In regard to political orientation, research has demonstrated that liberals show 
less acceptance of inequality (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Jost 2009; Jost et al., 2003), 
have more positive attitudes toward gays and lesbians, Muslim Americans, and Arabs 
(Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; Nisbet & Shanahan, 2004; Webster, Burns, Pickering, & 
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Saucier, 2014; Whitley & Lee, 2000), show less outgroup hostility (Kugler, Jost, & 
Noorbaloochi, 2014), and have more positive feelings toward non-normative groups (Luguri, 
Napier, & Dovidio, 2012). In addition, Jost and colleagues (2017), in their recent meta-analysis, 
reviewed 174 tests of the hypothesized connection between feelings of insecurity and threat and 
more conservatism or authoritarianism and found a moderately strong relationship between 
conservatism predicting more subjective threat (weighted average, r = .26). Reviews have also 
supported the hypothesis that conservatives are more likely and liberals less likely to have a 
lower tolerance for uncertainty; the review notes that, over nine studies, there was a moderately 
large association between conservatism and lower tolerance for uncertainty (weighted average 
r = - .33; Jost, 2017). Thus, liberals are likely to show less bias toward low status or non-
normative outgroups such as immigrants, and responsiveness to threat is likely to increase this 
intergroup bias, and potentially explain this relationship. 
3.3 Research Overview. 
We sought to explain the cultural divide between liberals and conservatives and sought to 
extend the Uncertainty-Threat model to ingroup relations regarding immigrants. Given that 
liberals tend to show less bias toward low status and non-normative groups, we hypothesized that 
liberals would show less bias toward immigrants; here, we use the term bias to mean a response 
tendency instead of an error. We next were also the first to test whether this relationship would be 
significantly mediated by both uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat, and whether these 
factors were equally influential; we also tested whether both would remain significant with social 
dominance orientation (SDO) in the model, which is a variable that is strongly related to social 
status (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). In follow-up studies, we extended perceived threat from 
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immigrants to include perceived threats from abstract (unspecified) outgroups and added a 
negative bias measure and an implicit measure of bias.   
  
3.4 Study 4 
3.5 Methodology 
 Hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1. Based upon previous research, we hypothesized that Political Ideology 
would be related to Bias toward immigrants in which more liberalism would be associated with 
less bias (Cunningham et al., 2004; Kugler et al., 2014; Luguri et al., 2012; Nisbet & Shanahan, 
2004; Webster, et al., 2014; Whitley & Lee, 2000). 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b. To test the first of two extremity hypotheses, we predicted that 
more liberalism would be linearly related to less Perceived Threat and less Uncertainty-
Avoidance. In line with Jost and colleagues (2003; 2007; 2011), the quadratic relationship (i.e., 
more perceived threat and uncertainty-avoidance for those who were very liberal or very 
conservative) would be non-significant (i.e., unsupported extremity hypothesis). Given that 
liberals were predicted to be more positive and conservatives less positive toward immigrants, we 
also predicted that there would be linear relationship between Political Ideology and Bias in 
which more liberalism was related to less Bias, but that the quadratic term would be non-
significant (i.e., a natural extension of the extremity hypothesis in which one’s initial preference 
would be increased). 
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Hypothesis 3a, b, c, d, and e. Based upon past research (Burke et al., 2013; Jost et al., 
2003; Jost et al., 2017; Sibley & Duckitt, 2009), we predicted that Political Ideology would be 
associated with Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), System Threat, Death Avoidance, and 
Fear of Death, in which more liberalism was related to lower ratings on each of these measures. 
Finally, we predicted that liberalism would be related to higher rates of helping immigrants. This 
variable had been added to show the effects on a behavioral variable but given that it was a new 
measure and that it was not the primary outcome variable, we had placed it near the end of the 
study.  
Hypotheses 4a and b. The main hypotheses for the current research related to the 
mediational predictions based upon the uncertainty-threat model by Jost and colleagues (2003; 
2007; 2011). We predicted that both chronic variables of Perceived-Threat and Uncertainty-
Avoidance would mediate the relationship to Bias toward immigrants (4a). In order to provide an 
additional test for our mediational hypotheses, we wished to include another variable within the 
model that is known to be associated with bias and outgroup prejudice. A large amount of 
research has demonstrated that social dominance orientation (SDO) is associated with bias 
toward outgroups (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Guimond, Dambrun, 
Michinov, & Durate, 2003; Kteily, Sidanius, & Levin, 2011). Those high in SDO endorse their 
beliefs in a competitive society and a preference for hierarchy within society and for their group 
to be at the top. This perception along with perceived threats can both be related to increased bias 
toward outgroups; thus, we wished to test that Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance 




 Two hundred and six participants from the United States were recruited from the 
recruitment platform Prolific.ac and they completed an online study for monetary compensation. 
In this chapter we have used an online sample from US due to lack of availability of student 
sample for a lab study, further we pilot tested the sample and found no difference in attitudes of 
political orientation on implicit bias in British student samples and US samples. So only 
participants, who indicated that their nationality was the US and they were residing in the US 
within the Prolific.ac platform were recruited for this study; thus, the participants did not think of 
themselves as immigrants. Participants were between 18 and 65 years old (M = 31.00, SD = 
11.35) with 77.2% White, 25.7% Conservative, and 64.1% male participants. We recruited 
roughly 200 participants in order to have .8 power for 2 predictors in the model with a nearly 
medium effect size (d = .46), which is based upon effect sizes observed for the smallest factor in 
previous research (Jost et al., 2007; Jost & Napier, 2011).  
 Design. 
Political orientation was a measured predictor variable, while Perceived Threat and 
Uncertainty-Avoidance were mediator variables, and Bias was the outcome variable. The two 
mediators of Perceived Threat (Stephan et al., 1999) and Uncertainty-Avoidance (Jost et al., 
2007) were counterbalanced in order to methodologically control for order effects. The 
continuous, Political Orientation measure was followed by Perceived Threat and then 
Uncertainty-Avoidance in orders one (U-A: openness then ambiguity) and two (U-A: ambiguity 
then openness), or they were followed by Uncertainty-Avoidance and then Perceived Threat in 
orders three (U-A: openness then ambiguity) and four (U-A: ambiguity then openness). 
142 
 
Participants were randomly assigned one of these four, counterbalanced orders (Table1 for these 
four orders: see Appendix Y). 
 Materials 
Filler Task 1: The first filler task was composed of four items from the Need for 
Cognition scale that were not related to political ideology (α = .75, Need for Cognition 4 items 
scale to Political Ideology, r = -.007). Examples of the items included “I like tasks that require 
little thought once I've learned them” and “I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for many hours” 
(see Appendix P). However, these items were answered on 1 to 5 response scale from Extremely 
Uncharacteristic to Extremely Characteristic, and after reverse scoring two items, higher scores 
indicated more need for cognition. 
Perceived Threat from Immigrants: This scale (Stephan, Yabarra, & Bachman, 1999) 
consisted of fifteen items that measured threat levels based on seven symbolic threat and eight 
realistic threat items that were presented in a randomized order. The scale used a seven-point, 
vertical scale from (1) Disagree Strongly to (7) Agree Strongly. An example of the items included 
“The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding social relations are not compatible with the 
beliefs and values of most Americans” (see Appendix S). Because the subscales share a common 
theme of threats to the ingroup (Stephen et al., 1999) and were highly correlated (r = .75, p < 
.001, α = .94), we used all fifteen items in the index of perceived threat, which has been used in 
previous research (Tipp et al., 2012; Tausch, Hewston, Kenworthy, Cairns & Christ, 2007; 
Schmidt & Muldoon 2015; Verkuyten, 2009). After reverse-scoring 8 items, scores were 
averaged and higher scores indicated more perceived threat (M = 3.40, SD = 1.24, α = .94). 
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Uncertainty-Avoidance: We used Jost and colleagues’ (2007) Uncertainty-Avoidance 
measure. This measure was the mean of items from the 10 item Openness to Experience subscale 
of the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008), “I am someone who is original, 
and comes up with new ideas,” (see Appendix T1) and from the same 4 item Intolerance for 
Ambiguity measure used by Jost (Budner, 1962),“People who insist upon a yes or no answer just 
don’t know how complicated things really are” (see Appendix T2). Both scales were rated from 
(1) Disagree strongly to (7) Agree strongly and the items were randomized within scales; after 
reverse scoring two items, scores were averaged, and higher scores represented more uncertainty-
avoidance (M = 3.10, SD = 0.83, α = .81). 
Filler Task 2: The second filler task was placed between the mediators and the outcome 
measure and was composed of four additional items from the Need for Cognition scale (α = .86, 4 
items Need for Cognition to Political Ideology, r = .047). Examples of the items included “I 
would prefer complex to simple problems,” and “I only think as hard as I have to” (see Appendix 
P). After reverse scoring two items, scores were averaged, and higher scores indicated more need 
for cognition. 
Bias scale: A five-item Feeling Thermometer (Alwin, 1992; Saguy et al., 2009) was used 
as the Bias outcome measure (see Appendix M). Participants rated their feelings toward 
immigrants on five opposite pairs of evaluative dimensions (Warm-Cold, Negative-Positive, 
Friendly-Unfriendly, Suspicious-Trustworthy, Admiration-Disgust) using a nine-point, vertical 
scale (e.g., the top, 1= _______ to = 9 _______). After reverse-scoring two items, higher scores 
indicated more negative reactions (M = 4.03, SD = 1.55, α = .95). A separate measure that was 
not incorporated into the bias measure above was completed as a pilot test for future items for 
Study 5. Participants completed some pilot questions toward immigrants (Approval, Acceptance, 
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Liking, Disdain, Hatred; adapted from Stephan et al., 2002) by rating “… the degree to which 
you feel _____ toward immigrants” from (0) No liking at all (9) Extreme liking, depending upon 
the adjective rated.   
 
Secondary Measures. 
Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO): The Social Dominance Orientation 
measure included 16 items (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) such as “To get ahead in 
life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.” All items were completed on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from (1) Very Negative to (7) Very Positive (see Appendix U). Items were 
presented in a random order. After reverse scoring eight items, the items were averaged with 
higher scores reflecting higher social dominance ideology (M = 2.58, SD = 1.25, α = .95). 
Death Avoidance scale: This scale consisted of 5 items that were rated on 7-point scales 
from (1) Disagree Strongly to (7) Agree Strongly. An example item includes “I avoid death 
thoughts at all costs” (see Appendix V1). Higher scores represented more death avoidance  
(M = 3.73, SD = 1.68, α = .92; Wong, Reker, & Gesser, 1994). 
Fear of Death scale: This scale consisted of 7 items that were rated on 7-point scales 
from (1) Disagree Strongly to (7) Agree Strongly. An example item includes “I have an intense 
fear of death” (see Appendix V2). Higher scores represented more fear of death (M = 3.91, SD = 
1.58, α = .91; Wong et al., 1994). 
System Threat item: Participants completed a single item on system threat that was used 
by Jost et al., (2007), “Our way of life is seriously threatened by the forces of terrorism in the 
145 
 
world.” This item was rated on 7-point scale from (1) Disagree Strongly to (7) Agree Strongly.  
Higher scores represented more system threat.  
Additional mathematical questions on three separate pages were presented in order to 
demonstrate that you are a real person, please complete some of these mathematics problems: 6 x 
7 = _____; 8 + 5 = _____.   
We also added following question in order to see the tendency how participants respond, 
“Would you be willing to help out immigrants, who are living in poverty, by providing your 
email address to be contacted about helping out?  __No, __Yes”. This additional question will 
also assess if participants respond as “No” this would mean either they did not wish to share their 
personal information to be associated with their responses, or they simply were not willing to 
help the immigrants. 
In the US, left-wing ideas are often but not exclusively supported by the Democratic 
Party, and right-wing ideas are often but not exclusively supported by the Republican Party. We 
are interested in where you see yourself in the political spectrum from 1 = Very Right, to 5 = 
Neither, to 7 = Very Left (M = 4.60, SD = 1.81). 
3.6 Procedure. 
Participants completed informed consent and then some demographic variables including 
gender, ethnicity, age, English as a second language, residence status, and political ideology. 
Participants rated their personal political orientation on a nine-point, vertical scale from (1) 
extremely conservative to (9) extremely liberal, with a moderate as the mid-point (5) as was used 
in Jost et al., (2007). The political orientation item has often been included within demographics 
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in previous research (Crawford, Kay, & Duke, 2015; Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Fitzgerald & 
Wickwire, 2012; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). The mean political orientation score was 5.65 
(SD = 2.17). 
Next, participants completed Filler Task 1, which included four filler questions from the 
Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1984) that were uncorrelated with political ideology 
(r = .007), and that provided a small separation from the next task. Participants were then 
randomly assigned to one of two orders of the mediators by being told to select the letter that 
appeared at the top of a list of letters (each list was randomly ordered for each participant; thus, 
participants were not self-selecting into an order. Whichever letter was chosen had been 
randomly ordered by the computer and participants did not know what each letter represented. 
Moreover, participants believed they were doing this to check that the system was recording their 
responses correctly). Participants then completed either the Perceived Threat scale first and then 
the Uncertainty-Avoidance scale, or they completed the opposite order. After completing these 
mediators, participants completed Filler Task 2 (4 filler items from the Need for Cognition scale) 
to provide separation between measures.  
Participants next completed the five-item Feeling Thermometer (Alwin, 1992; Saguy et 
al., 2009) as the Bias outcome measure (M = 4.03, SD = 1.55, α = .95). They then completed five 
additional bias items that were being pilot tested for a later study.  
To further test some relationships suggested by the Uncertainty-Threat Model, we 
included some secondary measures of death avoidance, fear of death, and system threat that had 
been used by Jost et al., 2007. Participants first completed a Death Avoidance scale (5 items, α = 
.92, M = 3.73, SD = 1.68,) and Fear of Death scale (M = 3.91, SD = 1.58, α = .91; Wong et al., 
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1994) to test the proposed positive relationship to conservatism. Participants also completed a 
single item of system threat (Jost et al., 2007) and then the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
scale with sixteen items (M = 2.58, SD = 1.25, α = .95, Pratto et al., 1994) to test the positive 
relationships between political ideology and system threat, and between political ideology and 
social dominance. Next, participants completed some simple mathematics, filler questions and 
then a secondary, behavioral measure of helping that was being pilot tested. They answered a 
yes/no question about whether they would be willing to help immigrants, who are living in 
poverty, by providing their email address in order to be contacted about helping out; no email 
addresses were actually collected. Finally, participants completed questions about a left-right 
political orientation item and then questions about the purpose and how positive their day was, 
and then were debriefed. The purpose and positive day questions were filler questions and added 
only to provide distractions after the main questions had been asked. 
3.7 Results. 
Prior to testing the main hypotheses, we coded the four orders of the mediators and 
conducted a regression with Order, Political Orientation, and the interaction in the model for each 
outcome measure. We observed non-significant Order × Political interactions for Attitudes 
toward Immigrants and for Attitude Bias 2 (pilot-tested items); for all analyses, we observed  
p > 0.146 and R2 < 0.011. A Linear regression was conducted next to investigate the hypothesis 
that Political Orientation would be associated with Attitudes toward immigrants. Higher scores 
reflected a more liberal political ideology. As hypothesized, Political Orientation was 
significantly and negatively related to negative Attitudes, R2 = .27, β = - .52, t = - 8.64, p < .001, 
with bootstrapped b = - .37, 95%BCa CI [- .45, - .29], p < .001, which indicated that, within a 
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narrow confidence interval, higher liberalism was associated with less negative Attitudes 
(Hypothesis 1a); all Confidence Intervals (CI) used Bias Corrected intervals (BCa CI) as 
recommended by Hayes (2013) regardless of whether they were called “BCa CI” or “CI”. 
Political Orientation was also significantly and negatively related to the second Attitude 
measure being pilot tested, R2 = .27, β = - .51, t = - 8.57, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = - .42, 
95%BCa CI [- .51, - .32], p < .001. To test the extremity hypotheses, we centered Political 
Orientation and computed the quadratic term using the mean centered variable based upon 
recommendations for quadratic regressions (Cohen et al., 2003; van Prooijen et al., 2015). We 
added the Political Orientation variable in Step 1 and the Quadratic variable in Step 2 of the 
regression model with Uncertainty-Avoidance and we observed a Quadratic R2 < .001, β = 
- .01, t = - .13, p = .894 with bootstrapped b < - .01, 95% BCa CI [- .02, .02]. This same analysis 
was performed for Perceived Threat and found a Quadratic R2 < .001, β = - .03, t = - .48, p = 
.631, bootstrapped b < - .01, 95% BCa CI [- .03, .02]. Both non-significant effects suggested that 
participants at the extreme ends of political ideology did not endorse threat or uncertainty-
avoidance significantly more (Hypotheses 2a), which replicates the non-significant, quadratic 
effects observed by Jost and colleagues (2003, 2007). We also performed these analyses for the 
relationship between Political Ideology and Attitudes toward immigrants. The Quadratic term 
was non-significant, R2 < .001, β = - .013, t = - .20, p = .839 with bootstrapped b < - .01, 
95%BCa CI [- .04, .03], suggesting that participants at either extreme end of the political 
spectrum were not responding with more negative attitudes toward immigrants (Hypothesis 2b). 
Finally, a binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to test whether Political 
Orientation would be positively associated with the binary, behavioral-variable of Helping 
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Immigrants who are living in poverty. We observed that more liberalism was significantly related 
to more Helping of immigrants (Hypothesis 1a), β = .28, SE = .08, Wald = 10.97, p = .001, Odds 
Ratio = 1.32, 95%BCa CI [1.12, 1.55], Cox and Snell R2 = .06. 
Mediation. 
We next tested the multiple-mediational hypothesis in which Perceived Threat and 
Uncertainty-Avoidance were proposed to significantly mediate the Political Orientation to Bias 
relationship. We performed a simultaneous, multiple-mediation test using PROCESS analysis in 
SPSS with bias-corrected confidence intervals to 5000 samples as recommended by Hayes, 
(2013, v2, 13.1), for multiple mediators. As hypothesized, both Perceived Threat and 
Uncertainty-Avoidance significantly mediated the Political Orientation to Bias relationship (see 
Figure 20; Hypothesis 4a). In evaluating the mediators, Threat was significantly larger with a 
comparison b = - .29, CI [- .38, - .21]. Finally, both Uncertainty-Avoidance (b = - .02, CI [- .05, - 
.01], Completely Standardized Indirect Effect (CSIE) = - .03) and Threat (b = - .32, CI [- .41, - 
.24], CSIE = - .45) remained significant indirect effects when SDO (b = .01, CI [- .04, .05],  
CSIE = .01) was added to the model (Hypothesis 4b). The mediational analyses for Behavioural 
Helping were also supportive of the model, but just only Threat variable (see Appendix Z, Study 
4 - Figure b1). 
Some researchers have suggested that differences on political ideology and threat are 
observed mainly on measures of threat related to physical threats such as mortality salience 
(Burke et al., 2013; Crawford, 2017). They suggest that for meaning threats, “threats to systems 
of meaning and value,” liberals and conservatives should show a symmetry in their 
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responsiveness to these meaning threats. We can test this hypothesis in relation to our research on 
immigrants because one subscale of the perceived threat scale is a measure of symbolic threat to 
beliefs and values (i.e., a meaning threat). For the Political Orientation to Bias relationship, both 
Uncertainty-Avoidance (b = - .03, CI [- .06, - .01], CSIE) = - .04) and Symbolic (meaning) Threat 
(b = - .26, CI [- .34, - .19], CSIE = - .36) were significant mediators (see Appendix Z, Figure S4).  
Figure 20.  
 
Figure 20: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Perceived 
Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias-corrected 
confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.  
 
Both mediators were also significant when entered separate mediations (Uncertainty-
Avoidance, b = - .03, CI [- .07, - .01], R2 = .06, CSIE = - .05, and Threat, b = - .33, CI [- .42, - 










b = -.07, p = .005 
b = .91, p < .001 
b = .32, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.32, CI [-.40, -.24], CSIE = -.44 
Indirect, b = -.02, CI [-.05, -.01], CSIE = -.03 
         Total effect, b = -.37, [-.46, -.29] 
 Direct effect, b = - .034, [-.11, .04] 
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produced the same pattern of results and significances for all analyses, with the exception that 
Death Avoidance was now significant, R2 = .02, p = .044, b = - .13, CI [- .258, - .004]. For both 
political variables, all patterns of results and significances remained the same for all analyses in a 
sample of 181 participants after removing participants who failed to indicate that they were born 
in the USA in the second set of demographics questions in Study 4. Even though all 206 
participants indicated that their Nationality was US in the prolific.ac screening criteria, some had 
failed to verify this in our demographic questions; we improved these questions in later studies. 
In order to match previous research as closely as possible, we had followed Jost et al.’s, 
2007, research in which they had combined Ambiguity-Avoidance with Closedness (i.e., reverse-
scored Openness factor from the Big-Five, personality index). In the current study, we observed a 
significant correlation between Ambiguity-Avoidance and Closedness (r = .443) and a high 
internal consistency for the combined measure of Uncertainty-Avoidance (α = .806). In addition, 
we also investigated whether a two-factor mediation model (i.e., Threat and Uncertainty-
Avoidance) would fit the data equally well as a three-factor mediation model (i.e., Threat, 
Closedness, and Ambiguity-Avoidance) for the Explicit Bias results. Overall, both measures were 
very similar to each other, but the two-factor model fit the data slightly better (RMSEA = .087, 
TLI = .800, CFI = .814) than the three-factor model (RMSEA = .093, TLI = .769, CFI = .784) 
and this two-factor model explained a good portion of the variance (i.e., 35.4% of the variance; χ2 
= 410.28, p < .001). These results indicate that either model could be a good fit for the current 





Political Orientation was significantly associated with Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-
Avoidance, but the quadratic effect, which tested the extremity hypothesis, was not significant; 
this pattern replicated the non-significant quadratic effects of Jost and colleagues (2003; 2007). In 
an extension of these predictions, the quadratic effect was also non-significant for the Political 
Orientation to Bias toward immigrants, which again shows a lack of support for the extremity 
hypothesis based upon the worldview validation perspective (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Hogg, 
2012). Moreover, we observed that both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat were 
significant mediators in a multiple-mediation model of Political Orientation to Bias, and 
Perceived Threat was a significantly more influential mediator; these mediations were replicated 
with the Symbolic (meaning) Threat subscale. Thus, the current research found support for the 
Uncertainty-Threat Model, and it is the first to extend this model to intergroup relations regarding 
immigrants and to the perceived threat scale. 
 
3.9 Study 5 
3.10 Methodology 
 Hypotheses. 
Study 5 aimed to extend the measure of threat to general or abstract outgroups and to test 
whether uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat from abstract outgroups, as opposed to 
immigrants, mediated the relationship between political orientation and bias toward immigrants. 
We adapted a perceived threat to specific groups scale (Stephan et al., 2002) to be about abstract 
or general outgroups in much the same way that the social dominance orientation (SDO) measure 
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is about hierarchy in relation to general groups. A second aim was to extend the measurement of 
bias to include only negative ratings. We hypothesized that political orientation would again be 
significantly and negatively correlated with bias and with the new, negative bias measure in 
addition to the Helping Immigrants variable. Second, we hypothesized that both uncertainty-
avoidance and the perceived threat from abstract outgroups would mediate the negative 
relationship between political ideology and bias, and between political ideology and negative bias 
toward immigrants, and in a replication of Study 4, threat would be a more influential mediator. 
Finally, we anticipated replicating the non-significant quadratic effects between political ideology 
and the mediators and between political ideology and both measures of bias. 
 Participants. 
A sample of three hundred and eight participants was recruited from the Prolific.ac 
participant pool. All participants indicated within the Prolific.ac platform that they were born in 
the US and currently resided in the US; thus, no participant was considered an immigrant. They 
were between 18 and 74 years old (M = 31.53, SD = 12.12) with 80.5% White, 22.1% 
Conservative, and 50.6% male participants. We recruited roughly 300 participants in order to 
have .85 power for 2 predictors and .82 with 3 predictors in the model with a small effect size  
(d = .39) based upon Study 4 results estimated from the multiple-mediation model. 
 Design. 
The order of the measures and mediators was the same as in Study 4 with a few changes. 
The deviations from Study 4 included the following: 1) the ambiguity items and openness items 
were randomized within a single, Uncertainty-Avoidance questionnaire instead of within separate 
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questionnaires, 2) study 5 used only two orders because Uncertainty-Avoidance was now a single 
scale; thus, the Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance mediators were again 
counterbalanced to control for order effects, 3) the Perceived Threat measure was changed to be 
about general, abstract outgroups using an adaptation of Stephan et al.’s (2002) measure with 24 
items (see Appendix W), and the single-item system threat question was included at the end of 
the perceived threat measure, 4) the death avoidance and threat from death scales were removed 
because of non-significant findings in Study 4,  5) a bias scale with only negative adjectives was 
added after the bias scale that had been used in Study 4 in order to tap only negativity (see 
Appendix X), and finally 6) seven filler items were added before the helping immigrants 
question. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two, counterbalanced orders of the 
mediators. 
 New Materials. 
Perceived Threat from Abstract Outgroups: We used the 24-item Perceived Threat 
measure that we changed to be about general, abstract outgroups by adapting Stephan et al.’s 
(2002) threat from ethnic minority groups measure (see Appendix W). There were 12 symbolic 
threat items (e.g., “My group has very different values than outgroups.”) and 12 realistic threat 
items (e.g., Too much money is spent on educational programs that benefit outgroups). The 
measure used a seven-point, vertical scale from (1) Disagree Strongly to (7) Agree Strongly. 
After reverse scoring a few items, we averaged the items and a higher score indicated more 
perceived threat from general/abstract outgroups (α = .96). 
Negative Bias scale: This scale included ratings of five negative feelings toward immigrants 
(Disapproval, Resentment, Dislike, Disdain, Hatred; adapted from Stephan et al., 2002). They 
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were asked to “Please indicate the degree to which you feel _________ toward immigrants” on a 
nine-point, vertical from (0) No _________ to (9) Extreme _________ (see Appendix X). Higher 
scores represented more negative bias toward immigrants (M = 2.49, SD = 1.99, α = .95).  
Filler Task 3: A third filler task was placed between the attitude bias outcome measures and 
the final questions about mathematics, helping immigrants, and making errors within the study. It 
was composed of seven items from the Need for Cognition scale (α = .82; see Appendix P). 
Following the rating of political orientation within the demographic questions, 
participants completed the same need for cognition Filler Task 1 from Study 4 (α = .75). They 
then were randomly assigned to complete either the Perceived Threat from Abstract Outgroups 
(24 items, α = .96, r = .87, M = 3.67, SD = 1.31) scale first and then the Uncertainty-Avoidance 
scale (M = 2.95, SD = .80, α = .81), or they completed the opposite order as was done in Study 4. 
After completing these mediators, participants completed the same need for cognition Filler Task 
2 as from Study 4 (α = .81).  
Participants next completed the first Bias scale, which was the same as in Study 4 and 
included participants rating their feelings toward immigrants on five opposite pairs of evaluative 
dimensions (M = 3.87, SD = 1.66, α = .94). They then completed the Negative Bias scale, which 
included rating five negative feelings toward immigrants (see Appendix X; Disapproval, 
Resentment, Dislike, Disdain, Hatred, M = 2.49, SD = 1.99, α = .95). Participants next completed 
the social dominance orientation (SDO) scale used in Study 4 (M = 2.36, SD = 1.18, α = .95). 
After completing Filler Task 3 (7 items from Need for Cognition scale; α = .82) and two 
mathematics items, participants completed the same yes/no helping-immigrants behavioral 




We coded the two orders of the mediators and conducted a regression with Order, 
Political Orientation, and the interaction in the model for each outcome measure. We found 
nonsignificant Order x Political interactions for the Attitudes measure and the Negative Attitude 
measure; all interaction p > 0.713 and R2 < 0.001. Two linear regressions were performed to test 
the expected negative relationships between Political Orientation and Attitudes toward 
Immigrants and between Political Orientation and Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants. As 
expected, Political Orientation was significantly and negatively related to more negative Attitudes 
(Hypothesis 1a), R2 = .29, β = - .54, t = - 11.09, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = - .43, 95%BCa 
CI - .51, - .35], p < .001, and it also was significantly and negatively related to more negativity on 
the Negative Attitude measure (Hypothesis 1a), R2 = .19, β = - .43, t =  - 8.38, p < .001, with 
bootstrapped b = - .41, 95%BCa CI [- .52, - .31], p < .001; Because higher scores on Political 
Orientation were related to a more liberal ideology, the results indicated that higher liberalism 
was associated with less negative attitudes. Moreover, we created an Averaged Attitude score for 
Attitudes and Negative Attitudes and then standardized it; Political Orientation was significantly 
and negatively related to this standardized-Averaged Attitude score, R2 = .27, β = - .51, t = - 
10.50, p < .001. 
For the extremity analysis, the quadratic term entered in Step 2 of the regression was non-
significant for the relationships between Political Orientation and Uncertainty-Avoidance,  
R2 = .009, β = - .10, t = -1.72, p = .09, bootstrapped b = - .02, 95%BCa CI [- .04, .01] and 
between Political Orientation and Threat from Unspecified Outgroups, R2 < .001, β = - .03,  
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t = - .46, p = .643, bootstrapped b = - .01, 95%BCa CI [- .04, .03] (Hypothesis 2a). In separate 
regressions, the Quadratic term was also non-significant for the Political Orientation to Attitudes 
relationship, R2 = .002, β = - .05, t = - .98, p = .327, bootstrapped b = - .02, 95%BCa CI [-.05, 
.02] and also for the Negative Attitudes variable as predicted (Hypothesis 2b), R2 < .001, β = .01, 
t = .10, p = .923, bootstrapped b < .01, 95%BCa CI [- .05, .05]. 
Next, a binary logistic regression was conducted to test the binary, behavioral-variable of 
Helping Immigrants who are living in poverty. We again observed that more liberalism was 
significantly related to more Helping of immigrants (Hypothesis1a), β = .20, SE = .07, Wald = 
9.16, p = .002, Odds Ratio = 1.22, 95%BCa CI [1.07, 1.40], Cox and Snell R2 = .03. 
Mediations 
To examine the multiple-mediation hypothesis for Perceived Threat from Outgroups and 
Uncertainty-Avoidance (r = 0.157), we conducted separate, multiple-mediation analyses for Bias 
and for Negative Bias using PROCESS. As predicted, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived 
Threat from Outgroups had significant indirect effects on the Political Orientation to Bias 
relationship (see Figure 21; Hypothesis 4a), and Threat was larger, comparison b = -.07, CI [-.14, 
-.01]. Both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Threat from Outgroups also had significant indirect 
effects on the Political Orientation to Negative Bias relationship (see Figure 22; Hypothesis 4a), 
and Threat was larger, comparison b = -.11, CI [-.19, -.04]. Once again, we tested these two 
mediations with the Symbolic Threat subscale and replicated the same pattern of results as with 
the full Perceived Threat scale (see Appendix Z, Figures S5 a & b). The mediational analyses for 
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Behavioural Helping were, however, not supportive of the hypothesis and also with the previous 
research (see Appendix Z, Figures b2). 
Uncertainty-Avoidance, b = -.03, CI [- .06, -.01], CSIE = -.04, and general Threat from 
Outgroups, b = - .08, CI [- .15, - .03] CSIE = - .10 on Bias, and Uncertainty-Avoidance, b = - .03, 
CI [- .07, - .01], CSIE = - .03, and general Threat from Outgroups, b = - .11, CI [- .19, - .06], 
CSIE = - .11 on Negative Bias remained significant indirect effects when SDO was added to the 
model for both Bias and Negative Bias respectively. We also observed that Uncertainty-
Avoidance, b = - .03, CI [- .05, - .01], CSIE = - .06, and general Threat, b = - .07, CI [- .11, - .05], 
CSIE = - .16, were both significant indirect effects on the standardized Averaged Bias score. 
Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Perceived 
Threat from Outgroups and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias 











b = -.11, p < .001 
b = .40, p < .001 
b = .43, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.12, CI [-.18, -.07], CSIE = -.15 
      Direct Effect, b = -.31, CI [-.39, -.23] 
Indirect, b = -.05, CI [-.08, -.02], CSIE = -.06 





Figure 22: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Negative Bias with 
Perceived Threat from Outgroups and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 
95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test. 
 
Confirming the results of Study 4, both mediators were significant when entered into 
separate mediations for Bias (Uncertainty-Avoidance, b = - .05, CI [- .08 -.02], R2 = .08, CSIE -
.06, and Perceived Threat from Outgroups, b = - .12, CI [- .19, - .07], R2 = .17, CSIE = - .15]). 
The separate mediations were also significant for Negative Bias with Uncertainty-Avoidance b = 
- .05, CI [- .10, - .02], R2 = .05, CSIE = - .05, and Perceived Threat from Outgroups b = - .15, CI 













b = -.11, p < .001 
b = .52, p < .001 
b = .41, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.15, CI [-.23, -.10], CSIE = -.16 
      Direct Effect, b = - .26, CI [-.35, -.18] 
Indirect, b = -.04, CI [-.09, -.01], CSIE = -.05 
       Total Effect, b = - .43, CI [-.51, -.35] 
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The Left-Right measure of Political Orientation produced the same pattern of results and 
significances for all analyses with the exception that the quadratic effect on just the Bias measure 
was now significant; however, this effect was very, very small for the Bias measure, R2 = .01,  
β = -.21, t = - 2.11, p = .036. In addition, for both political variables, all patterns of results and 
significances remained the same for all analyses in a sample of 301 participants after removing 
participants who failed to indicate that they were born in the USA in the second set of 
demographic questions in Study 5. Even though all 308 participants indicated that they were born 
in the USA in the prolific.ac screening criteria, some had failed to verify this within the Study 5 
demographic questions. 
We once again tested the differences created by splitting the Uncertainty-Avoidance 
measure. We found a significant correlation between Ambiguity-Avoidance and Closedness (r = 
.238) and a high internal consistency for the combined measure of Uncertainty-Avoidance (α = 
.810). Overall, the two-factor model with Uncertainty-Avoidance fit the data slightly better 
(RMSEA = .070, TLI = .831, CFI = .840) than the three-factor model with Ambiguity-Avoidance 
and Closedness separated (RMSEA = .072, TLI = .818, CFI = .827) for Explicit Bias. A similar 
pattern was observed for Negative Bias in which the two-factor model (RMSEA = .072, TLI = 
.827, CFI = .837) fit the data slightly better than the three-factor model with Ambiguity-
Avoidance and Closedness separated (RMSEA = .075, TLI = .816, CFI = .825). Overall, the two-
factor model with Uncertainty-Avoidance explained a good portion of the variance (i.e., 33.04% 
of the variance; χ2 = 409.26, p < .001). Once again, these results indicate that either model could 





In Study 5, we extended the measurement of bias to a negative bias measure and also 
extended the perceived threat measure to perceived threat from abstract outgroups, much like 
social dominance orientation is measured in relation to abstract groups. We replicated the 
political orientation to bias results and the multiple-mediation by uncertainty-avoidance and 
threat that had been observed in Study 4; in this case, threat was from abstract outgroups instead 
of threat from immigrants. We also demonstrated the same pattern of results for the Negative 
Bias measure and the Bias measure. In addition, both of these mediations were replicated with the 
Symbolic (meaning) Threat subscale. Overall, the observed results significantly extend the 
Uncertainty-Threat Model and its implications for examining intergroup relationships, especially 
for low status or disadvantaged groups such as immigrants, who have become a major focus of 
debates recently. 
 
3.13 Study 6 
3.14 Methodology 
 Hypotheses. 
In Study 6, we replaced the behavioural dependent variable with a validated, implicit 
measure of attitudes, the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005); because of 
time constraints, we did not measure both variables. In addition, we returned to the use of the 
perceived threat from immigrants measure as a mediator in study 6 in order to test whether it 
would mediate the results to the negative bias measures used in the study 5 but not in study 4. We 
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also tested whether perceived threat would mediate the relationship to the validated, implicit 
measure. 
 Participants. 
A sample of three hundred and thirty-one participants was recruited from the Prolific.ac 
participant pool to complete the online study with the anticipation that we would have to remove 
participants for non-completion and inattention. We followed the standard procedure for 
removing participants who failed to follow instructions and who responded on the implicit bias 
measure with one key response on ninety-eight percent or more of all test trials (Payne & 
Lundberg, 2014); we had a final sample of 312 participants. All participants indicated within the 
Prolific.ac platform that they were born in the US and currently resided in the US; thus, no 
participant was an immigrant. They were between 18 and 75 years old (M = 31.71, SD = 12.39) 
with 68.6 % White, 20.8 % Conservative, and 54.2 % male participants. We recruited roughly 
300 participants in order to have .8 power for 2 predictors in the model with a small effect size  
(d = .38) based upon previous online completion rates for our studies and based upon the results 
of Studies 4 and 5. 
 Design. 
Study 6 used the same materials and procedures as Study 5 with the following changes: 1) 
In the current study, we returned to the use of the Perceived Threat from Immigrants scale 
(Stephan et al., 1999; see Appendix S) that we had used in Study 4; 2) In Study 6, we 
counterbalanced the order of Perceived Threat, Uncertainty-Avoidance, and Social Dominance 
Orientation. The bias-dependent variables were also counterbalanced so that explicit measures 
and implicit measures each occurred first for half of the participants in order to control for order 
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effects (see Appendix Y, Table 2 for the order of measures); 3) we dropped the measure of 
system threat and the behavioral helping measure and added the Affect Misattribution Procedure 
as the measure of Implicit Bias. 
 Materials.  
Participants completed an online version of the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; see 
Appendix J) as an indirect measure of attitude bias toward immigrants (Imhoff & Banse, 2009; 
Payne et al., 2008; Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010; Payne & Lundberg, 2014). In the AMP 
instructions, participants were told that they would see Immigrant faces (shown Pakistani face as 
an example) and Non-Immigrant faces (shown a White face as an example) to complete the task. 
However, they were asked to judge the drawing as pleasant or unpleasant (see Appendix J). In the 
actual measure they saw a photograph of an Immigrant face (Pakistani/Indian face), a non-
Immigrant face (White), or a grey square for an equal number of trials; the prime faces were 
matched for attractiveness. Each prime photo was replaced quickly with a Korean pictograph of a 
non-word, letter string (see Appendix J); we used non-words so that ability to read Korean did 
not affect the outcome of the task. We used the same timing as previous online AMP research 
(Payne et al., 2010) in which there were 72 trials where participants saw a Dot for 500ms 
(milliseconds) to identify the beginning of a trial and this Dot was followed by a prime (face or 
grey square) for 75ms, then followed by a pictograph for 225ms. A television-static pattern mask 
then appeared and remained on the screen until participants responded by pressing either the key 
labeled Pleasant or the key labeled Unpleasant. Participants were instructed to ignore the faces of 
immigrants and non-immigrants and to judge only whether the pictograph drawing appeared to be 
more or less pleasant than average; they did this by pressing the Pleasant or Unpleasant key; they 
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had four practice trials to familiarize themselves with the task prior to completing the 72 critical 
trials. Thirty-six pictograph, non-words were presented twice within 2 blocks of 36 trials, and the 
12 immigrant faces, 12 white faces, and 12 grey squares were presented twice each (i.e., once in 
each block of 36 trials for a total of 72 trials). Each prime was randomly paired with pictographs 
within each block of 36 trials. We used the standard scoring procedure from past research by 
taking the percentage of pleasant responses after White faces and subtracting the percentage of 
pleasant responses after Immigrant faces; thus, scores can range from 1 to -1 and higher scores 
indicated more positive bias toward White faces in comparison to Immigrant faces (AMP; Payne 
et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010). 
3.15 Procedure.  
After completing the demographic questions and the rating of political ideology within 
the demographic section, participants completed the same Filler Task 1 (four items from the Need 
for Cognition scale, α = .61) from Studies 4 and 5. Next, participants were randomly assigned to 
order by being asked to choose the letter that appeared at the top of a list of letters (each 
randomly ordered for each participant and participants were unaware of the meaning of the 
letters; see Appendix Y, Table 2 for orders). For Study 6, Perceived Threat, Uncertainty-
Avoidance, and SDO were counterbalanced to control for order effects. After these mediators, 
participants completed the same Filler Task 2 (α = .74) from Studies 4 and 5, and then completed 
the dependent variables; the bias dependent variables (Bias, Negative Bias, and Implicit Bias) 
were counterbalanced so that explicit measures and implicit measures each occurred first for half 
of the participants in order to control for order effects. Bias toward immigrants, Perceived Threat 
from Immigrants, and Uncertainty-Avoidance were measured with the same scales used in Study 
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4 and all three showed good reliability (Bias, M = 3.60, SD = 1.40, α = .91; Threat, M = 3.00, SD 
= 1.16, α = .92; Uncertainty-Avoidance, M = 2.93, SD = 0.74, α = .77) with higher average scores 
equaling more bias or more perceived threat. Implicit Bias (M = .00, SD = .25) was measured 
with the standard AMP, and Negative Bias (M = 2.34, SD = 1.68, α = .95) was again measured 
with the same scale used in Study 5 (see Appendix X). After completing Filler Task 3 (α = .64) 
and two mathematics items, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
3.16 Results. 
We conducted three linear regressions to test the expected negative association between 
Political Orientation and Bias, Negative Bias, and Implicit Bias. Higher scores on Political 
Orientation were related to a more liberal ideology. As hypothesized, Political Orientation was 
significantly and negatively related to Bias (Hypothesis 1a), R2 = .23, β = - .48, t = - 9.58,  
p < .001, with bootstrapped b = - .33, 95% BCa CI [- .41, - .25], p < .001, significantly and 
negatively related to Negative Bias (Hypothesis 1b), R2 = .24, β = - .49, t = - 9.99, p < .001, with 
bootstrapped b = - .40, 95% BCa CI [- .50, - .30], p < .001, and it also was a significant, negative 
predictor of Implicit Bias (Hypothesis 1c), R2 = .12, β = - .35, t = - 6.48, p < .001, with 
bootstrapped b = - .04, 95% BCa CI [- .06, - .03], p < .001. We also standardized the three 
dependent variables and averaged them to create a standardized-Averaged Bias Score. Political 
Orientation was a significant, negative predictor of z-Averaged Bias, R2 = .32, β = - .57, t = -
12.12, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = -.21, 95% BCa CI [-.26, -.17], p < .001, and it was a larger 
effect (Cohen’s d = 1.37) than each of the other three measures of bias. The effect size on the 
explicit measures was also larger than on the implicit measure, though both were substantial (R2 
> .12). This indicates that participants may be increasing their bias when they are asked to 
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evaluate it and consciously report it. It is also of note that the standardized-Averaged Bias 
measure that incorporated all three measures had a larger effect size (R2 = .32) than the individual 
implicit and explicit measures; future research will need to confirm whether such a combined 
measure may produce better predictive ability. 
For the extremity analysis, the Quadratic term that was entered in Step 2 of the regression 
was non-significant for Political Orientation to Uncertainty-Avoidance, β = .04, t = .70, p = .485, 
bootstrapped b = .01, 95% BCa CI [- .01, .03], and for Political to Threat (Hypothesis 2a),  
β = - .01, t = - .26, p = .794, bootstrapped b < .01, 95% BCa CI [- .03, .03], which again 
replicated Jost and colleagues (2003; 2007). In addition, in separate regressions, the Quadratic 
term was non-significant for Bias (Hypothesis 2b), R2 = .002, β = - .04, t = - .78, p = .434, 
bootstrapped b = - .01, 95% BCa CI [- .05, .03], for Implicit Bias (Hypothesis 2b), R2 < .001,  
β < .001, t = .21, p = .834, bootstrapped b < .01, 95% BCa CI [- .01, .01], and for z-Averaged 
Bias, R2 < .001, β < .001, t = .66, p = .509, bootstrapped b = .01, 95% BCa CI [- .01, .03]. It was, 
however, significant for the Negative Bias variable (Hypothesis 2b), R2 = .01, β = .10, t = 2.03,  
p = .043, bootstrapped b = .04, 95% BCa CI [- .01, .08], but with a very small effect size  
(R2 = .01). The SDO findings from Studies 4 and 5 were also replicated with similar results 
showing that higher liberalism was significantly related to less SDO, R2 = .31, β = - .56,  
t = -11.74, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = - .29, 95% BCa CI [- .35, - .23], p < .001. Once again, 
we tested these two mediations with the Symbolic Threat sub-scale and again found the same 




To examine the multiple-mediation hypothesis for Perceived Threat from Immigrants and 
Uncertainty-Avoidance, we conducted separate, multiple-mediation analyses for the Political 
Orientation to Bias, to Negative Bias, to Implicit Bias, and to z-Averaged Bias. As hypothesized, 
both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat had significant indirect effects on Bias (see 
Figure 23; Hypothesis 4a), and Threat was a larger mediator, comparison b = - .30, CI [- .38, -
.23]. In a separate mediation, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat had significant 
indirect effects on Negative Bias (see Figure 24; Hypothesis 4a), and again Threat was a larger 
mediator, comparison b = - .31, CI [- .41, - .22]. For z-Averaged Bias, both Uncertainty-
Avoidance and Perceived Threat had significant indirect effects on z-Averaged Bias (see Figure 
25). In contrast to expectations, Uncertainty-Avoidance was not a significant mediator when 
Threat was within the multiple-mediation model for Implicit Bias (see Figure 26), though 
Uncertainty-Avoidance was significant for standardized Averaged Bias.  
Uncertainty-Avoidance, b = - .02, CI [- .04, - .01], CSIE = - .03, b = - .02, CI [- .039, -
.003], CSIE = - .02, and b = - .01, CI [- .0153, - .0003], CSIE = - .02, and Threat, b = - .28, CI [-
.36, - .21], CSIE = - .41, b = - .26, CI [- .36, - .18], CSIE = - .32, and b = - .14, CI [- .19, - .11], 
CSIE = - .38, remained significant indirect effects when SDO was added to the model for both 
Bias, Negative Bias, and z-Averaged Bias respectively (Hypothesis 4b). Neither Uncertainty-
Avoidance b = .001, CI [- .002, .005], nor SDO b = .004, CI [- .006, .014] were significant 






Figure 23: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Perceived 
Threat from Immigrants and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias 

















b = -.09, p < .001 
b = .90, p < .001 
b = .24, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.32, CI [-.40, -.25], CSIE = -.47 
Indirect, b = -.02, CI [-.04, -.01], CSIE = -.03 
        Direct, b = .02, CI [-.4, .08] 





Figure 24: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Negative Bias with 
Perceived Threat from Immigrants and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 



















b = -.09, p < .001 
b = .91, p < .001 
b = .23, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.33, CI [-.43, -.24], CSIE = -.40 
Indirect, b = -.02, CI [-.04, -.01], CSIE = -.03 
        Direct, b = -.05, CI [-.14, -.03] 





Figure 25: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Implicit Bias with 
Perceived Threat from Immigrants and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 



















b = -.09, p < .001 
b = .05, p = .003 
b = -.01, p = .429 
Indirect, b = -.02, CI [-.03, -.01], CSIE = -.13 
Indirect, b = .001, CI [-.002, .006], CSIE = .01 
      Direct, b = -.03, CI [-.04, -.02] 





Figure 26: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to standardized Averaged 
Bias with Perceived Threat from Immigrants and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets 
represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test. 
 
Both mediators were significant when entered into separate mediations for Bias 
(Uncertainty-Avoidance, b = -.03, CI [- .06, - .02], R2 = .06, CSIE = - .05, and Perceived Threat, 
b = - .33, CI [- .41, - .26], R2 = .23, CSIE = - .48]), and separate mediations for Negative Bias 
(Uncertainty-Avoidance b = - .03, CI [- .07, - .01], R2 = .05, CSIE = - .04, and Perceived Threat  
b = - .33, CI [- .44, - .25], R2 = .24, CSIE = - .41). However, for Implicit Bias, Uncertainty-













b = -.09, p < .001 
b = .45, p < .001 
b = .08, p = .03 
Indirect, b = -.16, CI [-.20, -.13], CSIE = -.43 
Indirect, b = -.01, CI [-.017, -.002], CSIE = -.02 
         Direct, b = -.43, CI [-.07, -.01] 
         Total, b = -.21, CI [-.25, -.17] 
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Perceived Threat was significant b = - .02, CI [- .03, - .01], R2 = .09, CSIE = - .13, when entered 
alone. 
The Left-Right measure of Political Orientation produced the same pattern of results and 
significances for all analyses, except that the Uncertainty-Avoidance indirect effect was not 
significant within the multiple-mediation with threat on the standardized-Averaged Bias measure, 
and Uncertainty-Avoidance was also not significant in the multiple-mediation model with SDO 
and Threat on the standardized-Averaged Bias measure. After removing an additional four 
participants who failed to verify that they were born in the US within the Study 6 demographic 
questions (308 participants), all patterns and significances were the same for the Left-Right 
measure with the exception that Uncertainty-Avoidance was not significant in the multiple 
mediations with Threat and SDO on the standardized-Averaged Bias measure. Again, for the 
main political variable, all patterns of results and significances remained the same for all analyses 
in a sample of 308 participants. 
Finally, as in Studies 4 and 5, we once again tested whether splitting the Uncertainty-
Avoidance measure into Ambiguity-Avoidance and Closedness would change the results.  We 
did not find support for this conclusion.  As in Studies 4 and 5, a similar pattern was observed for 
Explicit Bias in which the two-factor model (RMSEA = .083, TLI = .778, CFI = .837) fit the data 
slightly better than the three-factor model with Ambiguity-Avoidance and Closedness separated 
(RMSEA = .075, TLI = .816, CFI = .825). Overall, the two-factor model with Uncertainty-
Avoidance explained a good portion of the variance (i.e., 33.04% of the variance; χ2 = 409.26, p 
< .001).   
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3.17 Discussion.   
This research supports the idea that the divide between liberals and conservatives by 
highlighting the importance that differences in threat management or risk avoidance play in 
explaining political differences. In three studies, we provided good evidence that the Uncertainty-
Threat Model predicts relationships to political orientation, that it can be extended to an 
intergroup context, and that it predicts bias differences for liberals and conservatives within an 
immigration intergroup context. Moreover, both measured personality variables of uncertainty-
avoidance and perceived threat concerns mediated the relationship between liberalism 
(conservatism) and less (more) bias within an intergroup context related to immigrants; again, we 
use the term, bias, here to mean a response tendency instead of an error. In Study 4, measured 
uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threats from immigrants mediated the political orientation to 
bias relationship; they did so within both a multiple-mediation model and as separate mediators; 
within the multiple-mediation model that included uncertainty-avoidance, perceived threat was 
also demonstrated to be the most influential factor and that it was a very large effect on the 
relationship. Our research was the first to demonstrate such a mediation, and it also extended the 
mediation of threat management beyond the concepts of systemic threat from terrorism, belief in 
a dangerous world, and death anxiety (Jost et al., 2007). In Study 5, perceived threat was again 
extended from perceived threat from immigrants to perceived threat from abstract outgroups, and 
bias was extended to include a measure focusing on only negativity. Again, both uncertainty-
avoidance and perceived threat from abstract outgroups mediated the relationship between 
liberalism (conservatism) and less (more) bias, on both bias measures, and it was a moderately 
large effect. In Study 6, we replicated all findings with the exception of the mediational analysis 
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for the Implicit Bias measure. Interestingly, this indirect bias measure appears to be more tied to 
threat than we had previously believed because the threat was the only significant mediator of the 
relationship within either multiple-mediation model. However, an additional analysis on the 
averaged bias measure (of Bias, Negative Bias, and Implicit Bias) revealed that both uncertainty-
avoidance and perceived threat from immigrants significantly mediated the political orientation to 
averaged bias relationship; a combined analysis of Bias and Negative Bias from Study 5 also 
revealed the same significant mediation for uncertainty-avoidance and general threat. 
We also analyzed the type of threat we used and examined some of the effects related to 
uncertainty-avoidance. A recent review has indicated that threat has been defined within the 
motivated social cognition perspective (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017) in a way that may miss 
differences (Crawford, 2017). This review suggests that physical threat (i.e., threats to existential 
reality such as mortality salience) and meaning threats (i.e., systems of meaning and values) have 
often been conflated. They argue that liberals and conservatives respond differently to physical 
threats, but that they usually respond in a similar manner to meaning threats. Within our current 
research, we did not use physical threats. Instead, we used perceived threats to one’s group, 
which is similar to meaning threats. However, contrary to the review of meaning threats, we 
observed that liberals and conservatives responded differently to perceived threats to one’s 
ingroup (i.e., combined perceived realistic and symbolic threat), and that symbolic threat (i.e. a 
meaning threat) entirely replicated the differential relationship to political ideology and the 
mediations to bias toward immigrants (both implicit and explicit bias). In addition, we used 
personality measures of uncertainty-avoidance that had been used previously (Jost et al., 2007; 
2011). Over our three studies, we observed a weighted-average beta between Political Ideology 
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and Uncertainty-Avoidance of .25 (R2 = .06); while this was a reasonably good effect size and 
was the reason we kept it throughout our three studies, the weighted-average beta observed by 
Jost and colleagues (2007) was better  (.41). We have reviewed the recent research by Jost (2017; 
Jost, Sterling, et al., 2017) and have noted that Uncertainty-Avoidance may have a larger 
correlation with Political Ideology when more of the items of Need for Closure or Need for 
Structure are included within the measures of uncertainty-avoidance. Thus, future research may 
improve the measurement of Uncertainty-Avoidance by including Need for Cognitive Closure 
within this measure. 
In our research, we mainly observed evidence supporting only the uncertainty-threat 
model (i.e., linear relationship between political ideology and threat and uncertainty-avoidance 
and between political ideology and bias), and we did not observe much support for the extremity 
hypothesis (i.e., a quadratic relationship; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; van Prooijen et al., 2015). 
The extremity hypothesis proposes that people at either the left or right extreme on the political 
spectrum should show more extreme reactions or biases than people at the middle of the 
distribution. Van Prooijen et al. (2015) showed that people on the extreme left and right showed 
more derogation of immigrants and more derogation of societal groups in general. They and Jost 
et al., (2007) used a quadratic regression to test this hypothesis. We did not replicate van 
Prooijen’s effect in three studies with good sample sizes (206, 308, and 312 participants, .8 power 
to observe an R2 of .025 to.04) and using a general population (i.e., not samples using 
undergraduate students); In Study 6, we also did not support the extremity hypothesis from the 
worldview perspective for the Bias measure, the standardized-Average Bias measure, and the 
Implicit measure. We, instead, observed a significant linear effect in which liberals showed less 
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bias as hypothesized by the Uncertainty-Threat Model, but we did not observe the significant 
quadratic effect; participants at the extreme ends did not show more bias than moderates; 
however, we did observe a very slight extremity effect on the Negative Bias measure, but only in 
Study 6, and with only a very small effect size (R2 of .01), which matches previous research (van 
Prooijen et al., 2015). In addition, van Prooijen et al. used an extremely large sample of 7,553 
participants and observed very small changes in R2 of .01 (derogation of immigrants) and .03 
(derogation of societal groups); these small changes would require very large sample sizes to be 
observed reliably (779 participants for the .01 effect size with one predictor, or 957 with two); in 
addition, there is a question of the practical significance of the very smallest 1% effect observed 
in only one of our three dependent variables and only in our Study 6 in relation to the immigrants 
measure; would such a small effect be practically significant in applied settings? This is an 
empirical question for future studies to tackle. 
The current research provides a good first test of the chronic personality hypotheses that 
can be derived from the Uncertainty-Threat Model.  However, given that this research was an 
initial first test, it was correlational and limited to only demonstrating associations, though we did 
use methods to improve the correlational studies. For the mediational analysis, by measuring the 
mediators after political ideology, and bias after the mediators, it is known that the mediators did 
not influence participants’ ratings of political ideology within the study (because the political 
ratings occurred first) and that bias did not influence participants’ ratings of political ideology or 
the mediators within the study (Cohen et al., 2003; Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). However, 
rating political ideology could have had an influence of the later measures, though this a common 
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issue with political studies. Thus, future research could alter the order of these variables, or 
consider other ways to test the hypotheses generated by this model. 
In addition to showing support for the Uncertainty-Threat Model, this research was the 
first to extend the model to perceived threat from outgroups, both to specific outgroups (i.e., 
immigrants) and to abstract outgroups much like social dominance orientation does with abstract 
groups, and to extend the multiple-mediation beyond systemic threat from terrorism, belief in a 
dangerous world, or death anxiety (Jost et al., 2007). In Study 4, we used a validated measure of 
the perceived threat from immigrants and found a significant mediation of the relationship 
between more liberalism and less bias toward immigrants (Stephan et al., 1999). In Study 5, we 
extended this research by testing the model with a measure of the perceived threat from abstract 
outgroups and observed a similar significant mediation. In Study 6, we returned to the perceived 
threat from immigrants measure and demonstrated its mediation of the political orientation to bias 
effect for an objective, indirect measure of bias. Moreover, in all three studies, perceived threat 
was a significantly more influential mediator than uncertainty-avoidance within the multiple-
mediation model. This effect highlights the importance that perceived threat may play in 
differentiating liberals and conservatives and may provide a topic to bridge the divide on the 
immigration debates currently occurring worldwide.  
3.18 General Discussion 
Thus, a key difference between liberals and conservatives may be their responsiveness to 
perceived threats or risks (Jost et al., 2017) instead of differences in negativity bias as proposed 
by some theorists (Hibbing et al., 2014). Other researchers have begun to show that liberals and 
conservatives may differ in relation to threats (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Oxley, Smith, 
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Alford, Hibbing, Miller, Scalora, & Hibbing, 2008; Terrizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013; 
Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011). In other recent research, conservatism was positively related to self-
restraint and social-order dimensions of the Moral Motives Model (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & 
Baldacci, 2007), both of which could be said to be related to differences in responsiveness to 
social threats. Discussing these differences in terms of people having different responsiveness to 
the threat, as opposed to wanting to be socially dominant or having a general negativity bias, 
allows for a constructive debate that may reduce the focus of casting either group in a negative 
light. Differences in responsiveness to threat can be adaptive in different circumstances and 
having a balance of both may be beneficial to society (Janoff-bulman & Carnes, 2016). If we are 
able to acknowledge the perceived threats, it allows for the discussion of the benefits of 
immigration to the overall economy, while also discussing the problems with immigration 
hurting the poor with whom immigrants occasionally compete for jobs. It allows us to focus on 
helping immigrants learn English to improve the shared focus on the ideals of the principles of 
democracy rather than on dividing us on cultural differences defined by blood ties and heritage. It 
allows for these groups to discuss issues related to threat in ways that may acknowledge and offer 
solutions to differences in threat and perhaps move the debate forward towards the promise of 







4 CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The aim of our research was two-fold. First, we tested the role of intergroup ideologies in 
reducing outgroup bias and enhancing support for collective action at the same time along with 
political ideology as a predicting factor of bias. To achieve this aim Chapter 2 tested if 
Multiculturalism approach (MC), a Common Ingroup Identity approach (CIIM), and 
Commonality Without Highlighting subgroup identities approach (CWO) would be effective in 
improving the intergroup relations through bias reduction and generating support for collective 
action concurrently towards the British-Pakistani group; political ideology was also included as a 
factor. In Chapter 3, we pursued the consistent results of political ideology that we observed in 
Chapter 2 and examined the role of uncertainty avoidance and threat management as potential 
mediators of the signifiant political ideology and bias relationship. Our findings have contributed 
to the existing literature by closing the gaps in research on intergroup ideologies along with 
increasing our understanding of the influence of political ideology within the British context, yet 
it also has various socio-cognitive implications for the development of positive intergroup contact 
among ethnically diverse communities.  
In the first part of our research, we have tested the role of MC, CIIM, and CWO in bias 
reduction and support for collective action towards the Pakistani-British outgroup with political 
ideology. Across three experiments, the Multicultural prompt demonstrated an inconsistent 
pattern. Multiculturalism (MC) produced significantly more (not less) outgroup attitude bias than 
did a commonality approach (CIIM) within Experiment 1, and while MC produced more bias 
than CIIM in Experiment 2, it was not significant within the full model or on its own In addition, 
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within Experiment 2, MC did not produce significantly more bias than the neutral Control 
condition . While the Commonality (CIIM) condition did produce less bias than the Control 
condition, this effect was small and non-significant. Moreover, the results of Experiment 3 were 
contrary to Experiments 1 and 2. In this case, MC produced significantly less (not more) bias 
than the CIIM and the CWO (Commonality without highlighting) conditions. So, Experiment 2 
did not support increased bias by MC that had been observed in Experiment 1 while Experiment 
3 supported the opposite finding in which MC produced less bias in comparison to the CIIM 
condition. Thus, the overall pattern of results in relation to bias were inconsistent and mostly 
inconclusive.  
The pattern for support for collective action was more consistent. Multiculturalism (MC) 
produced significantly less support and not more support for collective action than CIIM within 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and Experiment 3 though the effects were small to medium in all 
three experiments. However, MC was not significantly different from the Control condition in 
Experiment 2 or the Commonality without highlighting condition in Experiment 3; thus, the main 
finding is that multiculturalism produced significantly less support for collective action than did 
the commonality condition, but MC did not significantly decrease support in comparison to either 
the control in Experiment 2 or the Commonality without subgroup highlighting in Experiment 3.     
In contrast, political ideology remained consistent in predicting willingness to support for 
collective action in all three experiments and significantly predicting bias in Experiments 1 and 2, 
though Experiment 3 was not significant with the non-significant interactions in the model but it 
was when just the simple effects were included. The consistency of the Political Ideology 
findings led to the second part of our research wherein we tested the mediating role of Threat-
Management and Uncertainty-Avoidance based upon the Uncertainty-Threat Model (Jost et al., 
181 
 
2003, 2007 2017) to explain the relationship between political ideology and negative attitude bias 
against immigrants in Chapter 3. The model significantly explained the ideological differences 
observed in relation to attitudes towards immigrants and the mediation by uncertainty avoidance 
and threat management.  
In the first section of our research, while considering the earlier empirical literature on the 
effectiveness of MC (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004) and CIIM (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) to 
overcome the outgroup bias, we tested these ideologies within the context of British White 
majority group to examine if these could reduce bias towards a non-normative ethnic minority 
group outside the US (for example Plaut et al., 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Ryan, Hunt, 
Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2009; Wolsko et al., 2000; Yogeeswaran & 
Dasgupta, 2014, worked with US samples). The Pakistani-British subgroup is one of the largest 
and fastest growing ethnic group of the UK, so we selected this minority group in this particular 
research context as a target group (ONS Census, 2012). We assumed that the majority population 
may experience exacerbated threat if people believe that minority groups want to maintain their 
culture (e.g., as implied within a multiculturalism approach). Recent research showed that 
respondents experienced more threat and supported multiculturalism less when they believed 
minority group members wanted to maintain their culture as opposed to wanting to adopt British 
culture (Tip et al., 2012; Tip et al., 2015). 
This threat from diversity may be partially explained by intergroup threat theory (Stephan 
et al., 2009) and research on the ingroup projection model that has found that people may often 
perceive their ingroup (e.g., White majority) as prototypical of a larger superordinate group (e.g., 
British or United Kingdom; Waldzus et al., 2003; Wenzel et al., 2007). An outgroup such as a 
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British minority group can be viewed negatively if it is included in the superordinate group 
(British), but is seen as having differences (cultural, religious, linguistic, etc) that may be viewed 
as violating the norms of the superordinate group (i.e., the norms of majority ingroup). Research 
on national identity within North America, and particularly in the USA, has shown that White 
Americans tend to see minority groups as extraneous to what it means to be an American and 
they see the American nationality as being comprised of attributes prototypical of their own racial 
group (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2010; Yogeeswaran et al., 2012). There is little research on 
this topic within the UK (Tip et al., 2012; Tip et al., 2015); thus, we designed this research to 
fulfill the need to investigate the influence of diversity, multiculturalism, and these processes on 
intergroup relations and civic engagement within the UK. 
We have examined these intergroup approaches across three experiments with White-
British samples to evaluate whether a particular ideology reduces implicit bias and increases 
willingness to engage in support for collective action simultaneously, which has not been 
demonstrated within the literature. In Experiment 1, we observed that MC induced significantly 
more implicit bias in comparison to the CIIM condition. These results are contrary to much of the 
research that shows MC reduces bias (Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Hachfeld et al., 2015; Plaut 
et al., 2018; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Tadmor et al., 2012; Wolsko et al., 2000). However, 
this finding is in line with research showing that the UK views multiculturalism less positively 
than North America, where much of the MC research has taken place (Apfelbaum, Grunberg, 
Halevy & Kang, 2017; Apfelbaum, Stephan & Reagans, 2016; Apfelbaum, Sommers & Norton, 
2008; Guimond et al., 2013; Morrison et al., 2010; Ryan et al., 2007; Wolsko et al., 2000), and 
with research showing that a commonality (CIIM) approach reduces prejudice, though may not 
improve support for collecitve action (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Houlette, 
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Gaertner, Johnson, Banker, Riek, & Dovidio, 2004; Klandermans, Sabucedo, & Rodriguez, 2004; 
Monteiro, Guerra, & Rebelo, 2009; Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, & Ward, 2001). The lower 
positivity to multiculturalism within the UK and Europe (Guimond et al., 2013) in conjunction 
with more perceived threat from those minority members viewed as wanted to keep their culture 
(Tip et al., 2015) or those being seen as more non-normative (Wenzel et al., 2007) may explain 
the increased bias. However, it does not explain the decreased support for collective action when 
compare to the commonality condition; we investigated this more thoroughly in Experiment 2. 
Further, we observed that conservatives showed more implicit bias than the liberals and also less 
support for CA. Inconsistent with our predictions, however, the political ideology did not show 
the significant effect on explicit bias. While this result was difficult to explain, we might assume 
the social desirability bias may have led to a reduced expression of any kind of biases because it 
was measured after the implicit measure and Race Relations Amendment Acts (UK) makes it 
illegal to discriminate (2000 & 2010). To further validate these findings and to test whether MC 
increased bias or CIIM decreased bias we conducted Experiment 2 with a neutral control 
condition. 
In the second experiment, we hypothesized that the MC and CIIM conditions would 
replicate the findings from Experiment 1. In order to test the direction of the effect (i.e., MC 
decreasing or CIIM increasing bias) we included a neutral control condition that simply asked 
participants to think about the two groups (i.e., White-British and Pakistani-British). However, 
neither MC to Control nor the CIIM to Control comparisons significantly predicted the implicit 
bias, though MC showed more bias than the CIIM condition, it was not significantly higher. Such 
non-replication of the results with similar measures and samples are difficult to explain despite 
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the established authenticity of the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) used to assess the 
indirect bias, and the previous research validation of the intergroup strategies and their effect on 
implicit bias. A potential explanation for this effect in the correct direction, but not being 
significant may be related to sample size. Within Experiment 1, we used a small sample (e.g., 54 
participants or 27 per condition) based upon past research showing medium to large effect sizes. 
If the effect of MC or CIIM were, in fact, small to medium, then we may have had an anomalous 
result in Experiment 1 due to idiosyncracies of a small sample. Within Experiment 2, we used a 
much larger sample (e.g., roughly 50 per condition), which is in line with recent calls for 
improving the replicability of research findings within psychology. A potential second 
explanation could be that MC may produce the expectation that minorities will fit their group’s 
stereotypes (Gutierrez & Unzueta, 2010) and white participants often oppose this approach in 
educational and organisational contexts (Thomas & Plaut, 2008; Verkuyten, 2009). Such 
resistance may be due to threat to one’s identity (Yogeeswaran, Dasgupta, Adelman, Eccleston, 
& Parker, 2011; Yogeeswaran et al., 2012) because people often dislike minorities who want to 
continue to embrace their culture (Tip, et al., 2012) or because they believe that this approach 
excludes their own ethnic group (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011; Unzueta & 
Binning, 2010). A third experiment was thus warranted to determine whether the increased bias 
observed in the MC to CIIM comparison was a reliable effect.  
   In relation to the increased support for collective action findings in the CIIM condition, 
other research is also in conflict with our findings. In that research, investigators have found that 
elementary school students were less likely to notice and report instances of racial discrimination 
and prejudice after having been primed with a commonality-focused message compared to a 
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valuing-diversity message similar to the multicultural approach (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Sommers, 
& Ambady, 2010). In contrast and in order to make the MC and CIIM manipulations more 
comparable and controlled within our studies, we highlighted the White-British and Pakistani-
British subgroups within both manipulations, which diverged from previous research that 
highlighted the identities only in the MC condition. This highlighting with the CIIM condition 
could have reduced participants missing the disadvantages of the minority subgroup and could 
have led to participants showing more and not less support for collective action for this group. 
So, we designed Experiment 3 to assess the commonality effect on the bias and support for 
collective action by dividing our intergroup prompt (CIIM) into a Commonality without 
highlighting the group identities prompt (see methods study 3, CWO).  
 As predicted, we observed in Experiment 3 that the Commonality focus, but with salient 
subgroups (CIIM) and novel approach of CWO both showed significantly more implicit bias with 
reference to the MC prompt, which was contrary to Experiments 1 and 2, but in line with research 
on multiculturalism from North America. While this Experiment was run several years after the 
first two experiments, the perception of a multicultural approach, however, had not improved 
between 2013 and 2016 (Mattei, & Broeks, 2018). In addition, anti-immigrant sentiment within 
the UK remains consistent. In contrast, CIIM produced more support for collective action in 
comparison to the MC condition, but the CWO (i.e., without highlighting) did not. This result 
lends support to the notion that our CIIM condition that included highlighting of subgroups may 
have been closer to a Dual-Identity approach and this may have been the reason for improved 
support for collective action. In a dual-identity approach, both the superordinate group (i.e., 
British) and the subgroup (Pakistani-British) identities are made salient simultaneously (in a 
186 
 
manner similar to our Commonality condition in which we discuss commonalities first and then 
in a second stage highlight the two subgroups).  
In this context, we can observe the role of our two-stage commonality model being 
similar to dual-identity model research; we, however, began our two-stage commonality research 
(Experiments 1 and 2) prior to the publication of Dovidio’s dual-identity research related to 
collective action; thus, it was not integrated into the research for this Chapter. In their research, 
Dovidio, Saguy, Ufkes, Scheepers, Gaertner, Forgas, and Fiedler (2015) tested the dual-identity 
model to identify whether activating both identities increased support for collective action. In one 
study, they showed that a dual identity increased willingness to support collective action, but they 
did not measure the effect that it had on outgroup attitude bias. Overall, it might be safe to say 
that the dual-identity manipulation appears to be effective in generating support for CA among 
the majority groups, but the research has not shown that the dual-identity perspective increases 
support for collective action and also reduces bias at the same time. Our future research may need 
to explore the dual identity perspective more thoroughly, even though it had not initially done 
this because much of our research was conducted prior to the research showing that the dual-
identity perspective improved support.  
Once again, the Political Ideology results were much more consistent for both the 
collective action and implicit bias variables. Overall, conservatives showed higher and liberals 
showed lower levels of implicit attitude bias (signficant in Experiments 1 and 2, but not 3) and 
and conservatives showed decreased support for CA in comparison to liberals (significant in all 
three experiments). Thus, political ideology was a significant predictor of bias consistently. In 
addition, observing that Political Ideology was significantly correlated with Perceived Threat in 
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Experiments 2 and 3 can be used to further explore the relationships to outgroup bias. We may 
wish to investigate whether minority groups or immigrants are being perceived as more of a 
threat as the demographics change from Britain being predominately white to being more diverse 
(i.e., ONS Census, 2012; 91.3% white in 2000 to 86% white in 2010). This effect may be 
exacerbated in times of economic turmoil such as those that Europe and Britain have faced 
recently (Park, Bryson, & Curtis, 2014; Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 1999). 
 Uncertainty-Threat Model, Political Ideology and Bias. 
In the second line of our research in Chapter 3, we tried to explain the widening gap 
between liberals and conservatives in relation to their attitudes about the intergroup context of 
immigrants, so we tested a the Uncertainty-Threat Model (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017; Jost 
& Napier, 2012). We used three studies with outgroup attitudes toward immigrants as the 
outcome variables, and political ideology as the predictor to examine the influence of uncertainty 
avoidance and threat management as the mediators of the political ideology to bias relationship. 
We tested an American sample (i.e., recruited general public in an online sample to see the 
difference from student sample of White-British sample) and examined their attitudes towards 
immigrants (i.e., unspecified immigrants) and towards abstract outgroups (unspecified outgroups) 
in Chapter 3. In these studies, we used perceived threat (Symbolic and Realistic Threat; Stephan 
et al., 1999; 2009), which is similar to the “meaning” threat  described by Crawfard, (2017). 
Further, the lack of research on threat and uncertainty together with their relationship to the 
political ideology and immigrants led us to explore these variables together.  
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 Political ideology and Bias relation. 
Initially, we tested the relationship of political ideology to attitude bias towards 
immigrants. Overall in three studies, we observed that less conservatism and more liberalism was 
related to less Bias, less Negative Bias, and less Implicit Bias. Our results of higher scores on 
liberalism related to less bias towards immigrants supported the previous research, (Graham et 
al., 2012; Hass, 2016; Hass & Cunningham, 2014; Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2017; Van 
Pooijen et al., 2015). Including our results of chapter 2 studies, more liberalism has consistently 
shown decreased outgroup bias (e.g., towards Pakistan-British & immigrants), which corresponds 
with research showing  less support for group inequality (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; 
Jost 2009; Jost et al., 2003) and more positive feelings towards non-normative groups (Luguri et 
al., 2012). 
We next compared the Uncertainty-Threat hypothesis to the competitor Extremity 
hypothesis in relation to uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat. The Extremity Hypothesis 
predicted that there would be a quadratic relationship in which needs to reduce uncertainty and 
threat were related to endorsement of any extreme ideology (i.e., extremity hypothesis) regardless 
of one’s beliefs and political ideology (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Hogg, 2012; McGregor et al., 
2001). Thus, high liberalism and high conservativism would be related to more Uncertainty-
Avoidance and more Threat. A linear relationship, however, between Political Ideology and 
Uncertainty-Avoidance or Threat would support the Uncertainty-Threat Model and not the 
extremity hypothesis. Across all three studies, we found that the quadratic relationship was non-
significant between Political Ideology and Uncertainty-Avoidance (Studies 4, 5, & 6) and 
Perceived Threat (Studies 4, 5, & 6) and only the linear effects were significant. In addition, if the 
extremity hypothesis from the worldview validation perspective was supported, then a chronic 
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tendency toward threat and uncertainty-avoidance should also be related to participants being 
more polarized in their view of immigrants as their chronic tendency to avoid threat/uncertainty 
was greater (i.e., very liberal participants would be more positive and very conservative 
participants would be more negative). Thus, the quadratic test was also applied to the Political to 
Bias relationships. Across the three studies, we observed that the quadratic effect was non-
significant for Attitude Bias (Studies 4, 5, & 6), Negative Bias (Study 5), and for Implicit Bias 
(Study 6), but all the linear effects were significant. The main exception was a very small 
quadratic effect on explicit negative bias (R2 = .01, p = .043) in Study 6. Thus, overall, there was 
much greater support for the Uncertainty-Threat Model. 
 Uncertainty-Avoidance and Threat-Management. 
One of our main goals of Chapter 3 was to explain the large cultural divide between 
liberals and conservatives that has been identified in the literature and that was supported in 
Chapter 2 in relation to negative attitudes toward Pakistani-British people. Within Chapter 3, we 
were the first to test the ability of measured/dispositional uncertainty-avoidance and threat 
management to mediate the relationship to political ideology within an immigration context that 
is highly relevant to the current political debates within a diversifying world. With the need for 
immigration to supplement population growth, and some economic growth as a result, these 
immigration debates are likely to continue for decades to come. We used a multiple-mediation 
analysis to examine the Political Ideology to immigrant Bias relationship, and we found a 
consistent mediation of this relationship by Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat across 
all three studies (Studies 4, 5, & 6). Moreover, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat 
mediated the Political Ideology to Bias relationship (Studies 4, 5, & 6) and to Negative Bias 
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(Studies 5 & 6). The one exception was in Study 6 in which only Threat mediated the relationship 
to Implicit Bias, whereas Uncertainty-Avoidance was non-significant. In further examining this 
effect, we found that an analysis with the averaged bias measure (average of Bias, Negative Bias, 
and Implicit Bias) showed that both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Threat mediated the effect. So, it 
appears that Perceived Threat may be a more reliable effect in relationship to both explicit and 
implicit bias, which is an interesting future direction for the research. Within Study 5, we had 
also extended perceived threat to be about abstract outgroups (i.e., unspecified outgroups) as 
opposed to perceived threat form immigrants. We observed that both uncertainty-avoidance and 
perceived threat from abstract outgroups mediated the relationship between liberalism 
(conservatism) and less (more) bias, on both bias measures, and it was a moderately large effect. 
In view of the replicated effects of political orientation and threat, we have observed a 
clear distinction in the attitudes of liberals and conservatives in relation to the attitude bias and 
support for collective action toward the Pakistani-British minority group and in relation to 
attitude bias (Chapter 2) and perceived threat as a mediator regarding immigrants in general 
(Chapter 3). Alternatively, the expression of more bias by conservatives and perception of more 
threat from the outgroup is in line with the previous research (Graham et al., 2009; Hibbing et al., 
2014; Jost et al., 2008; Jost, et al., 2017). Jost and colleagues (2003) conducted a meta-analysis 
and found several psychological variables that predicted political conservatism were driven by 
the perceived threat such as death anxiety, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity, openness to 
experience, uncertainty tolerance, and fear of threat and loss. There are other dividing factors 
such as differences in endorsement of moral foundations and social dominance orientation (SDO) 
(Graham et al., 2011; Ho et al., 2011). However, we believed that an essential difference on these 
divides, especially in the intergroup context of immigrants, revolves around uncertainty-
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avoidance and threat avoidance. To examine this idea, we initiated the second line of our research 
on the foundations of the Uncertainty-Threat model (Jost & Napier, 2012; Jost et al., 2017; Jost et 
al., 2007). In this model, the scholars provided some evidence that liberals and conservatives 
differ in their attention to and management of threats and in the avoidance of uncertainty. They 
further show that more uncertainty avoidance and more attention to threats was associated with 
less liberalism and more conservatism (Jost et al., 2007). In our research, we extended the 
measurement of threat management to include perceived symbolic and realistic threat (Stephan et 
al., 2009) because it has been a fundamental motive of intergroup relations, and also being 
unexplored in connection with the intergroup context within Uncertatinty-Threat Model. Overall, 
the hypotheses derived from the Uncertainty-Threat Model have yet to be tested in an intergroup 
context such as immigrants.  
Our findings of significant mediation of the political to bias relationship by uncertainty-
avoidance and threat further support the works of earlier scholars who claim that divide is a result 
of underlying differing psychological mechanisms (Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2009). 
However, other researchers (Brandt et al., 2014; Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013) have 
argued that previously if the liberals appeared positive and show affirmative action towards 
outgroups such as minorities, gay and lesbian people, and the poor to name a few because those 
groups oppose ideological values of conservatives. Such a fundamental difference in the 
worldview of the liberals and conservatives, and how these both impact the intergroup relations is 
still under debate and we have tried to test these further. Although, in recent studies, researchers 
have started finding that both liberals and conservatives do not differ in intolerance towards some 
ideologically different and threatening groups (Brandt et al., 2014), many of these groups 
opposed by conservatives tend to be low status groups and those opposed by liberals tend to be 
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high status groups (e.g., military, business people, Christian fundamentalists, wealthy people, 
etc). So, it might be that the ideological conflict perspective is in line with Jost and colleagues in 
regard to a main difference being avoiding uncertainty by keeping the status of groups unchanged 
and conservatives being okay with inequality in society and managing threats to that higher status 
(Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017).  
Across three studies in Chapter 3, we provided sufficient evidence for the effectiveness of 
the Uncertainty-Threat model to predict differences between liberals and conservatives in regard 
to immigrants, and this finding supports our research in Chapter 2 that used a specific minority 
group (Pakistani-British) as the outgroup. Overall, both uncertainty-avoidance and threat-
management were significant mediators of Political Ideology to bias. The Uncertainty-Threat 
model also provided evidence that higher levels of threat from both immigrants (Studies 4 and 6) 
and abstract outgroups (Study 5) mediated the effects, which provides additional support for the 
generality of the threat management effect. 
 In addition, our research appears as the first to find threat management as the strongest 
mediator of the political and bias relationship. Our model also extended to the research by 
demonstrating the effects on negative bias and also on implicit bias using Affect Misattribution 
Procedure (AMP), both within the lab and with a larger, more general sample online. In the first 
section of the current thesis, we used the AMP in the lab with a White-British sample within the 
UK and found a consistent replication of significant effect of AMP on the bias and political 
orientation. We observed the same replicated effect of AMP in our Uncertainty-Threat Model of 
mediation in section two of this research that was conducted within the USA in the online studies.  
Putting together the findings of the current research, we can say that the direction of the 
attitudes of majority groups towards minority groups is significantly divided on the political 
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ideology, which is mediated by the types of threat such as perceived threat and uncertainty-
avoidance. This division highlights the explaining factors underneath the attitudes and the 
cultural gap that majority groups perceive about minorities within intergroup context, and that 
liberalism has reliably shown less bias toward and more immigrant-oriented helping attitudes. 
These findings shift the debate of the dividing factors on one hand and confirm the role of the 
political ideology of the majority group to predict outgroup bias in an ethnically diverse country 
on the other hand. Across both lines of our research, we have collected data from both an 
American general public sample and from White-British students and, yet we observed similar 
patterns of data regarding threat perceptions and political ideology, and a linear relationship 
between ideology and bias. We replicated the Jost and colleagues (2003, 2011) model of 
Uncertainty-Threat and found enough evidence to extend the model within intergroup context. 
Before this work, we did not find such comprehensive testing of political ideology and 
uncertainty-threat mediation in intergroup context with the inclusion of multiple variables and 
more specifically within intergroup ideology (i.e., MC, CIIM, and CWO), bias and support for 
collective action all in one research project. We operationalised these variables by using 
measures that were reliable and frequently used in the previous literature. Our intergroup 
ideologies may not have steadily shown expected simultaneous bias reduction, yet they still 
encourage us to test these further in intergroup context in relation to support for collective action 




 Limitations and Future Directions. 
In order to discuss the limitations of the current research, we can map out several aspects 
of the two chapters to be improved for the future research.  
The CIIM prompt we have manipulated deviates from previous research (Richeson & 
Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000) which was used frequently in research in the US ethnic 
diversity context. We took initiative to manipulate this as a commonality prompt within British 
ethnic diversity context due to the commonality focused features of the prompt. This aspect of the 
commonality might not have appealed the White-British sample who are less likely to perceive 
any outgroup as similar as themselves (i.e., British-Pakistani), hence we observed mixed results 
on implicit bias and support for Collective Action with comparison to MC, but overall we 
observed less bias and more support for CA within commonality prompt which needs further 
testing with Dual-Identity Model. The inconsistency observed in the commonality prompt 
conditions in all three experiments potentially suggests the development of similar prompts that 
exclusively cover the demographics of British ethnic diversity context, along with inclusion of a 
sample beyond academic students to observe differences in attitudes of both sample groups.   
Another potential limitation is that we could have counterbalanced the measures of bias 
and support for CA as we did counterbalance of Uncertainty and Threat scales in chapter 3. So, in 
the future research this could be considered as an important methodological improvement to 
incorporate within experiments.  
We have used LDT as a separator and a delay measure between the intergroup prompt and 
AMP, which might have potentially contributed to wear off the effect of the prompt and could be 
replaced by a comparatively short filler scale in the future research.  
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Although the second line of research was replication and correlational and limited to only 
demonstrating associations for the Uncertainty-Threat Model and its relationships to attitudes 
toward immigrants, though we did use methods to improve the correlational studies. For the 
mediational analyses, by measuring the mediators after political ideology, and attitudes after the 
mediators, it is known that the mediators did not influence participants’ ratings of political 
ideology within the study because the political ratings occurred first, and that attitudes did not 
influence participants’ ratings of the mediators or political ideology (Cohen et al., 2003; Kenny et 
al., 1998). However, rating political ideology could have had an influence on the later measures, 
though this a common issue with political studies. Thus, future research could alter the order of 
these variables to fully demonstrate that those orders did not influence ratings. Moreover, future 
research could experimentally test the hypotheses generated by this model in order to examine 
the Uncertainty-Threat Model’s proposal that temporarily activating uncertainty and threat may 
induce a conservative shift in addition to the effects observed with chronic, dispositional 
measures. This is a question that the current research is not able to answer.  
Another limitation is the nature of the perceived threat that we measured. According to 
ITT, perceived realistic threats can be about both competition for resources (e.g., taking jobs; 
using social services) and about physical safety (e.g., being physically hurt). The standard 
measures used for measuring perceived threat based upon ITT have not measured threats to 
physical safety at the concrete or conceptual level, but according to the theory, there is room for 
incorporating such items (Stephan et al., 1999, 2002). If those physical safety items were to be 
included, we may see differences between the realistic and perceived threat subscales, which is 
often not observed on the usual measures (Rios et al., 2018). Thus, more research on the nature of 
196 
 
this measure will need to be conducted to test how well it taps meaning threats as opposed to 
physical threats, and whether physical threats can be measured more broadly and less concretely. 
 Conclusion and Implications. 
In Chapter 2, we proposed that thinking about and interacting with outgroup members or 
about diversity can induce questions of trust and whether an outgroup is threatening (Stephen et 
al., 2010; Wenzel et al., 2007). With a population that is still largely ethnically similar, an 
increase in the minority population may be perceived as a problem, especially in times of 
economic turmoil such as those that Britain has faced recently. (Park et al., 2014; Stephan et al., 
2009). While researchers have advocated for several different strategies (MC, CIIM etc.), to the 
best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to reconcile whether decreasing prejudice is 
mutually exclusive to increasing support for collective action and working towards resolving 
actual disadvantages. Our research tested these methods and observed that a commonality 
condition with highlighting subgroups (similar to the Common Ingroup Identity Model with 
highlighting) produced more positive intergroup attitudes and more support for collective action 
than did the multiculturalism perspective. However, these results were not consistent in relation 
to attitude bias towards immigrants, but the commonality with highlighting condition were 
consistently better in relation to support for collective action. Thus, further testing of this 
approach is warranted, and, further comparison with a dual-identity approach is warranted given 
the recent positive results of the dual-identity perspective in relation to support for collective 
action and improved attitudes within different studies. 
To conclude our discussion, we may argue that people with liberal and conservative 
ideologies differ in the ways they respond to perceived threats and risks (Jost et al., 2017) other 
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than just having a general negativity bias (Hibbing et al., 2014) or becoming socially dominant. 
Recently, the Moral Motives Model (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2007) observed a positive relationship 
between conservatism and two aspects of the model i.e., self-restraint and social-order which held 
contrasting responses to the social threats. However, dialogues on such differences help to shift 
the productive debate towards reducing the negative perception of any group (e.g., ethnic 
minorities/immigrants etc.). Although, these differences maybe contextual, hence, a balanced 
approach could benefit a diverse society (Janoff-bulman & Carnes, 2016). Further, 
acknowledgment of the perceived threat opens the venues of discussions regarding the 
immigration benefits to the economy along with the perception of immigrants as competitors in 
the labour job market. These discussions further lead to convincing people to not just accentuate 
the cultural and hereditary group divisions but help immigrants to improve their English language 
skills to equip them to develop their democratic values. Finally, this debate may also require 
finding viable autonomous solutions to the contrasting threat perceptions triggering social 
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Appendix A:  
Ideology General Instructions 
Note: Adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004) 
 
We are interested in people's impressions of various ethnic groups in the United 
Kingdom.  In the following study, we will ask you various questions regarding 
your perceptions of two different ethnic groups.  More specifically, we will ask 
you about “PAKISTANI-BRITISH” people in the United Kingdom and also 
about “WHITE-BRITISH” people in the United Kingdom.  You will be asked to 
make these judgments using the same set of attributes for both “PAKISTANI-
BRITISH” and “WHITE-BRITISH” groups.  Some of these questions may 
seem sensitive but please understand that our only purpose is to learn more about 
how various groups in the United Kingdom are viewed. 
 
Obviously there are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. All that 
matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely 
confidential and anonymous. There is no identifying information on this 
questionnaire that would link the responses to you. 
 
You may work through the various tasks at your own pace. If you have questions 
at any point, please ask the experimenter for help. 
 
Please re-read these instructions one more time.  
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix B:  
MC Prompt 
Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004) 
 
We are interested in people's impressions of various issues pertaining to ethnicity in the 
United Kingdom.  In the following questionnaire, we will ask you a variety of questions 
regarding your perceptions of ethnic issues and ethnic groups. Some of these questions 
may seem sensitive but please understand that our only purpose is to learn more about 
how these issues that affect our society are viewed. 
 
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic 
issues are a number one concern for the United Kingdom. We are in the unique position 
of having many different cultural groups living within our borders. This could 
potentially be a great asset. Different cultural groups bring different perspectives to life, 
providing a richness in food, dress, music, art, styles of interaction, and problem solving 
strategies. Each ethnic group within the United Kingdom can contribute in its own 
unique way. Recognising this diversity would help build a sense of harmony and 
complementarity among the various ethnic groups. Each group has its own talents, as 
well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, 
we validate the identity of each group and we recognise its existence and its importance 
to the social fabric. We can allow each group to utilise its assets, to be aware of its own 
particular problems or difficulties, and overall to live up to its potential. Thus, social 
scientists argue that understanding both the similarities and differences among 
ethnic groups is an essential component of long-term social harmony in the United 
Kingdom.  
The questionnaires are designed to tap people's views of a variety of social groups. 
 
Obviously there are no right or wrong answers to the questions on the following pages. 
All that matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely 
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confidential and anonymous. There is no identifying information on the questionnaire 
that would link the responses to you. 
 
Please reread these instructions one time.  
 

















Appendix C:  
MC choose response items 
Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004) 
1. Work together better. 
2. Understand each other. 
3. Less fighting. 
4. Learn new cultures. 
5. By interacting with people from different ethnic backgrounds, such as Pakistani-British and 
White-British, we are more able to understand stereotypes associated with other countries. 
6. Exposed to new goods, clothing, music, traditions, etc. 
7. Minorities don't feel that they are unimportant. 
8. Helps with international negotiations. 
9. Make society less boring. 
10. Educate people in the UK of other ethnic groups. 
11. Might help cut down on crime. 
12. Increase awareness of how certain groups are treated. 
13. Multiculturalism brings to light different viewpoints and methods of dealing with issues. One 
situation might be explained or dealt with in two separate ways by two different groups, such as 
Pakistani-British or White-British groups. This enhances our pool of ideas. 
14. Multiculturalism gives way to diverse activities that one would not experience otherwise. 
15. Multiculturalism helps groups with communication. Differing viewpoints can be hard to grasp and 
explaining these logically can be beneficial to all groups. 
16. It refines people's sense of what being human is all about. 
17. Provides diversity in social climate for future generations. 
18. Encourages bilingual communities. 




Appendix D:  
Control Condition Prompt 
Note: Adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004). Ideology general instructions were used as a control 
prompt instead of an actual prompt. 
 
We are interested in people's impressions of various ethnic groups in the United 
Kingdom.  In the following study, we will ask you various questions regarding 
your perceptions of two different ethnic groups.  More specifically, we will ask 
you about “PAKISTANI-BRITISH” people in the United Kingdom and also 
about “WHITE-BRITISH” people in the United Kingdom.  You will be asked to 
make these judgments using the same set of attributes for both “PAKISTAN I-
BRITISH” and “WHITE-BRITISH” groups.  Some of these questions may 
seem sensitive but please understand that our only purpose is to learn more about 
how various groups in the United Kingdom are viewed. 
 
Obviously there are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. All that 
matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely 
confidential and anonymous. There is no identifying information on this 
questionnaire that would link the responses to you. 
 
 
You may work through the various tasks at your own pace. If you have questions 
at any point, please ask the experimenter for help. 
 
Please re-read these instructions one more time.  




Appendix E:  
CIIM Prompt 
Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004) 
 
We are interested in people's impressions of various issues pertaining to ethnicity in the 
United Kingdom.  In the following questionnaire, we will ask you a variety of questions 
regarding your perceptions of ethnic issues and ethnic groups. Some of these questions 
may seem sensitive but please understand that our only purpose is to learn more about 
how these issues that affect our society are viewed. 
 
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic 
issues are a number one concern for the United Kingdom. At the present time, we are 
experiencing a great deal of conflict among various ethnic groups. Social scientists note 
that it is extremely important to heed the principle that all men and women are created 
equal. That is, in order to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember 
that we are all first and foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the 
United Kingdom. In order to make the U.K. as strong and successful as possible, we 
must think of ourselves not as a collection of independent factions, but instead as parts 
of a larger whole. We must look beyond skin colour and understand the person within, 
to see each person as an individual who is part of the larger group, “British”. Currently, 
we are spending a great many resources on conflict between ethnic groups. If we can 
recognise our "sameness" we will be able to rechannel those resources to work on other 
difficult and important problems within our society such as poverty, caring for the 
elderly, and medical research. Thus social scientists encourage us to see the larger 
picture, to appreciate that at our core, we really are all the same. 
 




Obviously there are no right or wrong answers to the questions on the following pages. 
All that matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely 
confidential and anonymous. There is no identifying information on the questionnaire 
that would link the responses to you. 
 
Please reread these instructions one time.  
 
















Appendix F:  
CIIM Choose Response items 
Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004) 
1. More productive in business when people work well together. 
2. A sense of pride when people are in one group. 
3. Diminishes a barrier between races that blocks good communication. 
4. Would solve many of the social problems and injustices that hurt us today. 
5. There would be fewer hate crimes. 
6. Less time and money used towards legal cases due to racial issues. 
7. When at war everyone would fight for everyone equally. For example, a White person would 
defend a Pakistani person as much as another White person. 
8. Would not need to spend as much government money on groups that help enforce a unified UK. 
9. We might become a more prosperous country with everyone working together. 
10. More cooperation with other countries if they see that we are one not different races. 
11. Less violence. 
12.  Free flow of ideas between races resulting in faster technological advances. 
13. No more racial tensions would result in a happier and more productive society. 
14. We would be stronger as a nation if U.K. citizens, such as Pakistani-British and White-British got 
along instead of turning things into racial issues. 
15. Not having to focus on ethnic issues frees up resources to focus on other issues. 
16. Equal access to work/other positions or facilities --wouldn't have to produce extra facilities for 
separate but equal type policies. 
17. People would be nicer to one another. 
18. There would be less fighting between races. 




Appendix G:  
CWO Prompt 
Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004). CIIM prompt used as CWO prompt. 
 
We are interested in people's impressions of various issues pertaining to ethnicity in the 
United Kingdom.  In the following questionnaire, we will ask you a variety of questions 
regarding your perceptions of ethnic issues and ethnic groups. Some of these questions 
may seem sensitive but please understand that our only purpose is to learn more about 
how these issues that affect our society are viewed. 
 
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic 
issues are a number one concern for the United Kingdom. At the present time, we are 
experiencing a great deal of conflict among various ethnic groups. Social scientists note 
that it is extremely important to heed the principle that all men and women are created 
equal. That is, in order to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember 
that we are all first and foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the 
United Kingdom. In order to make the U.K. as strong and successful as possible, we 
must think of ourselves not as a collection of independent factions, but instead as parts 
of a larger whole. We must look beyond skin colour and understand the person within, 
to see each person as an individual who is part of the larger group, “British”. Currently, 
we are spending a great many resources on conflict between ethnic groups. If we can 
recognise our "sameness" we will be able to rechannel those resources to work on other 
difficult and important problems within our society such as poverty, caring for the 
elderly, and medical research. Thus social scientists encourage us to see the larger 
picture, to appreciate that at our core, we really are all the same. 
 
 




Obviously there are no right or wrong answers to the questions on the following pages. 
All that matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely 
confidential and anonymous. There is no identifying information on the questionnaire 
that would link the responses to you. 
 
Please reread these instructions one time.  
















Appendix H:  
CWO Choose response items 
Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004). CIIM choose responses used, however, these were 
manipulated by deleting the highlighting (i.e., underlining) of the subgroup categories from the responses 
to transform these for CWO conditions. 
 
1. More productive in business when people work well together. 
2. A sense of pride when people are in one group. 
3. Diminishes a barrier between races that blocks good communication. 
4. Would solve many of the social problems and injustices that hurt us today. 
5. There would be fewer hate crimes. 
6. Less time and money used towards legal cases due to racial issues. 
7. When at war everyone would fight for everyone equally. For example, one person would 
defend another person. 
8. Would not need to spend as much government money on groups that help enforce a 
unified UK. 
9. We might become a more prosperous country with everyone working together. 
10. More cooperation with other countries if they see that we are one not different races. 
11. Less violence. 
12.  Free flow of ideas between races resulting in faster technological advances. 
13. No more racial tensions would result in a happier and more productive society. 
14. We would be stronger as a nation if U.K. citizens got along instead of turning things into 
racial issues. 
15. Not having to focus on ethnic issues frees up resources to focus on other issues. 
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16. Equal access to work/other positions or facilities --wouldn't have to produce extra 
facilities for separate but equal type policies. 
17. People would be nicer to one another. 
18. There would be less fighting between races. 

















Appendix I:                            Lexical Decision Task (LDT) 
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Appendix J:  
Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) 
Instructions and Primes: 
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Examples of Chinese Pictographs used in AMP in Experiments 1, 2 & 3 (chapter2) 
                                                              
 
Examples of Korean Pictographs used in AMP in experiment 3 (chapter 2) and study 6 (chapter3) 
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Examples of Pakistani-British / immigrant faces used in AMP in experiments 1-3 (chapter 2) & in 
study 6 (chapter3)            
                                                  
     Examples of White-British faces used in AMP in experiments 1-3 (chapter 2) and in study 6 (chapter3) 
                                               
                                                     
                                                                        




Appendix K:  
Support for Collective Action scale 
 
Note: adapted from Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, and Pratto, (2009). 
Instructions: 
The following questions concern various levels of support people might have for policies related to 
Pakistani-British people and life within the UK.  We want to be clear that we are NOT evaluating you or 
your individual responses.  We have not collected information about your identity and your responses are 
linked only to a random number, so all your responses are completely anonymous and confidential. If we 
are to learn anything useful, it is important that you respond to each of the questions openly and honestly.   
Please rate the question on the scale indicated below: 
 
1. Not at all 
2. Somewhat 
3. Moderately 
4. Very Much 
5. Completely 
 
1. I see a need to support a change that will improve the position of Pakistani-British 
people within the UK in comparison to White-British people. 
2. I support legislation through which Pakistani-British people will be guaranteed equal 
work opportunities as White-British people in the UK 








Appendix L:                                              
(Filler Items) 
Subjective Happiness Scale  
Instructions:   
For each of the following statements or questions, please indicate the number from the scale that you think 
is most appropriate in describing you.  (Carefully take note of the labels, or anchors, for the 1 to 7 scales, 
as they differ for each of the four items.) 
In general, I consider myself: 






7. A very happy person 
Compared with most of my peers, I consider myself: 






7. More happy 
Some people are generally very happy.  They enjoy life regardless of what is going on, getting the most 
out of everything.  To what extent does this characterization describe you? 






7. A great deal 
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Some people are generally not very happy.  Although they are not depressed, they never seem as happy as 
they might be.  To what extent does this characterization describe you? 






















Appendix M:  
Explicit Bias Measure 
Please rate your feelings toward Pakistani-British people on the following evaluative dimensions. 
1. Extremely Warm 
2. Very Warm 
3. Moderately Warm 
4. Somewhat Warm 
5. Neither 
6. Somewhat Cold 
7. Moderately Cold 
8. Very Cold 
9. Extremely Cold 
Please rate your feelings toward Pakistani-British people on the following evaluative dimensions. 
1. Extremely Negative 
2. Very Negative 
3. Moderately Negative 
4. Somewhat Negative 
5. Neither 
6. Somewhat Positive 
7. Moderately Positive 
8. Very Positive 
9. Extremely Positive 
Please rate your feelings toward Pakistani-British people on the following evaluative dimensions. 
1. Extremely Friendly 
2. Very Friendly 
3. Moderately Friendly 
4. Somewhat Friendly 
5. Neither 
6. Somewhat Unfriendly 
7. Moderately Unfriendly 
8. Very Unfriendly 
9. Extremely Unfriendly 
Please rate your feelings toward Pakistani-British people on the following evaluative dimensions. 
1. Extremely Suspicious 
2. Very Suspicious 
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3. Moderately Suspicious 
4. Somewhat Suspicious 
5. Neither 
6. Somewhat Trusting 
7. Moderately Trusting 
8. Very Trusting 
9. Extremely Trusting 
Please rate your feelings toward Pakistani-British people on the following evaluative dimensions. 
1. Extreme Admiration 
2. High Admiration 
3. Moderate Admiration 
4. Some Admiration 
5. Neither 
6. Some Disgust 
7. Moderate Disgust 
8. High Disgust 













Appendix N:  
Demographics 
Demographic instruction: 
We have a few more questions to ask about you, please enter the following information: 
Click on "continue" to get to the next screen. 
Age: Please type in your age.  (please use a number, e.g., 19) 
Fill-in-the-Blank ----------------- 
Gender: Please indicate your gender by using the mouse to click on the appropriate box.  
1. F  
2. M 
Race: Please indicate your race (or ethnicity) by using the mouse to click on the appropriate box.   
You will have a chance to specify or expand up it more on the next question. (used in experiments 1-3) 
1. Southeast Asian 
2. White 
3. African 
4. African American 
5. Middle Eastern or North African 
6. Indian or Indian Subcontinent 
7. Latino or Hispanic 
Race 2: if you would not include yourself as a member of one of the ethnic groups listed in 1 through 
6, or if you would like to further specify your previous answer.  Please indicate your race or ethnicity 
by using the mouse to click on the appropriate box. 
1. Southeast Asian 
2. White 
3. African 
4. African American 
5. Middle Eastern or North African 
6. Indian or Indian Subcontinent 
7. Latino or Hispanic 
8. Other 
Race 3:  If you selected other, please specify your race or ethnicity: 
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  Fill-in-the-Blank    -------------  
Please indicate your ethnicity by using the mouse to click on the appropriate box. You will have a chance 
to specify it more on the next question. (Used in studies 4-6) 
1. Southeast Asian 
2.  White 
3. African American 
4. Afro-Caribbean 
5. Middle Eastern or North African 
6. Indian 
7. Native American 
8. Pacific Islander 
9. Latino or Hispanic 
Please select "other" if you would not include yourself as a member of one of the ethnic groups listed in 1 
through 8, or if you would like to further specify your previous answer. Please indicate your race or 
ethnicity by using the mouse to click on the appropriate box. 




5 Middle Eastern or North African 
6 Pakistani 
7 Indian 
8 Native American 
9 Pacific Islander 
10 Latino or Hispanic 
11 other 
Race 3:  If you selected other, please specify your race or ethnicity: 






Political Ideology Item 
Note: Participants received the following measure of political ideology;  
Please rate your, personal political orientation:  
  
1. Extremely Conservative  
2. Very Conservative  
3. Moderately Conservative  
4. Somewhat Conservative  
5. Centre/moderate  
6. Somewhat Liberal  
7. Moderately Liberal  
8. Very Liberal  













Appendix P:  
Need for Cognition scale (Filler Task) 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1984). 
Please rate the following statements on the scale provided: 
1. extremely unlike me 
2. somewhat unlike me 
3. uncertain 
4. somewhat like me 
5. extremely like me 
 
1. I prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my abilities. 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in 
depth about something. 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to. 
8. I prefer to think about small daily projects rather than long-term ones. 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them. 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
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11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with problems that I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of mental effort. 
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works. 














Appendix Q:  
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Filler Task) 
Instructions:  
Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience.  Using the 1-6 scale, please indicate 
how frequently or infrequently you currently have each experience.  Please answer according to what 
really reflects your experience rather than what you think your experience should be. Please treat each 
item separately from every other item.  Click continue now. 
1. Almost Always 
2. Very Frequently 
3. Somewhat Frequently 
4. Somewhat Infrequently 
5. Very Infrequently 
6. Almost Never 
 
1. I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until sometime later.  
2. I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or thinking of something else. 
3. I find it difficult to stay focused on what's happening in the present. 
4. I tend to walk quickly to get where I'm going without paying attention to what I experience along 
the way. 
5. I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they really grab my attention. 
6. I forget a person's name almost as soon as I've been told it for the first time. 
7. It seems I am "running on automatic," without much awareness of what I'm doing. 
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8. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them. 
9. I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with what I'm doing right now to 
get there. 
10. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I'm doing. 

















Appendix R:  
Perceived Threat Measure 
Note: adapted from Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman (1999) 
Instructions:  
Please take a moment now to complete the following questions.   
Obviously, there are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. All that matters is your own 
opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely confidential. 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree Moderately 
3. Disagree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Agree Somewhat 
6. Agree Moderately 
7. Agree Strongly 
Symbolic 1: Pakistani-British immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of UK society as 
soon as possible after they arrive. 
Symbolic 2: Immigration from Pakistan is undermining UK culture. 
symbolic 3: The values and beliefs of Pakistani-British immigrants regarding work are basically quite 
similar to those of most British people. 
symbolic 4: The values and beliefs of Pakistani-British immigrants regarding moral and religious issues 
are NOT compatible with the beliefs and values of most British people. 
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symbolic 5: The values and beliefs of Pakistani-British immigrants regarding family issues and socialising 
children are basically quite similar to those of most British people. 
symbolic 6: The values and beliefs of Pakistani-British immigrants regarding social relations are NOT 
compatible with the beliefs and values of most British people. 
symbolic 7: Pakistani-British immigrants should NOT have to accept British ways. 
real1: Pakistani-British immigrants get more from this country than they contribute. 
real 2: The children of Pakistani-British immigrants should have the same right to attend schools in the 
United Kingdom as British people do.  
real 3: Pakistani-British immigration has increased the tax burden on British people. 
real 4: Pakistani-British immigrants are NOT displacing British workers from their jobs. 
real 5: Pakistani-British immigrants should be eligible for the same health-care benefits received by 
British people. 
real 6: Social services have become less available to British people because of Pakistani-British 
immigration. 
real 7: The quality of social services available to British people has remained the same, despite Pakistani-
British immigration. 
real 8: Pakistani-British immigrants are as entitled to subsidised housing or subsidised utilities (water, 





Appendix S:  
Perceived Threat from Immigrants 
Response Scale 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree Moderately 
3. Disagree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Agree Somewhat 
6. Agree Moderately 
7. Agree Strongly 
 
1. Immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of American society as soon as 
possible after they arrive. 
2. Immigration is undermining American culture. 
3. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding work are basically quite similar to those of most 
Americans. 
4. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding moral and religious issues are NOT compatible 
with the beliefs and values of most Americans. 
5. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding family issues and socializing children are 
basically quite similar to those of most Americans. 
6. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding social relations are NOT compatible with the 
beliefs and values of most Americans. 
7. Immigrants should NOT have to accept American ways. 
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8. Immigrants get more from this country than they contribute. 
9. The children of immigrants should have the same right to attend schools in the United States as 
Americans do. 
10. Immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans. 
11. Immigrants are NOT displacing American workers from their jobs. 
12. Immigrants should be eligible for the same health-care benefits received by Americans. 
13. Social services have become less available to Americans because of immigration. 
14. The quality of social services available to Americans has remained the same, despite immigration. 
15. Immigrants are as entitled to subsidised housing or subsidised utilities (water, electricity, 













Appendix T:  
Uncertainty-Threat Measure 
1). Oppenness to experience Scale items 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you.  For example, do you agree that 
you are someone who likes to spend time with others?  Please write a number next to each statement to 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
1 – strong disagreement 
2 – moderate disagreement 
3 – slight disagreement 
4 –  
5 – slight agreement 
6 – moderate agreement 
7 – strong agreement 
I am someone who 
1. _____  Is talkative 
2. _____  Tends to find fault with others 
3. _____  Does a thorough job 
4. _____  Is depressed, blue 
5. _____  Is original, comes up with new ideas 
6. _____  Is reserved 
7. _____  Is helpful and unselfish with others 
8. _____  Can be somewhat careless 
9. _____  Is relaxed, handles stress well.   
10. _____  Is curious about many different things 
11. _____  Is full of energy 
12. _____  Starts quarrels with others 
13. _____  Is a reliable worker 
14. _____  Can be tense 
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15. _____  Is ingenious, a deep thinker 
16. _____  Generates a lot of enthusiasm 
17. _____  Has a forgiving nature 
18. _____  Tends to be disorganized 
19. _____  Worries a lot 
20. _____  Has an active imagination 
21. _____  Tends to be quiet 
22. _____  Is generally trusting 
23. _____  Tends to be lazy 
24. _____  Is emotionally stable, not easily upset 
25. _____  Is inventive 
26. _____  Has an assertive personality 
27. _____  Can be cold and aloof 
28. _____  Perseveres until the task is finished 
29. _____  Can be moody 
30. _____  Values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
31. _____  Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
32. _____  Is considerate and kind to almost everyone 
33. _____  Does things efficiently 
34. _____  Remains calm in tense situations 
35. _____  Prefers work that is routine 
36. _____  Is outgoing, sociable 
37. _____  Is sometimes rude to others 
38. _____  Makes plans and follows through with them 
39. _____  Gets nervous easily 
40. _____  Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
41. _____  Has few artistic interests 
42. _____  Likes to cooperate with others 
43. _____  Is easily distracted 









2). Ambiguity Intolerance scale (Budner’s (1962) 
On positively worded items, strong agreement was scored 7, moderate agreement, 6, slight agreement, 5, 
slight disagreement, 3, moderate disagreement, 2, and strong disagreement, 1 Scoring of negative. Items 
was in the reverse direction. All omissions were scored 4. 
 
Coded to be the Ambiguity Intolerant score (i.e., Higher Uncertainty Avoidance) 
 
Ambig1 
An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer probably doesn’t know too much. 
1 – strong disagreement 
2 – moderate disagreement 
3 – slight disagreement 
4 –  
5 – slight agreement 
6 – moderate agreement 
7 – strong agreement 
 
Ambig13r 
People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don’t know how complicated things really are. 
 
1 – strong disagreement 
2 – moderate disagreement 
3 – slight disagreement 
4 –  
5 – slight agreement 
6 – moderate agreement 




I have always felt there is a clear difference between right and wrong. 
1 – strong disagreement 
2 – moderate disagreement 
3 – slight disagreement 
4 –  
5 – slight agreement 
6 – moderate agreement 






There is not necessarily a right way and a wrong way to do everything.  
 
1 – strong disagreement 
2 – moderate disagreement 
3 – slight disagreement 
4 –  
5 – slight agreement 
6 – moderate agreement 
















Appendix U:  
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale 
16-item Group Based Social Dominance Orientation Measure from Pratto et al., (1994)  
Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling towards? 
Beside each object or statement select an item from '1' to '7' which represents the degree of your 
positive or negative feeling.  
RESPONSE SCALE  
1 Very Negative  
2 Negative  
3 Slightly Negative  
4 Neither Positive nor Negative  
5 Slightly Positive  
6 Positive  
7 Very Positive  
  
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.  
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.  
3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.  
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.  
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.  
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.  
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.  
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.  
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9. It would be good if groups could be equal.  
10. Group equality should be our ideal.  
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.  
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.  
13. Increased social equality.  
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.  
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.  
















1). Death Avoidance Scale (Wong, Reker, & Gesser, 1994). 
Instructions: 
This questionnaire contains a number of statements related to different attitudes toward death. Read each 
statement carefully, and then decide the extent to which you agree or disagree. For example, an item might 
read: “Death is a friend.” Indicate how well you agree or disagree by clicking the circle next to the option. 
If you are undecided, click undecided. However, try to use the undecided category sparingly.  
Note that the scales run from BOTH strongly agree to strongly disagree AND from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree. 
It is important that you work through the statements and answer each one. Many of the statements will 
seem alike, but all are necessary to show slight differences in attitudes. 
(click next to begin) 
Please remember that the scales run from BOTH strongly agree to strongly disagree AND from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. 
Whenever the thought of death enters my mind, I try to push it away. 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree Moderately 
3. Disagree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Agree Somewhat 
6. Agree Moderately 
7. Agree Strongly 
I avoid death thoughts at all costs. 
1. Agree Strongly 
2. Agree Moderately 
3. Agree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
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5. Disagree Somewhat 
6. Disagree Moderately 
7. Disagree Strongly 
I avoid thinking about death altogether. 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree Moderately 
3. Disagree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Agree Somewhat 
6. Agree Moderately 
7. Agree Strongly 
 
I always try NOT to think about death. 
1. Agree Strongly 
2. Agree Moderately 
3. Agree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Disagree Somewhat 
6. Disagree Moderately 
7. Disagree Strongly 
I try to have nothing to do with the subject of death. 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree Moderately 
3. Disagree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Agree Somewhat 
6. Agree Moderately 
7. Agree Strongly 
 
2). Fear of Death scale (Wong, Reker, & Gesser, 1994). 
The fact that death will mean the end of everything as I know it frightens me. 
1. Agree Strongly 
2. Agree Moderately 
3. Agree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Disagree Somewhat 
6. Disagree Moderately 
7. Disagree Strongly 
Death is no doubt a grim experience. 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree Moderately 
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3. Disagree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Agree Somewhat 
6. Agree Moderately 
7. Agree Strongly 
The prospects of my own death arouses anxiety in me. 
1. Agree Strongly 
2. Agree Moderately 
3. Agree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Disagree Somewhat 
6. Disagree Moderately 
7. Disagree Strongly 
I have an intense fear of death. 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree Moderately 
3. Disagree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Agree Somewhat 
6. Agree Moderately 
7. Agree Strongly 
I am disturbed by the finality of death. 
1. Agree Strongly 
2. Agree Moderately 
3. Agree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Disagree Somewhat 
6. Disagree Moderately 
7. Disagree Strongly 
The uncertainty of not knowing what happens after death worries me. 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree Moderately 
3. Disagree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Agree Somewhat 
6. Agree Moderately 
7. Agree Strongly 
The subject of life after death troubles me greatly. 
1. Agree Strongly 
2. Agree Moderately 
3. Agree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
298 
 
5. Disagree Somewhat 
6. Disagree Moderately 
7. Disagree Strongly 
Our way of life is seriously threatened by the forces of terrorism in the world. 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree Moderately 
3. Disagree Somewhat 
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5. Agree Somewhat 
6. Agree Moderately 
















Appendix W:  
Perceived Threat from Outgroups 
(adapted from Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra, Bettencourt, Ervin, Jackson, McNatt, & Renfro, 2002). 
Instructions: Please take a moment now to complete the following questions. 
 
This is a study of attitudes toward outgroups. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to 
understand the views toward people not from your ingroup. We are asking questions about some 
sensitive issues. We recognize that sometimes it is not easy to be completely frank and honest, 
but your answers will help us better understand attitudes toward these important issues. 
 
Obviously, there are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. All that matters is your 
own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely confidential. There is no identifying 
information on this questionnaire that would link the responses to you. 
 
In this section of the study, we will ask you to think about "OUTGROUPS." For the purposes of 
this study, an Outgroup is any group or groups of which you DO NOT class yourself as being a 
member of, or belonging to, and that you do not identify with. 
 
(click next to begin) 
 
1. Outgroups hold too many positions of power and responsibility in this country. 
o Disagree Strongly 
o Disagree Moderately 
o Disagree Somewhat 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Agree Somewhat 
o Agree Moderately 
o Agree Strongly 
 
2. Outgroups dominate American politics more than they should. 
3. When outgroups are in positions of authority, they discriminate against my group when   
making hiring decisions. 
4. Too much money is spent on educational programs that benefit outgroups. 
5. Outgroups have more economic power than they deserve in this country. 
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6. Outgroups receive too much of the money spent on healthcare and childcare. 
7. Too little money per student is spent on education for outgroups. 
8. The tax system favors outgroups. 
9. Many companies hire less qualified members of outgroups over more qualified members of my 
group.  
10. Outgroups have more political power than they deserve in this country. 
11. Public service agencies favor outgroups over my group. 
12. The legal system is more strict on outgroups than on my group. 
13. My group has very different values than outgroups. 
14. Outgroups have no right to think they have better values than my group. 
15. Outgroups want their rights to be put ahead of the rights of my group. 
16. Outgroups don’t understand the way my group views the world. 
17. Outgroups do not value the rights granted by the Constitution (life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) as much as my group does. 
18. Outgroups and my group have different family values. 
19. Outgroups don’t value the traditions of their group as much as 
 my group does. 
20. Outgroups regard themselves as morally superior to my group. 
21. The values of outgroups regarding work are different from those of my group. 
22. Most members of outgroups will never understand what members of my group are like. 
23. Outgroups should not try to impose their values on my group. 












Appendix X:  
Negative Bias Measure 
Note: Measure adapted based on Stephan et al. (2002) and coded on a 1-10 scale.   
Please indicate the degree to which you feel disapproval toward immigrants.  









9 Extreme disapproval  
  
Please indicate the degree to which you feel resentment toward immigrants.  









9 Extreme resentment  
 
Please indicate the degree to which you feel dislike toward immigrants.  











9 Extreme dislike  
Please indicate the degree to which you feel disdain toward immigrants.  









9 Extreme disdain  
Please indicate the degree to which you feel hatred toward immigrants.  









9 Extreme hatred 
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Appendix Y:  
Supplemental Material (Chapter 3) 
Table 1: Study 4.  Counterbalancing the order of measures.  
 
Order  Main Measures 




































































        



































7 Threat U-A SDO N. 
Cog4 




8 Threat SDO U-A N. 
Cog4 




9 U-A Threat SDO N. 
Cog4 




10 U-A SDO Threat N. 
Cog4 




11 SDO Threat U-A N. 
Cog4 




12 SDO U-A Threat N. 
Cog4 











Higher liberalism was significantly related to less System Threat (Hypothesis 3b), R2 = .09, β = -.31, t = -
4.58, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = -.25, 95%BCa CI [-.36, -.15], p < .001.  However, we did not 
replicate Jost et al.’s (2007) findings of Political Orientation predicting Death Avoidance (Hypothesis 3c), 
R2 = .01, β = -.11, t = -1.60 p = .111, with bootstrapped b = -.09, 95%BCa CI [-.19, .02], p = .101, or Fear 
of Death (Hypothesis 3d), R2 < .01, β = .05, t = 0.76, p = .448, with bootstrapped b = .04, 95%BCa CI [-
.06, .14], p = .444. 
 
 
Study 5:  
 
Higher liberalism was significantly related to less System Threat (Hypothesis 3b), R2 = .19, β = -.43, t = -








Mediations with perceived Symbolic Threat: 
Study 4: 
For the Political Orientation to Bias relationship, both Uncertainty-Avoidance (b = -.03, CI [-.06, -.01], 
CSIE = -.04) and Symbolic (meaning) Threat (b = -.26, CI [-.34, -.19], CSIE = -.36) were significant 




Figure S4. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Symbolic Threat and Uncertainty-















b = -.07, p = .005 
b = .75, p < .001 
b = .39, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.26, CI [-.34, -.19], CSIE = -.36 





For the Political Orientation to Bias relationship, both Uncertainty-Avoidance (b = -.05, CI [-.08, -.02], 
CSIE = -.06) and Generalized Symbolic (meaning) Threat (b = -.11, CI [-.17, -.06], CSIE = -.13) were 
significant mediators (Figure S2a). For the Political Orientation to Negative Bias relationship, both 
Uncertainty-Avoidance (b = -.05, CI [-.09, -.02], CSIE = -.05) and Generalized Symbolic (meaning) 




Figure S5a. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Generalized Symbolic Threat and 

















b = -.11, p < .001 
b = .39, p < .001 
b = .44, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.11, CI [-.17, -.06], CSIE = -.13 






Figure S5b. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Negative Bias with Generalized Symbolic 
Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence 
intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap. 
Study 6: 
For the Political Orientation to Bias relationship, both Uncertainty-Avoidance (b = -.02, CI [-.04, -.01], 
CSIE = -.03) and Symbolic (meaning) Threat (b = -.25, CI [-.32, -.19], CSIE = -.37) were significant 
mediators (Figure S6a). For the Political Orientation to Negative Bias relationship, both Uncertainty-
Avoidance (b = -.02, CI [-.04, -.01], CSIE = -.03) and Symbolic (meaning) Threat (b = -.25, CI [-.34, -
.18], CSIE = -.31) were significant mediators (Figure S6b). Finally, for the Political Orientation to Implicit 
Bias relationship, Uncertainty-Avoidance was non-significant (b = .001, CI [-.002, .006], CSIE = .01) 
















b = -.11, p < .001 
b = .51, p < .001 
b = .43, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.14, CI [-.21, -.09], CSIE = -.15 






Figure S6a. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Symbolic Threat and Uncertainty-




















b = -.09, p = .005 
b = .74, p < .001 
b = .24, p = .002 
Indirect, b = -.25, CI [-.32, -.19], CSIE = -.37 






Figure S6b. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Negative Bias with Symbolic Threat and 





















b = -.09, p < .001 
b = .75, p < .001 
b = .23, p = .019 
Indirect, b = -.25, CI [-.34, -.18], CSIE = -.31 







Figure S6c. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Implicit Bias with Symbolic Threat and 















b = -.09, p < .001 
b = .04, p = .006 
b = -.02, p = .429 
Indirect, b = -.01, CI [-.02, -.01], CSIE = -.10 




Mediations with Behavioural Helping variable: 
Study 4: 
For the Political Orientation to Behavioural Helping relationship, Uncertainty-Avoidance was non-
significant (b = .004, CI [-.025, .041]) while Threat (b = .19, CI [.06, .32]) was a significant mediator 




Figure b1. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Behavioural Helping with Threat and 
Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 














b = -.07, p = .005 
b = -.53, p = .005 
b = -.06, p = .782 
Indirect, b = .19, CI [.06, .32] 





For the Political Orientation to Behavioural Helping relationship, neither Uncertainty-Avoidance (b = 





Figure b2. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Behavioural Helping with Threat from 















b = -.11, p < .001 
b = .09, p = .392 
b = -.12, p = .489 
Indirect, b = -.03, CI [-.09, .04] 
Indirect, b = .01, CI [-.03, .05] 
 
